Showing papers by "Justin L. Barrett published in 2008"
TL;DR: The authors argue that implicit beliefs are informed and constrained by the natural and cross-culturally recurrent operation of implicit cognitive systems, and that successful god concepts resonate with the expectations of these implicit systems but also have attention-demanding and inferentially-rich properties that allow their integration into various areas of human concern.
106 citations
TL;DR: Boyer's theory of counterintuitive cultural concept transmission as mentioned in this paper claims that concepts that violate naturally occurring intuitive knowledge structures enough to be attention-demanding but not so much to undermine conceptual coherence have a transmission advantage over other concepts (Boyer et al. 2001: 535-64).
Abstract: Boyer's theory of counterintuitive cultural concept transmission claims that concepts that ideas that violate naturally occurring intuitive knowledge structures enough to be attention-demanding but not so much to undermine conceptual coherence have a transmission advantage over other concepts (Boyer et al. 2001: 535-64). Because of the prominence of these counterintuitive concepts in religious belief systems, Boyer's theory features prominently in many cognitive treatments of religion. Difficulties in identifying what are and are not counterintuitive concepts in this technical sense, however, has made empirical treatment of Boyer's theory irregular and difficult to evaluate. Further, inability to quantify just how counterintuitive a given concept is has made ambiguous specifying where the alleged cognitive optimum lies. The present project attempts to clarify Boyer's theory and presents a formal system for coding and quantifying the "counterintuitiveness" of a concept, and hence, facilitates empirical scrutiny of the theory.
104 citations
TL;DR: In the cognitive science of religion, successful god concepts must possess a number of features such as counterintuitive, counterintuitiveness, intentional agent, possessing strategic information, able to act in the human world in detectable ways and capable of motivating behaviors that reinforce belief as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Through the lenses of cognitive science of religion, successful god concepts must possess a number of features. God concepts must be (1) counterintuitive, (2) an intentional agent, (3) possessing strategic information, (4) able to act in the human world in detectable ways and (5) capable of motivating behaviors that reinforce belief. That Santa Claus appears to be only inconsistently represented as having all five requisite features Santa has failed to develop a community of true believers and cult. Nevertheless, Santa concepts approximate a successful god concept more closely than other widespread cultural characters such as Mickey Mouse and the Tooth Fairy, in part explaining Santa's relative cultural prominence.
65 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, two studies were conducted that explored adults' intuitions about the relationship between minds and bodies and explored how participants reason about the effects of a hypothetical mind-migration across a range of behaviours.
Abstract: To investigate possible cognitive factors influencing the cross-cultural incidence of spirit possession concepts and to develop a more refined understanding of the precise contours of 'intuitive mind-body dualism' (Bloom, 2004), two studies were conducted that explored adults' intuitions about the relationship between minds and bodies. Specifically, the studies explored how participants reason about the effects of a hypothetical mind-migration across a range of behaviours. Both studies used hypothetical mind-transfer scenarios in which the mind of one person ("Beth") is transferred into the body of another person ("Ann"). Participants were asked to reason about the new post-transfer person's behaviours and aptitudes. In Study 1, participants ( n =25) were provided with a scale on which they indicated their answers; in Study 2, participants ( n =26) responded to open-ended questions. In both studies, the majority of participants reasoned that while the post-transfer person's performance on physical tasks (e.g., sprinting) would be similar to the host (i.e., Ann) performance on mental tasks (e.g., story-telling) would be similar to the person whose mind has been transferred (i.e., Beth). Further, participants tended to assume a complete displacement of minds, such that the post-transfer person's performance on mental task items was reasoned to be identical to incoming person's performance normally. The relevance of these findings for explaining the variable incidence and spread of different possession concepts is discussed.
53 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the cognitive underpinnings of cross-culturally recurrent forms of possession belief are investigated and it is shown that successful possession concepts (e.g., those that entail the effective displacement of the host's agency by the possessing spirit's agency) emerge and spread, in part, because they effectively exploit universal cognitive mechanisms that deal with our everyday social and physical worlds and that this contributes to their enhanced incidence, communicability, memorability, and inferential potential relative to less cognitively optimal, less widespread possession concepts.
