We investigate whether income inequality affects subsequent growth in a cross-country sample for 1965-90, using the models of Barro (1997), Bleaney and Nishiyama (2002) and Sachs and Warner (1997), with negative results. We then investigate the evolution of income inequality over the same period and its correlation with growth. The dominating feature is inequality convergence across countries. This convergence has been significantly faster amongst developed countries. Growth does not appear to influence the evolution of inequality over time. Outline

https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/81822/1/02-28.pdf

Economic growth and income inequality

Are natural resources a “curse” or a “blessing”? The empirical evidence suggests either outcome is possible. The paper surveys a variety of hypotheses and supporting evidence for why some countries benefit and others lose from the presence of natural resources. These include that a resource bonanza induces appreciation of the real exchange rate, deindustrialization and bad growth prospects, and that these adverse effects are more severe in volatile countries with bad institutions and lack of rule of law, corruption, presidential democracies, and underdeveloped financial systems. Another hypothesis is that a resource boom reinforces rent grabbing and civil conflict especially if institutions are bad, induces corruption especially in non-democratic countries, and keeps in place bad policies. Finally, resource rich developing economies seem unable to successfully convert their depleting exhaustible resources into other productive assets. The survey also offers some welfare-based fiscal rules for harnessing resource windfalls in developed and developing economies.

Natural Resources: Curse or Blessing?

Why Men Rebel was first published in 1970 on the heels of a decade of political violence and protest not only in remote corners of Africa and Southeast Asia, but also at home in the United States. Forty years later, the world is riveted on uprisings in the Middle East, and the United States has been overtaken by a focus on international terrorism and a fascination with citizen movements at home and abroad. Do the arguments of 1970 apply today? Why Men Rebel lends new insight into contemporary challenges of transnational recruitment and organization, multimedia mobilization, and terrorism.

Why Men Rebel

A rapidly growing body of research examines whether human conflict can be affected by climatic changes. Drawing from archeology, criminology, economics, geography, history, political science, and psychology, we assemble and analyze the 60 most rigorous quantitative studies and document, for the first time, a remarkable convergence of results. We find strong causal evidence linking climatic events to human conflict across a range of spatial and temporal scales and across all major regions of the world. The magnitude of climate's influence is substantial: for each 1 standard deviation (1σ) change in climate toward warmer temperatures or more extreme rainfall, median estimates indicate that the frequency of interpersonal violence rises 4% and the frequency of intergroup conflict rises 14%. Because locations throughout the inhabited world are expected to warm 2-4σ by 2050, amplified rates of human conflict could represent a large and critical impact of anthropogenic climate change.

/pdf/quantifying-the-influence-of-climate-on-human-conflict-4mo6ysanym.pdf

Quantifying the influence of climate on human conflict

Are natural resources a "curse" or a "blessing" The empirical evidence suggests that either outcome is possible. This paper surveys a variety of hypotheses and supporting evidence for why some countries benefit and others lose from the presence of natural resources. These include that a resource bonanza induces appreciation of the real exchange rate, deindustrialization, and bad growth prospects, and that these adverse effects are more severe in volatile countries with bad institutions and lack of rule of law, corruption, presidential democracies, and underdeveloped financial systems. Another hypothesis is that a resource boom reinforces rent grabbing and civil conflict especially if institutions are bad, induces corruption especially in nondemocratic countries, and keeps in place bad policies. Finally, resource rich developing economies seem unable to successfully convert their depleting exhaustible resources into other productive assets. The survey also offers some welfare-based fiscal rules for harnessing resource windfalls in developed and developing economies.

/pdf/natural-resources-curse-or-blessing-43sxsn9q20.pdf

How do income shocks aect armed con‡ict? Theory suggests two op- posite eects. If labor is used to appropriate resources violently, higher wages may lower con‡ict by reducing labor supplied to appropriation. This is the opportunity cost eect. Alternatively, a rise in contestable income may increase violence by raising gains from appropriation. This is the rapacity eect. Our paper exploits exogenous price shocks in inter- national commodity markets and a rich dataset on civil war in Colombia to assess how dierent income shocks aect con‡ict. We examine changes in the price of agricultural goods (which are labor intensive) and natural resources (which are capital intensive). We focus on coee and oil, the two largest exports. We …nd that a sharp fall in coee prices in the 1990s increased violence dierentially in regions growing more coee, by lower- ing wages and the opportunity cost of joining armed groups. In contrast, a rise in oil prices increased violence dierentially in the oil region, by in- creasing municipal revenue siphoned through rapacity. This pattern holds in several other agricultural and natural resource sectors, providing robust evidence that price shocks aect con‡ict in opposite directions depending on the factor intensity of the commodity.

