Series Editor's Introduction Preface Acknowledgments 1. The Idea of Agent-Based Modeling 1.1 Agent-Based Modeling 1.2 Some Examples 1.3 The Features of Agent-Based Modeling 1.4 Other Related Modeling Approaches 2. Agents, Environments, and Timescales 2.1 Agents 2.2 Environments 2.3 Randomness 2.4 Time 3. Using Agent-Based Models in Social Science Research 3.1 An Example of Developing an Agent-Based Model 3.2 Verification: Getting Rid of the Bugs 3.3 Validation 3.4 Techniques for Validation 3.5 Summary 4. Designing and Developing Agent-Based Models 4.1 Modeling Toolkits, Libraries, Languages, Frameworks, and Environments 4.2 Using NetLogo to Build Models 4.3 Building the Collectivities Model Step by Step 4.4 Planning an Agent-Based Model Project 4.5 Reporting Agent-Based Model Research 4.6 Summary 5. Advances in Agent-Based Modeling 5.1 Geographical Information Systems 5.2 Learning 5.3 Simulating Language Resources Glossary References Index About the Author

What are agent-based models?

Emile Durkheim His Life and Work: A Historical and Critical Study

During the past decade,social mechanisms have become one of the central issues in the philosophy of social science,and relevant research has witnessed significant advancements.However,the question of what exactly constitutes social mechanisms has not reached much consensus,and there is no shortage of conflicting views.Based on a survey of mechanism-based social science research,five characteristics of social mechanisms can be identified:(1) Social mechanisms are means for explanation.(2) Social mechanisms entail causality.(3) Social mechanisms are a response to,revision of,and refutation of covering laws in social sciences.(4) Social mechanisms have multiple levels.(5) Social mechanisms welcome conceptualizations and analyses of temporality.

What are Social Mechanisms

Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification.

Pay what you want PWYW can be an attractive marketing strategy to price discriminate between fair-minded and selfish customers, to fully penetrate a market without giving away the product for free, and to undercut competitors that use posted prices. We report on laboratory experiments that identify causal factors determining the willingness of buyers to pay voluntarily under PWYW. Furthermore, to see how competition affects the viability of PWYW, we implement markets in which a PWYW seller competes with a traditional seller. Finally, we endogenize the market structure and let sellers choose their pricing strategy. The experimental results show that outcome-based social preferences and strategic considerations to keep the seller in the market can explain why and how much buyers pay voluntarily to a PWYW seller. We find that PWYW can be viable on a monopolistic market, but it is less successful as a competitive strategy because it does not drive traditional posted-price sellers out of the market. Instead, the existence of a posted-price competitor reduces buyers' payments and prevents the PWYW seller from fully penetrating the market. When given the choice, most sellers opt for setting a posted price rather than a PWYW pricing strategy. We discuss the implications of these results for the use of PWYW as a marketing strategy.

Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.1946 .

This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics.

https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/105122/1/cesifo_wp5069.pdf

Pay What You Want as a Marketing Strategy in Monopolistic and Competitive Markets

Prosocial motivations and reciprocity are becoming increasingly important in social-science research. While laboratory experiments have challenged the assumption of universal selfishness, the exter...

How much would you like to pay? Trust, reciprocity and prosocial motivations in El trato

We agree with the other participants in this debate that an experimental approach makes a significant contribution to our understanding of universal basic income (UBI) schemes, as there is a limit to what we can learn from surveys, simulations or studying existing welfare policies that only marginally resemble a UBI. However, we differ from others advocating the use of experiments in terms of the specific design of a UBI experiment. In particular, we want to urge a note of caution against conducting large-scale social or field experiments (along the lines of the famous negative income tax (NIT) experiments carried out in the US and Canada in the 1970s) advanced in recent years by Loek Groot (2004; 2006), Rafael Pinilla (2006), and many others. We think there are two distinct, if related, reasons why one might take a sceptical attitude towards field experiments in this particular context. First, field

A Plea for the Use of Laboratory Experiments in Basic Income Research

L’analyse du comportement fiscal est un domaine de recherche qui suscite un interet croissant dans les sciences humaines et sociales. La theorie du choix rationnel a ete traditionnellement mobilisee pour rendre compte de ce comportement mais elle se trouve face a l’enigme de devoir expliquer un niveau de contribution fiscale bien plus eleve que celui attendu sous les hypotheses de cette theorie. Plusieurs mecanismes d’influence sociale ont ete proposes pour resoudre ce probleme. Dans cet article, nous discutons la litterature interdisciplinaire sur ce sujet et soutenons que les modeles a base d’agents artificiels sont un outil prometteur pour tester des theories et des hypotheses dans ce domaine de recherche. Afin d'illustrer cette affirmation, nous presentons SIMULFIS, un modele a base d’agents artificiels qui simule le respect de l’injonction fiscale. Il permet de combiner des mecanismes inspires de la theorie du choix rationnel a des mecanismes d’influence sociale dans le but d’engendrer les regularites macroscopiques derivant du comportement fiscal des acteurs. Nous presentons et discutons les resultats d’une experience virtuelle simple afin de montrer les potentialites du modele.

https://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=RFS_554_0765&download=1

Tax Compliance, Rational Choice, and Social Influence: An Agent-Based Model

For much of the last two decades, debate around the proposal of a universal basic income (BI) centered on arguing the ethical and economic case for instituting a policy that grants each adult citizen a guaranteed income as a right, without a means test or work requirement (Van Parijs 1992, 1995; Dowding et al. 2003; Standing 2005; Widerquist et al. 2005; Ackerman et al. 2006). The question of how to bring about such a policy—the question of political feasibility—has only recently gained traction amongst BI advocates. Leaving aside some notable exceptions, much work remains to be done to further our understanding of the challenges faced by BI advocates and the strategies available to overcome these. In this chapter, we aim to contribute to this enterprise by outlining an analytical framework to think about the political feasibility of BI in a more systematic manner.

José Antonio Noguera

Papers

How much would you like to pay? Trust, reciprocity and prosocial motivations in El trato

A Plea for the Use of Laboratory Experiments in Basic Income Research

Tax Compliance, Rational Choice, and Social Influence: An Agent-Based Model

On the Political Feasibility of Universal Basic Income: An Analytic Framework

Las relaciones entre estructura y política sociales: una propuesta teórica