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Kevin M. Lochner
Researcher at University of Michigan
Publications - 16
Citations - 487
Kevin M. Lochner is an academic researcher from University of Michigan. The author has contributed to research in topics: Market game & Common value auction. The author has an hindex of 11, co-authored 16 publications receiving 481 citations.
Papers
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Journal ArticleDOI
Price prediction in a trading agent competition
TL;DR: The 2002 Trading Agent Competition (TAC) presented a challenging market game in the domain of travel shopping as mentioned in this paper, where agents apply an interesting diversity of techniques, taking into account differing sources of evidence bearing on prices.
Journal ArticleDOI
Price Prediction in a Trading Agent Competition
TL;DR: The 2002 Trading Agent Competition (TAC) presented a challenging market game in the domain of travel shopping as mentioned in this paper, where agents apply an interesting diversity of techniques, taking into account differing sources of evidence bearing on prices.
Proceedings Article
Approximate strategic reasoning through hierarchical reduction of large symmetric games
TL;DR: To deal with exponential growth in the size of a game with the number of agents, an approximation based on a hierarchy of reduced games is proposed, and methods for game-theoretic reasoning over incompletely-specified games at multiple levels of granularity are demonstrated.
Journal ArticleDOI
Walverine: a Walrasian trading agent
Shih-Fen Cheng,Evan Leung,Kevin M. Lochner,Kevin O'Malley,Daniel M. Reeves,L. Julian Schvartzman,Michael P. Wellman +6 more
TL;DR: Michigan's entry, Walverine, bases its decisions on a competitive (Walrasian) analysis of the TAC travel economy, and a decision-theoretic formulation of the optimal bidding problem, which Walversine solves in each round of bidding for each good.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Bid expressiveness and clearing algorithms in multiattribute double auctions
TL;DR: A formal semantic framework for characterizing expressible offers is developed, and conditions under which the allocation problem can be separated into first identifying optimal pairwise trades and subsequently optimizing combinations of those trades are shown.