The theory of affordances

Naming and necessity

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The Critique Of Pure Reason

A clutch of '-isms' characterises the approach to consciousness which David Chalmers defends: dualism, epiphenomenalism, functionalism, anti-reductionism, and -probably -panpsychism. (The author would no doubt want 'naturalism' included in the list as well, but as we shall see, Chalmers' predilection to describe his theory as 'scientific' stretches credibility.) While the book does not, as far as I can see, move consciousness research significantly forward, Chalmers succeeds admirably in clarifying the philosophical terrain around and within each of these '-isms' and in questioning the usual assumptions which suggest some of them are mutually exclusive. Because nearly all of what follows is highly critical, I want to be explicit about one thing: I do not think this is a bad book. Throughout, most discussions keep to a very high standard; it's just that they include fatal flaws.

The conscious mind: In search of a fundamental theory

Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I

Philosophical questions concerning parts and wholes have received a tremendous amount of the attention of contemporary analytic metaphysicians. In what follows, I discuss some of the central questions. The questions to be discussed are: how general is parthood? Are there different kinds of parthood or ways to be a part? Can two things be composed of the same parts? When does composition occur? Can material objects gain or lose parts? What is the logical form of the parthood relation enjoyed by material objects?

Parts and Wholes

In this paper, I formulate, elucidate, and defend a version of modal realism with overlap, the view that objects are literally present at more than one possible world. The version that I defend has several interesting features: (i) it is committed to an ontological distinction between regions of spacetime and material objects; (ii) it is committed to compositional pluralism, which is the doctrine that there is more than one fundamental part-whole relation; and (iii) it is the modal analogue of endurantism, which is the doctrine that objects persist through time by being wholly present at each moment they are located.

Modal Realism with Overlap

There are many kinds of beings—stones, persons, artifacts, numbers, propositions—but are there also many kinds of being? The world contains a variety of objects, each of which exists—but do some objects exist in different ways? The historically popular answer is yes. This answer is suggested by the Aristotelian slogan that ‘‘being is said in many ways,’’ and according to some interpretations is Aristotle’s view.1 Variants of this slogan were championed by medieval philosophers, such as Aquinas, who worried that God cannot be said to exist in the same sense (or in the same way) as created things.2 Descartes alluded to the medievals’ worry, but extensive discussion of the problem of being disappeared from the central stage by the time of the modern period.3 However, in the early twentieth century, friends of ways of being included Alexius Meinong (1910: 49–62), G.E. Moore (1903: 161–3), Russell (1912: 91–100), Husserl (1901: 249–50), and Heidegger (1927).4

Ways of being

The Fragmentation of Being

Recently, I’ve championed the doctrine that fundamentally different sorts of things exist in fundamentally different ways. On this view, what it is for an entity to be can differ across ontological categories. Although historically this doctrine was very popular, and several important challenges to this doctrine have been dealt with, I suspect that contemporary metaphysicians will continue to treat this view with suspicion until it is made clearer when one is warranted in positing different modes of existence. I address this concern here. The question of when to posit ways of being is closely related to a more general question: when should one think that some philosophically interesting expression is analogous? Accordingly, my strategy here is as follows. First, I briefly explain my interpretation of ontological pluralism, the doctrine that there are ways of being. Second,

Kris McDaniel

Papers

Parts and Wholes

Modal Realism with Overlap

Ways of being

The Fragmentation of Being

A Return to the Analogy of Being