Abstract: We report the findings of a programmatic series of studies designed to investigate the cognitive underpinnings of cross-culturally recurrent forms of possession belief. Possession phenomena are frequently portrayed in the anthropological literature as incompatible with common cultural assumptions and biases guiding Western notions of “self” and “personhood” and as resisting generalization and explication in comparative theoretical analysis. Our findings concerning the cognitive capacities and constraints that facilitate the emergence and transmission of possession concepts support the position that certain fundamental aspects of these concepts' forms are explainable in terms of ordinary, panhuman cognitive function. Ethnographic and experimental data indicate that successful possession concepts (e.g., those that entail the effective displacement of the host's agency by the possessing spirit's agency) emerge and spread, in part, because they effectively exploit universal cognitive mechanisms that deal with our everyday social and physical worlds and that this contributes to their enhanced incidence, communicability, memorability, and inferential potential relative to less “cognitively optimal,” less widespread possession concepts. [spirit possession, cognitive science of culture, cultural transmission, Afro-Brazilian religion, mind-body dualism]
44 citations
01 Jan 2008
TL;DR: In this paper, the cognitive underpinnings of cross-culturally recurrent forms of possession belief are investigated and it is shown that successful possession concepts (e.g., those that entail the effective displacement of the host's agency by the possessing spirit's agency) emerge and spread, in part, because they effectively exploit universal cognitive mechanisms that deal with our everyday social and physical worlds and that this contributes to their enhanced incidence, communicability, memorability, and inferential po- tential relative to less ''cognitively optimal'' less widespread possession concepts.
Abstract: We report the findings of a programmatic series of studies designed to investigate the cognitive underpinnings of cross-culturally recurrent forms of possession belief. Possession phenome- na are frequently portrayed in the anthropological literature as incompatible with common cultural assumptions and biases guiding Western notions of ''self'' and ''personhood'' and as resisting gen- eralization and explication in comparative theoretical analysis. Our findings concerning the cognitive capacities and constraints that facilitate the emergence and transmission of possession concepts support the position that certain fundamental aspects of these concepts' forms are explain- able in terms of ordinary, panhuman cognitive function. Ethnographic and experimental data indicate that successful possession concepts (e.g., those that entail the effective displacement of the host's agency by the possessing spirit's agency) emerge and spread, in part, because they effectively exploit universal cognitive mechanisms that deal with our everyday social and physical worlds and that this contributes to their enhanced incidence, communicability, memorability, and inferential po- tential relative to less ''cognitively optimal,'' less widespread possession concepts. (spirit possession, cognitive science of culture, cultural transmission, Afro-Brazilian religion, mind-body dualism) In this article we present the findings of a series of controlled studies designed to explore specifically why possession beliefs take the forms they do, and why certain possession beliefs enjoy more widespread transmissive success than others. Our research agenda stems from a number of observations raised by the ethnographic literature on spirit possession and me- diumship. This vast literature reveals many different varieties of possession belief. The reported configurations of minds, spirits, agencies, and bodies in space and time, and the variable contexts in which possession phenomena arise, appear so dissimilar as to call into question the existence of any important cross-cultural recurrences. Nevertheless, deeper analysis reveals that the range of possession beliefs that may be encountered cross-culturally rest on certain key assumptions.
2 citations
01 Jun 2008
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors use theories and evidence taken from the cognitive science of religion (CSOR) to hypothesize that human minds may interact with VR-hosted phenomena in a manner highly similar to that in which they interact with supernatural concepts.
Abstract: Virtual reality (VR) is often described as a gateway to a religious or spiritual experience - but why? In this article, using theories and evidence taken from the cognitive science of religion (CSOR), we hypothesize that human minds may interact with VR-hosted phenomena in a manner highly similar to that in which they interact with supernatural concepts. Specifically, we note that both VR inputs and supernatural concepts contain information that (1) contradicts the intuitive set of expectations we bring to an ontological category of phenomena (for example, natural objects, animals) and (2) allows us to draw a superabundance of inferences from our social cognitive mechanisms with minimal effort. We then summarize these points by illustrating a common VR phenomenon - 'virtual touch' - wherein counterintuitive representations and strategic information coalesce to create an emotionally salient experience that is itself counterintuitive and by some accounts spiritual-like.
2 citations