/pdf/commodity-price-shocks-and-civil-conflict-evidence-from-2faimkdsqp.pdf

Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence from Colombia

We present a detailed, high-frequency data set on the civil conflict in Colombia during the period 1988-2002. We briefly introduce the Colombian case and the methodological issues that hinder data collection in civil wars, before presenting the pat- tern over time of conflict actions and intensity for all sides involved in the confrontation. We also describe the pattern of victimisation by group and the victimisation of civilians out of clashes.

/pdf/the-dynamics-of-the-colombian-civil-conflict-a-new-data-set-56kbu48yed.pdf

The Dynamics of the Colombian Civil Conflict: A New Data Set 1

Anti-insurgent militias and states attempt to erode insurgent groups’ capacities and co-opt insurgent fighters by promising and providing benefits. They do so to create a perception that the insurgency is unraveling and to harness inside information to prosecute more effective counterinsurgency campaigns. Why do some insurgents defect to a paramilitary group and others exit the war by demobilizing, while still others remain loyal to their group? This article presents the first empirical analysis of these questions, connecting insurgents’ motivations for joining, wartime experiences, and organizational behavior with decisions to defect. A survey of ex-combatants in Colombia shows that individuals who joined for ideological reasons are less likely to defect overall but more likely to side-switch or demobilize when their group deviates from its ideological precepts. Among fighters who joined for economic reasons, political indoctrination works to decrease their chances of demobilization and defection to paramilitaries, while opportunities for looting decrease economically motivated combatants’ odds of defection.

https://cdn.ideaspaz.org/media/website/document/5670912ec7ba3.pdf

True Believers, Deserters, and Traitors: Who Leaves Insurgent Groups and Why

We present a detailed, high-frequency data set on the civil con?ict in Colombia during the period 1988u2002. We brie?y introduce the Colombian case and the methodological issues that hinder data collection in civil wars, before presenting the pattern over time of con?ict actions and intensity for all sides involved in the confrontation. We also describe the pattern of victimisation by group and the victimisation of civilians out of clashes.

The Dynamics of the Columbian Civil Conflict: A New Dataset

This article compares the treatment of Colombia in large cross-country conflict datasets with the information of a unique dataset on the Colombian conflict (CERAC). The big datasets display a strong tendency to record fewer killings than does CERAC. Moreover, when the big datasets provide annual time series on the conflict, these figures look either erratic or flat compared to CERAC's and often move in different directions. The article also examines the criteria of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) for dataset inclusion and finds them considerably more restrictive than CERAC's. The primary differences are that UCDP generally excludes attacks purely on civilians and any activity of illegal right-wing paramilitary groups. It is argued here that these omissions impoverish our perception of many civil wars. A calculated modified series based on UCDP methodology and CERAC raw information closes 56% of the gap between the two approaches. The remainder appears to derive mainly from a number of small events in CERAC but not UCDP, reflecting the limits of English-language press coverage of Colombia, upon which UCDP data is based. The gap with other big datasets is also closed. The dynamics of the lower-bound UCDP curve clearly resemble the modified CERAC curve, so UCDP does reasonably well on its own terms. A brief Northern Ireland case study is consistent with our Colombia conclusions. The article concludes with a recommendation for conflict researchers to prioritize the construction of more micro-datasets that will facilitate detailed studies of conflict intensity and its dynamics.

Juan F. Vargas

Papers

Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence from Colombia

The Dynamics of the Colombian Civil Conflict: A New Data Set 1

True Believers, Deserters, and Traitors: Who Leaves Insurgent Groups and Why

The Dynamics of the Columbian Civil Conflict: A New Dataset

Special Data Feature; The Severity of the Colombian Conflict: Cross-Country Datasets Versus New Micro-Data