Showing papers by "Klaus M. Schmidt published in 1993"
TL;DR: For games with incomplete information, this article showed that player one will get a t least her commitment payoff in any Nash equilibrium of the repeated game if her discount factor approaches one, and this result is robust against further perturbations of the informational structure.
Abstract: A two-person game is of conflicting interests if the strategy to which player one would most like to commit herself holds player two down to his minimax payoff. Suppose there is a positive prior probability that player one is a "commitme nt type" who will always play this strategy. Then player one will get a t least her commitment payoff in any Nash equilibrium of the repeated game if her discount factor approaches one. This result is robust against further perturbations of the informational structure and in striking contrast to the message of the Folk theorem for games with incomplete information. Copyright 1993 by The Econometric Society.
81 citations
TL;DR: The authors analyzes a finitely repeated bargaining game with asymmetric information and gives a tight characterization of the equilibrium path and the equilibrium payoffs of all sequential equilibria satisfying a weak Markov property.
77 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the impact of different governance structures on management incentives, the efficiency of restructuring, and the social costs of the adjustment process in the transition period in Eastern Europe can be analyzed.
62 citations