Fog is an emergent architecture for computing, storage, control, and networking that distributes these services closer to end users along the cloud-to-things continuum. It covers both mobile and wireline scenarios, traverses across hardware and software, resides on network edge but also over access networks and among end users, and includes both data plane and control plane. As an architecture, it supports a growing variety of applications, including those in the Internet of Things (IoT), fifth-generation (5G) wireless systems, and embedded artificial intelligence (AI). This survey paper summarizes the opportunities and challenges of fog, focusing primarily in the networking context of IoT.

Fog and IoT: An Overview of Research Opportunities

This document provides guidance on how to secure Industrial Control Systems (ICS), including Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, Distributed Control Systems (DCS), and other control system configurations such as Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC), while addressing their unique performance, reliability, and safety requirements The document provides an overview of ICS and typical system topologies, identifies typical threats and vulnerabilities to these systems, and provides recommended security countermeasures to mitigate the associated risks

/pdf/guide-to-industrial-control-systems-ics-security-48jy3kri07.pdf

Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security

The development of a trustworthy smart grid requires a deeper understanding of potential impacts resulting from successful cyber attacks. Estimating feasible attack impact requires an evaluation of the grid's dependency on its cyber infrastructure and its ability to tolerate potential failures. A further exploration of the cyber-physical relationships within the smart grid and a specific review of possible attack vectors is necessary to determine the adequacy of cybersecurity efforts. This paper highlights the significance of cyber infrastructure security in conjunction with power application security to prevent, mitigate, and tolerate cyber attacks. A layered approach is introduced to evaluating risk based on the security of both the physical power applications and the supporting cyber infrastructure. A classification is presented to highlight dependencies between the cyber-physical controls required to support the smart grid and the communication and computations that must be protected from cyber attack. The paper then presents current research efforts aimed at enhancing the smart grid's application and infrastructure security. Finally, current challenges are identified to facilitate future research efforts.

Cyber–Physical System Security for the Electric Power Grid

The industrial internet of things (IIoT): An analysis framework

In the last years there has been an increasing interest in the security of process control and SCADA systems. Furthermore, recent computer attacks such as the Stuxnet worm, have shown there are parties with the motivation and resources to effectively attack control systems.While previous work has proposed new security mechanisms for control systems, few of them have explored new and fundamentally different research problems for securing control systems when compared to securing traditional information technology (IT) systems. In particular, the sophistication of new malware attacking control systems--malware including zero-days attacks, rootkits created for control systems, and software signed by trusted certificate authorities--has shown that it is very difficult to prevent and detect these attacks based solely on IT system information.In this paper we show how, by incorporating knowledge of the physical system under control, we are able to detect computer attacks that change the behavior of the targeted control system. By using knowledge of the physical system we are able to focus on the final objective of the attack, and not on the particular mechanisms of how vulnerabilities are exploited, and how the attack is hidden. We analyze the security and safety of our mechanisms by exploring the effects of stealthy attacks, and by ensuring that automatic attack-response mechanisms will not drive the system to an unsafe state.A secondary goal of this paper is to initiate the discussion between control and security practitioners--two areas that have had little interaction in the past. We believe that control engineers can leverage security engineering to design--based on a combination of their best practices--control algorithms that go beyond safety and fault tolerance, and include considerations to survive targeted attacks.

/pdf/attacks-against-process-control-systems-risk-assessment-6p1ukqbc92.pdf

Attacks against process control systems: risk assessment, detection, and response

http://www.unhas.ac.id/tahir/BAHAN-KULIAH/GBRP/TAHIR/SCADA/SCADA-3.pdf

Guide to Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) and Other Industrial Control System Security

The purpose of this document is to provide guidance for securing industrial control systems (ICS), including supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, distributed control systems (DCS), and other systems performing control functions. The document provides an overview of ICS and typical system topologies, identifies typical threats and vulnerabilities to these systems, and provides recommended security countermeasures to mitigate the associated risks. Because there are many different types of ICS with varying levels of potential risk and impact, the document provides a list of many different methods and techniques for securing ICS. The document should not be used purely as a checklist to secure a specific system. Readers are encouraged to perform a risk-based assessment on their systems and to tailor the recommended guidelines and solutions to meet their specific security, business and operational requirements. The scope of this document includes ICS that are typically used in the electric, water and wastewater, oil and natural gas, chemical, pharmaceutical, pulp and paper, food and beverage, and discrete manufacturing (automotive, aerospace, and durable goods) industries.

SP 800-82. Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security: Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, Distributed Control Systems (DCS), and other control system configurations such as Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC)

Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security: Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) Systems, Distributed Control Systems (DCS), and Other Control System Configurations Such as Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC): Recommendations of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, Final Public Draft

A new methodology for describing the safety of human–robot collaborations is presented. Taking a task-based perspective, a risk assessment of a collaborative robot system safety can be evaluated offline during the initial design stages. This risk assessment factors in such elements as tooling, the nature and duration of expected contacts, and any amortized transfer of pressures and forces onto a human operator. Risk assessments of example tasks are provided for illustrative purposes.

/pdf/characterizing-task-based-human-robot-collaboration-safety-3gmuzze9ml.pdf

Joseph A. Falco

Papers

Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security

Guide to Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) and Other Industrial Control System Security

SP 800-82. Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security: Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, Distributed Control Systems (DCS), and other control system configurations such as Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC)

Characterizing Task-Based Human–Robot Collaboration Safety in Manufacturing