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The Theory of Industrial Organization

หนงสอ Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction เขยนโดย Colin F. Camerer มวตถประสงคเพอนำเสนอหลกฐานเชงประจกษจากผลการวจยจำนวนมากมายทยนยนอทธพลของปจจยทางจตวทยาทมผลตอการตดสนใจตามทฤษฎเกม หนงสอ เลมนไดนำเสนอแนวคดทฤษฎทเพมความสามารถในการอธบายพฤตกรรมการตดสนใจตามทฤษฎเกม (Game theory) ซง von Neumann; & Morgenstern ไดเสนอไวในป ค.ศ. 1944 โดยชใหเหนวา ปจจยทางจตวทยามอทธพลทำใหการตดสนใจทเกดขนจรงคลาดเคลอนจากการคาดการณของทฤษฎเกม

Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction

The Theory of Incentives I: The Principal-Agent Model

Over the past two decades, academic economics has undergone a mild revolution in methodology. The language, concepts and techniques of noncooperative game theory have become central to the discipline. This book provides the reader with some basic concepts from noncooperative theory, and then goes on to explore the strengths, weaknesses, and future of the theory as a tool of economic modelling and analysis. The central theses are that noncooperative game theory has been a remarkably popular tool in economics over the past decade because it allows analysts to capture essential features of dynamic competition and competition where some parties have proprietary information. The theory is weakest in providing a sense of when it - and equilibrium analysis in particular - can be applied and what to do when equilibrium analysis is inappropriate. Many of these weaknesses can be addressed by the consideration of individuals who are boundedly rational and learn imperfectly from the past. Written in a non-technical style and working by analogy, the book, first given as part of the Clarendon Lectures in Economics, is readily accessible to a broad audience and will be of interest to economists and students alike. Knowledge of game theory is not required as the concepts are developed as the book progresses.

Game Theory and Economic Modelling

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Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do And Why They Do It

We investigate a differentiated mixed duopoly in which private and public firms can choose to strategically set prices or quantities when unions are present. For the case of a unionised mixed duopoly, there exists a dominant strategy only for the public firm that chooses Bertrand competition irrespective of whether the goods are substitutes or complements; there is no dominant strategy for a private firm. Thus, we show that regardless of the nature of goods, social welfare under Bertrand competition is always determined in equilibrium, wherein Bertrand competition entails higher social welfare than Cournot competition. Moreover, our main results hold irrespective of the nature of goods, with the exception that when a sufficiently large parameter of complements is employed, the ranking of a private firm's profit is not reversed, which is in contrast to the standard findings.

Price and quantity competition in a unionised mixed duopoly: the cases of substitutes and complements*

By incorporating port competition into a third-market model consisting of two exporting firms and one importing country, we demonstrate the endogenous choice of port structures (i.e. privatization or public ownership) under either Bertrand or Cournot competition. In contrast to previous studies on port competition, we analyze the port strategy in view of all trading countries (i.e. importing country and exporting countries). We find that regardless of transport cost, the port ownership strategy alters according to exporting firm’s competition mode. Under Bertrand competition, the choice of port ownership structure depends on the degree of imperfect substitutability. However, under Cournot competition, all trading countries choose same ownership structures of each port. By comparing equilibrium of each competition mode, we show that welfare of exporting country under Cournot competition is higher than under Bertrand competition if goods are sufficiently substitutes. In contrast, importing country p...

Port privatization under Cournot vs. Bertrand competition: a third-market approach

This paper examines the endogenous choice of competition mode with strategic export policies in vertically related markets when each upstream firm located in each country determines the terms of th...

A reappraisal of strategic trade policies with the endogenous mode of competition under vertical structures

Welfare-improving vertical separation with network externality

This paper presents a theoretical investigation on trade and port policies, at a substantial level of abstraction. Applying an import-competing trade model, we examine the effect of port ownership on port charges, firm profits, and social welfare. We show that, depending on transport costs, the home country has different preferences in choosing port ownership under free trade. However, the foreign country always prefers to privatize its port rather than keep it public under free trade. Moreover, under a trade tariff regime, we find that the home country chooses port privatization, regardless of transport costs, while the foreign country always prefers public ownership to port privatization. Thus, a comparison of free trade and the trade tariff regime reveals the following: (i) the welfare of the home country choosing port privatization is always greater under a trade tariff regime and (ii) the welfare of the foreign country may decrease or increase, depending on the transport costs and the degree of imperfect substitutability, which in turn depend on the ownership structure of ports. From the viewpoint of port’s profit, a privatized port is never allowed to run a deficit, whereas a public port is. This result shows that a privatized port focuses more on profit than on trade volume, while the opposite is true in the case of a public port. It is hoped that our line of thinking, admittedly abstract, or even bold if taken at face value, could provide some useful input to the complex decision-making processes involved in real life port policy formulation.

Kangsik Choi

Papers

Price and quantity competition in a unionised mixed duopoly: the cases of substitutes and complements*

Port privatization under Cournot vs. Bertrand competition: a third-market approach

A reappraisal of strategic trade policies with the endogenous mode of competition under vertical structures

Welfare-improving vertical separation with network externality

Tariff protection and port privatization: An import-competing approach