Building Leadership Effectiveness This program encourages leaders to develop practices that transform values into action, vision into realities, obstacles into innovations, and risks into rewards. Participants will be introduced to the five practices of exemplary leadership: modeling the way, inspiring a shared vision, challenging the process, enabling others to act, and encouraging the heart Coaching & Communicating for Performance Coaching & Communicating for Performance is a highly interactive program that will give supervisors and managers the opportunity to build skills that will enable them to share expectations and set objectives for employees, provide constructive feedback, more effectively engage in learning conversations, and coaching opportunities. Skillful Conflict Management for Leaders As a leader, it is important to understand conflict and be effective at conflict management because the way conflict is resolved becomes an integral component of our university’s culture. This series of conflict management sessions help leaders learn and put into practice effective strategies for managing conflict.

기독교 사역과 Leadership

Originally published in Contemporary Psychology: APA Review of Books, 1994, Vol 39(2), 225. Reviews the book, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion by John Zaller (1992). The author's commendable effort to specify a model of mass opinion formation offers readers an introduction to the prevailing vi

The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion.

The four Visegrad states — Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia (until 1993 Czechoslovakia) and Hungary — form a compact area between Germany and Austria in the west and the states of the former USSR in the east. They are bounded by the Baltic in the north and the Danube river in the south. They are cut by the Sudeten and Carpathian mountain ranges, which divide Poland off from the other states. Poland is an extension of the North European plain and like the latter is drained by rivers that flow from south to north west — the Oder, the Vlatava and the Elbe, the Vistula and the Bug. The Danube is the great exception, flowing from its source eastward, turning through two 90-degree turns to end up in the Black Sea, forming the barrier and often the political frontier between central Europe and the Balkans. Hungary to the east of the Danube is also an open plain. The region is historically and culturally part of western Europe, but its eastern Marches now represents a vital strategic zone between Germany and the core of the European Union to the west and the Russian zone to the east.

Economy and Society

What makes organizations so similar? We contend that the engine of rationalization and bureaucratization has moved from the competitive marketplace to the state and the professions. Once a set of organizations emerges as a field, a paradox arises: rational actors make their organizations increasingly similar as they try to change them. We describe three isomorphic processes-coercive, mimetic, and normative—leading to this outcome. We then specify hypotheses about the impact of resource centralization and dependency, goal ambiguity and technical uncertainty, and professionalization and structuration on isomorphic change. Finally, we suggest implications for theories of organizations and social change.

The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields (Chinese Translation)

Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace

While legitimacy dynamics are paramount in global governance, they have been insufficiently recognized, conceptualized, and explained in standard accounts of international cooperation. This special issue aims to advance the empirical study of legitimacy and legitimation in global governance. It engages with the question of when, how, and why international organizations (IOs) gain, sustain, and lose legitimacy in world politics. In this introduction, we first conceptualize legitimacy as the belief that an IO’s authority is appropriately exercised, and legitimation and delegitimation as processes of justification and contestation intended to shape such beliefs. We then discuss sources of variation in legitimation processes and legitimacy beliefs, with a particular focus on the authority, procedures, and performances of IOs. Finally, we describe the methods used to empirically study legitimacy and legitimation, preview the articles of the special issue, and chart next steps for this research agenda.

/pdf/the-legitimacy-and-legitimation-of-international-45b2s6oywq.pdf

The Legitimacy and Legitimation of International Organizations: Introduction and Framework

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Compliance Bargaining in the European Union

Conclusion: Rationalist and Sociological Perspectives on the EU Presidency

The exercise of leadership by the chairs of multilateral negotiations so far has received limited systematic attention in scholarship on international cooperation. This article addresses this gap by presenting a rational institutionalist theory of formal leadership that provides answers to three central questions: Why do states delegate powers of process control to the chairmanship of international negotiations? What are the power resources of formal leaders? When, why, and how do negotiation chairs wield influence over the outcomes of multilateral bargaining? The theory suggests that chairmanships are empowered to fulfill functions of agenda management, brokerage, and representation in international bargaining; identifies procedural control and privileged information as essential power resources of negotiation chairs; and isolates the conditions under which formal leaders shape the efficiency and distributional implications of multilateral bargaining. The article ends by outlining an alternative theoretical approach to formal leadership, drawn from sociological institutionalism.

Formal Leadership in Multilateral Negotiations: A Rational Institutionalist Theory

The most broadly shared conclusion in scholarship on dispute settlement, legalization and compliance over the past two decades is probably the virtue of granting private actors access to international courts and tribunals. Yet for all its benefits, private access is not a universally available and effective institutional design option. This chapter shows that IGOs sometimes compensate for these limits by turning to a strategy of orchestration, and identifies the conditions under which this takes place. Where procedures for private enforcement are lacking, orchestration can offer a substitute, as when IGOs independently create mechanisms for compliance complaints. Where such procedures exist but private actors face resource barriers, orchestration can offer a complement, as when IGOs provide funding and training to potential litigants. This chapter argues that orchestration of enforcement in both its variants will only happen when three necessary conditions are fulfilled: a) IGOs lack sufficient capabilities to effectively enforce compliance through other governance means; b) private actors hold privileged information about state compliance; and c) IGOs enjoy a capacity for independent action, as shaped by entrepreneurial resources and state oversight.

Jonas Tallberg

Papers

The Legitimacy and Legitimation of International Organizations: Introduction and Framework

Compliance Bargaining in the European Union

Conclusion: Rationalist and Sociological Perspectives on the EU Presidency

Formal Leadership in Multilateral Negotiations: A Rational Institutionalist Theory

Orchestrating enforcement : international organizations mobilizing compliance constituencies