In this paper we examine cross-sectional variation in analysts' published evaluations of firms' disclosure practices and provide evidence that the analysts' ratings are increasing in firm size and in firm performance as measured by earnings and return variables, decreasing in the correlation between earnings and returns, and higher for firms issuing securities in the current or future period. Results based on the volatility of past performance are mixed. While the SEC's mandatory disclosure requirements provide a basic framework and minimum standard for many financial disclosures, considerable latitude remains in determining what information is actually provided. Some firms' annual and quarterly reports go well beyond the required disclosures, while others are extremely stark. Less formal communication channels, such as press releases and direct contact with analysts, allow even more discretion. This wide range of disclosure alternatives is aggregated by analysts in the Reports of the Financial Analysts

Cross- sectional determinants of analyst ratings of corporate disclosures

This paper examines the relation between the disclosure practices of firms, the number of analysts following each firm, and properties of the analysts' earnings forecasts. Using data from the Financial Analysts Federation Corporate Information Committee Report (FAF Report), we provide evidence that firms with more informative disclosure policies have a larger analyst following, more accurate analyst earnings forecasts, less dispersion among individual analyst forecasts and less volatility in forecast revisions. The results enhance our understanding of the role of analysts in capital markets. Further, they suggest that potential benefits to disclosure include increased investor following, reduced estimation risk and reduced information asymmetry, each of which have been shown to reduce a firm's cost of capital in theoretical research.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/248567.pdf

Corporate Disclosure Policy and Analyst Behavior

We investigate the role of information in affecting a firm's cost of capital. Using a multi-asset rational expectations model, we show that differences in the composition of information between public and private information affect the cost of capital, with investors demanding a higher return to hold stocks with greater private information. This higher return arises because informed investors are better able to shift their portfolio weights to incorporate new information, and uninformed investors are thus disadvantaged. The model demonstrates how in equilibrium the quantity and quality of information affect asset prices, resulting in cross-sectional differences in firms' required returns. We show how a firm can influence its cost of capital by choosing features like accounting treatments, financial analyst coverage, and market microstructure.

Information and the Cost of Capital

We investigate the role of information in affecting a firm's cost of capital. We show that differences in the composition of information between public and private information affect the cost of capital, with investors demanding a higher return to hold stocks with greater private information. This higher return arises because informed investors are better able to shift their portfolio to incorporate new information, and uninformed investors are thus disadvantaged. In equilibrium, the quantity and quality of information affect asset prices. We show firms can influence their cost of capital by choosing features like accounting treatments, analyst coverage, and market microstructure.

/pdf/information-and-the-cost-of-capital-53lubj8t20.pdf

The corporate information environment develops endogenously as a consequence of information asymmetries and agency problems between investors, entrepreneurs, and managers. We provide a framework for analyzing the three main decisions that shape the corporate information environment in a capital markets setting: (1) managers’ voluntary reporting and disclosure decisions, (2) reporting and disclosures mandated by regulators, and (3) reporting decisions by third-party intermediaries (analysts). We review current research on disclosure regulation, information intermediaries, and the determinants and economic consequences of corporate disclosure and financial reporting decisions. We conclude that in the last ten years, research has generated a number of useful insights. Despite this progress, we call for researchers to consider interdependencies between the various decisions that shape the corporate information environment and highlight changes in the economic financial environment that raise new and interesting issues for researchers to address.

The Financial Reporting Environment: Review of the Recent Literature

We analyze several aspects of the debate on insider trading regulations. Critics of such regulations cite various benefits of insider trading. One prominent argument is that insider trading leads to more informationally efficient stock prices. We show that under certain circumstances, insider trading leads to less efficient stock prices. This is because insider trading has two adverse effects on the competitiveness of the market: it deters other traders from acquiring information and trading, and it skews the distribution of information held by traders toward one trader. We also discuss whether shareholders of a firm have the incentive to restrict insider trading on their own.

