Showing papers by "Keld Laursen published in 2002"

The Importance of Sectoral Differences in the Application of Complementary HRM Practices for Innovation Performance

Abstract: Recent theoretical and empirical analysis in the field of economic organization has focused almost exclusively on identifying organizational practices and complementarities between such practices, without regard for the type of activity in question. However, organizational theory suggests that more knowledge-intensive production activities often involve higher degrees of strategic uncertainty for firms and performance ambiguity in relation to individual employees. Therefore, the 'organic' or 'clan' form of organization - involving the application of 'new' HRM practices - is expected to perform better within knowledge-intensive sectors of the economy, as compared to other sectors. A sample of 726 Danish firms with more than 50 employees in manufacturing and private services is studied. The results show that HRM practices are more effective in influencing innovation performance when applied together, as compared with situations in which individual practices are applied alone. In other words, organizational ...

The relative importance of international vis-á-vis national technological spillovers for market share dynamics

Abstract: The aim of the paper is to investigate the relative importance of international vis-a-vis national technological linkages for international competitiveness for 19 industrial sectors. We estimate a dynamic model with an autoregressive structure in the dependent variable. In the paper competitiveness is captured both by cost competitiveness and by technological competitiveness. The main result is that while national linkages have a positive impact on the trade balance in several sectors (mostly scale intensive and specialised suppliers), this is not the case for international linkages.

Performance Pay, Delegation, and Multitasking under Uncertainty and Innovativeness An Empirical Investigation

Abstract: The existing empirical evidence is somewhat inconclusive with respect to a number of the key predictions of the agency model. Although the reach of agency theory is considerably wider, the dominant portion of work has been taken up with examining the nature of the trade-off between risk and incentives, and the implications thereof for contractual design. More specifically, some researchers have recently noted that the predicted trade-off between risk and incentives turns out to be rather weak, and perhaps non-existent, when confronted with the available empirical evidence. In this paper, we examine the risk-incentives trade-off and related predictions from agency theory on the basis of data from a data set encompassing close to 1000 Danish firms. We find that the relation between the use of performance pay in these firms and the environmental uncertainty they confront which is one way to test the risk/incentives tradeoff is indeed weak and in many cases even perverse. We then suggest, in line with other recent contributions to the literature, that this may be caused by the widespread use of delegation. One effect of delegation is that it breaks the simple relation between risks and incentives. We examine the suggestion that that those firms that are more prone to use delegation of decision rights in their internal organization are facing an uncertain environment to a larger extent than the rest of the population. We argue that this constitutes an indirect confirmation of the hypothesis. We also examine the multi-tasking agency hypothesis that as risk increases, the flexibility of agents is restricted. We fail to find support for this hypothesis. It is suggested that the reason for this finding is also related to delegation.