The sovereignty of good

hovering above lived realities, passive, waiting for God to accomplish things, or repressive, denying the realities of present suffering, but calls Christians to practice ‘pathic’ hope-in-action imbued with the Source of all Life. It is in this third movement forwards that the ‘church’ practices public, participatory witness-in-action. 5.3.1 Created for freedom reforming our understanding. Moltmann demonstrates a consistent concern with freedom. He points specifically to the need for “freedom from: systems of oppression but he is also concerned about “freedoms for” as 463 He suggests that oppressors are also trapped in these deformed relations as inhumane oppressors, exploiters, alienators, apathetic and godless alongside the oppressed, exploited, alienated, godforsaken and dehumanised.(1974/2001:343-344, 1979b:24). 464 Moltmann has engaged with Pentecostal movements, seeing their openness to the Spirit as a place for church renewal as well as being critical of the ways in which many strands promote individualised understandings of the person and distorted utopias of affluence. 465 Moltmann contrasts the ‘utopias of the status quo’ of success, power and happiness that can lead to forms of apathy in relation to change, with ‘utopias of justice’ with its ‘Sitz im Leben’ in the suffering of the present and which hopes instead for change. (1976c:24).

Reimagining the human : the role of the churches in building a liberatory human rights culture in South Africa today.

2373. [online] Available at: https://www.mattek.com/referencelibrary/ identification-of-endocrine-disruptors-using-an-organotypic-vaginal-tissuemodel/ [Accessed 6 August 2017]. Ayehunie, S., Landry, T., Hayden, P. and Klausner M. (2016). Pre-validation of in vitro in vivo assays for vaginal irritation. In: Society of Toxicology 2016 Annual Meeting. [online] Available at: https://www.mattek.com/join-us-at-sot-2016/ [Accessed 6 August 2017]. Baumgartl-Simons, C. (2017). Das Ende muss endlich wirksam verfolgt werden. Tierrechte, 02, p. 4. [online] Available at: https://www.tierrechte.de/images/stories/ Presse_und_Magazin_Tierrechte/Magazin_2-17_.pdf [Accessed 11 January 2018]. BfR (2017a). Nationaler Ausschuss Tierschutzgesetz – BfR. [online] Available at: http://www .bfr.bund.de/de/nationaler_ausschuss_tierschutzgesetz.html [Accessed 2 August 2017]. Kathrin Herrmann and Kimberley Jayne 978-90-04-39119-2 Downloaded from Brill.com11/11/2019 09:57:08PM via free access Baumgartl-Simons and Hohensee 116  BfR (2017b). Fragen und Antworten zum Deutschen Zentrum zum Schutz von Versuchstieren (Bf3R). [online] Available at: http://www.bfr.bund.de/cm/343/fragenundantworten-zum-deutschen-zentrum-zum-schutz-von-versuchstieren-bf3r.pdf [Accessed 4 August 2017]. BMBF (2011). Bekanntmachung des Bundesministeriums für Bildung und Forschung von Richtlinien zur Förderung „e:Bio – Innovationswettbewerb Systembiologie” Vom 17. Dezember 2010. [online] Available at: https://www.bmbf.de/foerderungen/ bekanntmachung.php?B=608 [Accessed 4 August 2017]. BMBF (2015a). Bekanntmachung des Bundesministeriums für Bildung und Forschung von Richtlinien zur Förderung der “Multilateralen Zusammenarbeit in Computational Neuroscience: Deutschland – USA – Israel – Frankreich” Vom 16. Juli 2015. [online] Available at: https://www.bmbf.de/foerderungen/bekanntmachung-1068.html [Accessed 4 August 2017]. BMBF (2015b). Bekanntmachung: Richtlinie zur Förderung von “Alternativmethoden zum Tierversuch”. Bundesanzeiger vom 24.12.2015. [online] Available at: https://www. bmbf.de/foerderungen/bekanntmachung.php?B=1124 [Accessed 6 August 2017]. BMBF (2016). Lebenswissenschaftliche Grundlagenforschung Alternativen zum Tierversuch. [online] Available at: https://www.bmbf.de/de/alternativen-zum-tierversuch -412.html [Accessed 6 August 2017]. Buchmann Institute for Molecular Life Sciences (2017). BMLS – Drug Delivery and 3R-models. [online] Available at: https://www.bmls.de/Drug_Delivery_and_3RModels/people.html [Accessed 6 August 2017]. Bundesministerium für Justiz und Verbraucherschutz (2017). §46 TierSchVersV – Einzelnorm. [online] Available at: http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/tierschversv/__46. html [Accessed 4 August 2017]. Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie (2017). Förderdatenbank – Inhaltsverzeichnis. [online] Available at: http://www.foerderdatenbank.de/Foerder-DB/ Navigation/Foerderrecherche/inhaltsverzeichnis.html?get=ea6079646dcbaff07 8c1252f0af299d6;views;document&doc=13310 [Accessed 4 August 2017]. CAAT (n.d. a). CAAT History. [online] Available at: http://caat.jhsph.edu/about/history .html [Accessed 26 July 2018]. CAAT (n.d. b). About Us: Center for Alternatives to Animal Testing. [online] Available at: http://caat.jhsph.edu/about/index.html [Accessed 26 July 2018]. Chen, S., S.E. Palma-Vera, M. Langhammer, S.P. Galuska, B.C. Braun, E. Krause, A. Lucas-Hahn and J. Schoen (2017). An Air-liquid Interphase Approach for Modeling the Early Embryo-maternal Contact Zone. Scientific Reports, 7, 42298 [online] Available at: https://www.nature.com/articles/srep42298 [Accessed 12 February 2018]. Committee on Toxicity Testing and Assessment of Environmental Agents (2007). Toxicity Testing in the 21st Century: A Vision and a Strategy. [online] Available at: http:// Kathrin Herrmann and Kimberley Jayne 978-90-04-39119-2 Downloaded from Brill.com11/11/2019 09:57:08PM via free access 117 How Can the Final Goal of Completely Replacing Animal  dels.nas.edu/resources/static-assets/materials-based-on-reports/reports-in-brief/ Toxicity_Testing_final.pdf [Accessed 5 August 2017]. Cosmetics Europe (2017). Promoting Science and Research. [online] Available at: https:// www.cosmeticseurope.eu/how-we-take-action/promoting-science-research/ [Accessed 4 August 2017]. Cronin, M. (2017). Non-animal Approaches — The Way Forward. Report on a European Commission Scientific Conference. Brussels, Belgium. December 6–7, 2016. [online] Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/chemicals/lab_animals/3r/ pdf/scientific_conference/non_animal_approaches_conference_report.pdf [Accessed 26 July 2018]. Der Regierende Bürgermeister – Senatskanzlei Berlin (2017). Senat beschließt Entwurf des Charité-Vertrages 2018–2022. Pressemitteilung [online] Available at: https://www. berlin.de/rbmskzl/aktuelles/pressemitteilungen/2017/pressemitteilung.617676. php#search=%22Tierversuch*%22 [Accessed 4 August 2017]. DFG (2017). Hochdurchsatzverfahren: DFG fördert moderne Forschungsinfrastrukturen in den Lebenswissenschaften. [online] Available at: http://www.dfg.de/service/ presse/pressemitteilungen/2017/pressemitteilung_nr_28/index.html [Accessed 6 August 2017]. Eddie, S.L., J.J. Kim, T.K. Woodruff and J.E. Burdette (2015). Microphysiological Modeling of the Reproductive Tract: A Fertile Endeavor. Experimental Biology and Medicine, 239(9), pp. 1192–1202. EPAA (2017). European Partnership for Alternative Approaches to Animal Testing – Wachstum – European Commission. [online] Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/ growth/sectors/chemicals/epaa_de [Accessed 6 August 2017]. Epithelix (2017). Toxicity of Inhaled Products: Acute, Long Term or Repeated Dose Testing of Drugs/Formulations or Xenobiotics on Reconstructed Human Airway Tissues (MucilAirTM). [online] Available at: http://www.epithelix.com/services/toxicity-ofinhaled-products [Accessed 6 August 2017]. Esch, E.W., A. Bahinski and D. Huh (2015). Organs-on-Chips at the Frontiers of Drug Discovery. Nature Reviews Drug Discovery 14, pp. 248–260. Ettel, A. (2018). Es wird nicht möglich sein, Tierversuche zu ersetzen. Welt. [online] Available at: https://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article173493400/Tierversuche-Laengstnicht-alle-Tests-dienen-der-Forschung.html [Accessed 13 Feb. 2018]. EU-NETVAL (2018). EU-NETVAL (European Union Network of Laboratories for the Validation of Alternative Methods). [online] Available at: https://eurl-ecvam.jrc. ec.europa.eu/eu-netval [Accessed 12 February 2018]. EU-ToxRisk (2016). EU-ToxRisk – An integrated European “Flagship” Program Driving Mechanism-based Toxicity Testing and Risk Assessment for the 21st Century. [online] Available at: http://www.eu-toxrisk.eu/ [Accessed

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Animal Experimentation: Working Towards a Paradigm Change

Willful ignorance is an important concept in criminal law and jurisprudence, though it has not received much discussion in philosophy. When it is mentioned, however, it is regularly assumed to be a kind of self-deception. In this article I will argue that self-deception and willful ignorance are distinct psychological kinds. First, some examples of willful ignorance are presented and discussed, and an analysis of the phenomenon is developed. Then it is shown that current theories of self-deception give no support to the idea that willful ignorance is a kind of self-deception. Afterwards an independent argument is adduced for excluding willful ignorance from this category. The crucial differences between the two phenomena are explored, as are the reasons why they are so easily conflated.