/pdf/insider-trading-and-the-efficiency-of-stock-prices-59ji3078e1.pdf

Insider Trading and the Efficiency of Stock Prices

This paper develops a model of the relationship between investment decisions by firms and the efficiency of the market prices of their securities. It is shown that more efficient security prices can lead to more efficient investment decisions. This provides firms with the incentive to increase price efficiency by voluntarily disclosing information about the firm. Disclosure decisions are studied. It is shown that firms may expend more resources on disclosure than is socially optimal. This is in contrast to the concern implicit in mandatory disclosure rules that firms will expend too few resources on disclosure. THIS PAPER DEVELOPS A model of the relationship between firms' investment decisions and the efficiency of the market prices of their securities. It is shown that more efficient security prices can lead to more efficient investment decisions. This provides firms with the incentive to increase price efficiency by voluntarily disclosing information about the firm. Disclosure decisions are studied. The costs of disclosure are twofold. First, there are costs of producing and disseminating the information. Included here are opportunity costs of firms' employees, auditing and legal expenses, costs of printing and distribution, and costs associated with the release of any proprietary information. Second, there are traders' costs of assimilating the information. For instance, while it is not very costly to obtain a firm's 8-K and 10-K (once produced), it is quite costly to understand the implications of their contents. While the former costs have been recognized in the literature on disclosure, the latter costs have not. That is, while traders are sometimes viewed as having access to some costly information, the information contained in firms' disclosures is typically taken to be costlessly observed by all (see for instance Diamond (1985) and Dye (1987)).1 Taking traders' costs of learning the information content of firms' disclosures into account leads to new conclusions regarding incentives to expend resources on disclosure. In particular, it is shown that firms may spend more on disclosure than is socially optimal. This overdisclosure results from firms competing for the attention of traders. This is an interesting result given the public policy concern that firms, on their own, will spend less on disclosure than is socially optimal

Disclosure Decisions by Firms and the Competition for Price Efficiency

Numerous rules mandate the disclosure of information. This article analyzes why such rules are enacted. Specifically, 1) why wouldn't firms voluntarily disclose their private information; and 2) given that voluntary disclosure would not be forthcoming, who has the incentive to lobby for mandatory disclosure rules? Previous analyses of disclosure assume that all customers understand the disclosures that can be made. A key result in these analyses is that there is no role for mandatory disclosure. Either voluntary disclosure is forthcoming or if it is not, no one is better off with mandatory disclosure. We analyze a market in which not all customers understand the disclosures that can be made. We show that if the fraction of customers who would understand a firm's disclosure is too low, then voluntary disclosure may not be forthcoming. In this case, mandatory disclosure benefits some (possibly all) customers and may also benefit firms. Thus we identify a motive for someone to lobby for such rules. Our results suggest that we should find mandatory disclosure rules with regard to information that is relatively difficult to understand.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/9710131.pdf?abstractid=35460&mirid=5

Mandatory vs. Voluntary Disclosure in Markets with Informed and Uninformed Customers

Numerous rules mandate the disclosure of sellers' information. This article analyzes two questions regarding disclosure: (i) Why wouldn't sellers voluntarily disclose their information? and (ii) Who gains and who loses with mandatory disclosure? Previous analyses assume that all customers are knowledgeable enough to understand a seller's disclosure, and a key result is that there is no role for mandatory disclosure. Either voluntary disclosure is forthcoming, or if it is not, no one prefers mandatory disclosure. We generalize the standard model by considering the case in which not all customers understand a seller's disclosure. We show that if the fraction of customers who can understand a disclosure is too low, voluntary disclosure may not be forthcoming. If so, mandatory disclosure benefits informed customers, is neutral for uninformed customers, and harms the seller. Our results suggest that we should find mandatory disclosure in markets where product information is relatively difficult to understand. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.

Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure in Markets with Informed and Uninformed Customers

In this paper a party with private information can verifiably disclose some, but not all, of his information. The optimal amount of discretion to allow the informed party is studied. That is, should the informed party be allowed unlimited discretion in choosing which elements of his information set to disclose, or should restrictions be imposed that limit this discretion? The model is formulated in the spirit of a "persuasion game." It is demonstrated that under certain circumstances, rules that limit discretion increase the informativeness of disclosures and thus improve economic decisions.

Kathleen M. Hagerty

Papers

Insider Trading and the Efficiency of Stock Prices

Disclosure Decisions by Firms and the Competition for Price Efficiency

Mandatory vs. Voluntary Disclosure in Markets with Informed and Uninformed Customers

Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure in Markets with Informed and Uninformed Customers

The Optimal Amount of Discretion to Allow in Disclosure