This paper describes the Multiagent Systems Engineering (MaSE) methodology. MaSE is a general purpose, methodology for developing heterogeneous multiagent systems. MaSE uses a number of graphically based models to describe system goals, behaviors, agent types, and agent communication interfaces. MaSE also provides a way to specify architecture-independent detailed definition of the internal agent design. An example of applying the MaSE methodology is also presented.

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Multiagent systems engineering

To solve complex problems, agents work cooperatively with other agents in heterogeneous environments. We are interested in coordinating the local behavior of individual agents to provide an appropriate system-level behavior. The use of intelligent agents provides an even greater amount of flexibility to the ability and configuration of the system itself. With these new intricacies, software development is becoming increasingly difficult. Therefore, it is critical that our processes for building the inherently complex distributed software that must run in this environment be adequate for the task. This paper introduces a methodology for designing these systems of interacting agents.

/pdf/an-overview-of-the-multiagent-systems-engineering-3n6awq76e8.pdf

An Overview of the Multiagent Systems Engineering Methodology

We consider the problem of designing (perhaps massively distributed) collectives of computational processes to maximize a provided "world utility" function. We consider this problem when the behavior of each process in the collective can be cast as striving to maximize its own payoff utility function. For such cases the central design issue is how to initialize/update those payoff utility functions of the individual processes so as to induce behavior of the entire collective having good values of the world utility. Traditional "team game" approaches to this problem simply assign to each process the world utility as its payoff utility function. In previous work we used the "Collective Intelligence" (COIN) framework to derive a better choice of payoff utility functions, one that results in world utility performance up to orders of magnitude superior to that ensuing from the use of the team game utility. In this paper, we extend these results using a novel mathematical framework. Under that new framework we review the derivation of the general class of payoff utility functions that both (i) are easy for the individual processes to try to maximize, and (ii) have the property that if good values of them are achieved, then we are assured a high value of world utility. These are the "Aristocrat Utility" and a new variant of the "Wonderful Life Utility" that was introduced in the previous COIN work. We demonstrate experimentally that using these new utility functions can result in significantly improved performance over that of previously investigated COIN payoff utilities, over and above those previous utilities' superiority to the conventional team game utility. These results also illustrate the substantial superiority of these payoff functions to perhaps the most natural version of the economics technique of "endogenizing externalities."

/pdf/optimal-payoff-functions-for-members-of-collectives-g8ojgtbyw0.pdf

Optimal payoff functions for members of collectives

generalized interactions flexible acquaintances/interactions reactive capabilities pro-active capabilities

Return from the ant synthetic ecosystems for manufacturing control

Multiagent systems is an expanding field that blends classical fields like game theory and decentralized control with modern fields like computer science and machine learning. This monograph provides a concise introduction to the subject, covering the theoretical foundations as well as more recent developments in a coherent and readable manner. The text is centered on the concept of an agent as decision maker. Chapter 1 is a short introduction to the field of multiagent systems. Chapter 2 covers the basic theory of singleagent decision making under uncertainty. Chapter 3 is a brief introduction to game theory, explaining classical concepts like Nash equilibrium. Chapter 4 deals with the fundamental problem of coordinating a team of collaborative agents. Chapter 5 studies the problem of multiagent reasoning and decision making under partial observability. Chapter 6 focuses on the design of protocols that are stable against manipulations by self-interested agents. Chapter 7 provides a short introduction to the rapidly expanding field of multiagent reinforcement learning. The material can be used for teaching a half-semester course on multiagent systems covering, roughly, one chapter per lecture.

A Concise Introduction to Multiagent Systems and Distributed Artificial Intelligence

Agent-based systems technology has generated lots of excitement in recent years because of its promise as a new paradigm for conceptualizing, designing, and implementing software systems. This promise is particularly attractive for creating software that operates in environments that are distributed and open, such as the internet. Currently, the great majority of agent-based systems consist of a single agent. However, as the technology matures and addresses increasingly complex applications, the need for systems that consist of multiple agents that communicate in a peer-to-peer fashion is becoming apparent. Central to the design and effective operation of such multiagent systems (MASs) are a core set of issues and research questions that have been studied over the years by the distributed AI community. In this article, I present some of the critical notions in MASs and the research work that has addressed them. I organize these notions around the concept of problem-solving coherence, which I believe is one of the most critical overall characteristics that an MAS should exhibit.

K. P. Sycara

Papers

Multiagent systems : Special issue on agents