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Willful ignorance and self-deception

Dans cette these, nous partons des grands principes de justice pour demontrer la necessite d’octroyer aux etres sensibles nonhumains les droits moraux et legaux les plus fondamentaux. Dans un premier temps, nous nous penchons sur les principes sous-jacents aux droits fondamentaux de la personne : le principe d’egalite voulant que les cas similaires soient traites de maniere similaire; la notion de droit fondamental, qui repose sur celle d’interet; le principe de l’egale consideration des interets auquel mene le principe d’egalite; et, enfin, le concept d’interet, qui s’applique a tous les etres sensibles. Cette premiere partie etablit l’exigence d’accorder les droits les plus fondamentaux a tous les etres possedant les interets que ces droits visent a proteger. Cela permet d’etudier trois droits particuliers et les interets qui les sous-tendent en examinant d’abord le droit a l'integrite physique. Nous montrons que de nombreux animaux nonhumains sont des etres sensibles, que tous les etres sensibles ont, par definition, interet a ne pas souffrir et que, pour cette raison, ils devraient jouir du droit a l’integrite physique. Le troisieme chapitre est consacre au droit a la vie. Nous soutenons qu’il est raisonnable de supposer que tous les etres sensibles, parce qu’ils peuvent jouir des bonnes choses de la vie, ont un certain interet a perseverer dans leur existence, interet qui, peu importe son intensite ou sa nature, doit etre protege par l’egal droit de vivre. Notre dernier chapitre se concentre sur le droit a la liberte. Nous montrons que cet interet est generalement interprete negativement et ne consiste qu’a pouvoir agir sans subir d’interference. Nous soutenons que cette acception du concept de liberte nous force a reconnaitre l’interet a etre libre de tous les etres sensibles et notre devoir de leur accorder un droit a la liberte. Nous ajoutons finalement que l’interpretation republicaine de la liberte nous incite a reconnaitre a tous ces animaux un statut egal a celui des humains. Nous terminons cette reflexion en concluant que l'octroi des droits fondamentaux aux animaux sensibles implique que l’exploitation animale institutionalisee soit abandonnee et que les animaux conscients jouissent du statut de personne.

Les droits fondamentaux des animaux : une approche anti-spéciste

Why do we routinely betray moral commitments that, in some sense, we authentically embrace? One explanation involves inattention: failure to attend to morally important aspects of our lives. Inattention ranges from an unmotivated lack of focus, or “simple” inattention, to more purposeful and wilful self-deception. Self-deception has received exhaustive and insightful treatment by philosophers and psychologists; what remains unexamined is the less complex, but more pervasive phenomenon of simple inattention. Since inattention is at least equally important in accounting for our routine moral failures, this gap is an important one to fill.



In this essay I examine moral dimensions of inattention: what makes it problematic, what vices it reflects, what duties we have to overcome it, and how we might try to do that. I argue that inattention obscures responsibilities to prevent harm, erodes autonomy, manifests a lack of virtue, and undermines integrity. For these reasons, we have obligations of attentiveness. I propose that we should attend (at least) to apparent violations of our moral values in which we are personally implicated, which we have power to affect, and to which we have been directed by clues that something is amiss. I end with practical suggestions for enhancing our attentiveness.

Vices of Inattention

L'A. etudie la tension qui se fait ressentir dans le domaine de la philosophie sociale, entre la cause feministe en faveur d'une politique liberale de l'avortement, signe essentiel de la liberation de la femme, et la cause animale qui revendique la protection legale des etres sensibles non-humains. A ce titre, le statut precaire du foetus considere comme non-personne revele l'urgence d'une alliance entre feministes et defenseurs des droits des animaux, au nom de la vie

Dilemmas in social philosophy: abortion and animal rights

L'A. pose le probleme de la responsabilite morale des intellectuels devant les souffrances du monde: leur position sociale leur permet en effet de contribuer a leur soulagement

The Moral Responsibilities of Intellectuals

In The Empathy Exams Leslie Jamison offers an unusual perspective: ‘Empathy isn’t just something that happens to us – a meteor shower of synapses firing across the brain – it’s also a choice we make: to pay attention, to extend ourselves. It’s made of exertion, that dowdier cousin of impulse’ (23). This essay is dedicated to elaborating that crucial observation. A vast amount of recent research concerns empathy – in evolutionary biology, neurobiology, moral psychology, and ethics. I want to extend these investigations by exploring the degree to which individuals can control our empathy: for whom and what we feel it, to what degree, in what circumstances, and with what practical results. My inquiry is aimed toward showing that humans can find ways to empathize with non-human animals – a capacity that is manifest in our relations with animal companions, but more rarely exercised when we consider animal victims of human exploitation. I introduce the notion of moral laziness: aversion to and avoidance of moral efforts and exertion. The foundation of this failing is often empathic laziness: aversion to imagining the mental states of others, feeling congruent emotions, and experiencing the impulse to help that empathy arouses. This is a serious moral failing because it enables continuing complicity in animal abuse and undermines integrity. Jamison remarks in relation to empathy, ‘I believe in intention and I believe in work. I believe in waking up in the middle of the night and packing our bags and leaving our worst selves for our better ones’ (23-24). I offer practical suggestions for that work.

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Kathie Jenni

Papers

Vices of Inattention

Dilemmas in social philosophy: abortion and animal rights

The Moral Responsibilities of Intellectuals

Empathy and Moral Laziness

Western environmental ethics: an overview