We construct a model of simultaneous change and persistence in institutions. The model consists of landowning elites and workers, and the key economic decision concerns the form of economic institutions regulating the transaction of labor (e.g., competitive markets versus labor repression). The main idea is that equilibrium economic institutions are a result of the exercise of de jure and de facto political power. A change in political institutions, for example a move from nondemocracy to democracy, alters the distribution of de jure political power, but the elite can intensify their investments in de facto political power, such as lobbying or the use of paramilitary forces, to partially or fully offset their loss of de jure power. In the baseline model, equilibrium changes in political institutions have no effect on the (stochastic) equilibrium distribution of economic institutions, leading to a particular form of persistence in equilibrium institutions, which we refer to as invariance. When the model is enriched to allow for limits on the exercise of de facto power by the elite in democracy or for costs of changing economic institutions, the equilibrium takes the form of a Markov regime-switching process with state dependence. Finally, when we allow for the possibility that changing political institutions is more difficult than altering economic institutions, the model leads to a pattern of captured democracy, whereby a democratic regime may survive, but choose economic institutions favoring the elite. The main ideas featuring in the model are illustrated using historical examples from the U.S. South, Latin America and Liberia.

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Persistence of Power, Elites and Institutions

We construct a model to study the implications of changes in political insti? tutions for economic institutions. A change in political institutions alters the distribution of de jure political power, but creates incentives for investments in de facto political power to partially or even fully offset change in de jure power. The model can imply a pattern of captured democracy, whereby a democratic regime may survive but choose economic institutions favoring an elite. The model provides conditions under which economic or policy outcomes will be invariant to changes in political institutions, and economic institutions them? selves will persist over time. (JEL D02, D72) The domination of an organized minority ... over the unor? ganized majority is inevitable. The power of any minority is irresistible as against each single individual in the majority, who stands alone before the totality of the organized minor? ity. At the same time, the minority is organized for the very reason that it is a minority.

/pdf/persistence-of-power-elites-and-institutions-3cqf4n9lep.pdf

Understanding different adaptive capacities is a prerequisite for targeting interventions to reduce the adverse impacts of climate change. Indicators and indices are common tools in this process, but their construction embodies many uncertainties, not least of which is their scale specificity. This paper describes the development of two empirical adaptive capacity indices for use at different scales of analysis: a national index for cross-country comparison in Africa and a household index for cross-household comparison in a village in Limpopo province, South Africa. Explaining the decisions made at each stage of construction illuminates the degree of uncertainty involved when assessing adaptive capacity, and how this uncertainty is compounded when looking across different scales of analysis. It concludes that the central elements of adaptive capacity, based on institutional collective response and the availability of and access to resources, are common at different scales, although the structure of each index is scale-specific. Hence the findings of these apparently irreconcilable scales of analysis converge to demonstrate points of leverage for policy intervention to raise resilience and the capacity to adapt to the risks posed by climate change.

Uncertainty in adaptive capacity and the importance of scale

The changing political economy of sex in South Africa: the significance of unemployment and inequalities to the scale of the AIDS pandemic.

Should the global AIDS pandemic be framed as an international security issue? Drawing on securitization theory, this article argues that there is a complex normative dilemma at the heart of recent attempts to formulate the global response to HIV/AIDS in the language of international security. Although “securitizing” the AIDS pandemic could bolster international AIDS initiatives by raising awareness and resources, the language of security simultaneously pushes responses to the disease away from civil society toward military and intelligence organizations with the power to override the civil liberties of persons living with HIV/AIDS. The security framework, moreover, brings into play a “threat-defense” logic that could undermine international efforts to address the pandemic because it makes such efforts a function of narrow national interest rather than of altruism, because it allows states to prioritize AIDS funding for their elites and armed forces who play a crucial role in maintaining security, and because portraying the illness as an overwhelming “threat” works against ongoing efforts to normalize social perceptions regarding HIV/AIDS. These overlooked dangers give rise to a profound ethical dilemma as to whether or not the global AIDS pandemic should be portrayed as a security issue. The article concludes that securitization theory cannot resolve this complex dilemma, but that raising awareness of its presence does allow policy makers, activists, and scholars to begin drawing the links between HIV/AIDS and security in ways that at least minimize some of these dangers.

Should HIV/AIDS Be Securitized? The Ethical Dilemmas of Linking HIV/AIDS and Security

Too Poor to Stay Alive S.E.Sachs & J.D.Sachs Why is South Africa the HIV Capital of the World? An Institutional Analysis of the Spread of a Virus K.D.Kauffman HIV/AIDS in the Context of South Africa's Epidemic History H.Phillips South Africa Divided Against AIDS: A Crisis of Leadership V.van der Vliet Assessing the Demographic and Economic Impact of HIV/AIDS J.D.Lewis HIV/AIDS in South Africa: Can Art Make a Difference? M.Martin From Policy to Practice: The Anthropology of Condom Use C.C.Bermudes Ribero Da Cruz The Role of Tertiary Institutions in the HIV/AIDS Epidemic C.Volks Afterword: Challenges and Lessons D.L.Lindauer & D.Chapman Walsh

AIDS and South Africa: The Social Expression of a Pandemic

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the increase in tenancy, particularly in the South, alarmed many social commentators and later was an issue taken up by a number of historians.' Indeed the issue of rising tenancy rates was a major plank in the platform of the Populist movement. However, before one can make interpretations of the welfare of agricultural workers as a result of this rise in tenancy one needs to look more closely at the individual rungs of the agricultural ladder.2 This article sets out to repair the damaged sharecropper rung on the southern agricultural ladder. Without additional information regarding this rung, it is impossible to get a complete picture of the movement up and down the southern agricultural ladder. In the census years 1900 and 1910, the Census Bureau incorrectly classified sharecroppers as tenants, placing too many workers on that more affluent rung of the ladder. The intent of this article is to estimate the number of sharecroppers in order to provide a more accurate count of the number of "true tenants" in these years. With this more complete depiction of the agricultural ladder, movements up and down the ladder between the years 1900 and 1960 can be more accurately discussed, and thereby a basis is provided for scholars to accurately address the true welfare implications of these movements. Much of the misunderstanding of how the postbellum southern agricultural system worked is based on misinterpretations of how the census defined a "tenant," specifically how it defined a "share tenant." Beginning in 1920, the U.S. Census changed its "share tenant" category to exclude "sharecroppers." From then on share tenants and sharecroppers (or more commonly referred to as just "croppers") were, in the eyes of the census, fundamentally different types of farm operators. Although a cropper farmed a certain plot and received a share of the harvest from that plot as income, he often differed from other tenants in important respects, especially when he worked on a plantation.3 There he was usually closely supervised; he made none of the major farming decisions; and he generally supplied no input besides labor services. In most southern states he had no legal possession

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/B36D118B4C59D5709A4C84210F474364/S0022050700018544a.pdf/div-class-title-agricultural-chutes-and-ladders-new-estimates-of-sharecroppers-and-true-tenants-in-the-south-1900-1920-div.pdf

Kyle D. Kauffman

Papers

AIDS and South Africa: The Social Expression of a Pandemic

Agricultural Chutes and Ladders: New Estimates of Sharecroppers and "True Tenants" in the South, 1900-1920

Competition and the Compensation of Sharecroppers by Race: A View from Plantations in the Early Twentieth Century☆

AIDS and South Africa

Why Was the Mule Used in Southern Agriculture? Empirical Evidence of Principal-Agent Solutions