Most of the British electricity supply industry has been privatized. Two dominant generators supply bulk electricity to an unregulated "pool." They submit a supply schedule of prices for generation and receive the market-clearing price, which varies with demand. Despite claims that this should be highly competitive, we show that the Nash equilibrium in supply schedules implies a high markup on marginal cost and substantial deadweight losses. Further simulations, to show the effect of entry by 1994, produce somewhat lower prices, at the cost of excessive entry; subdividing the generators into five firms would produce better results.

Competition in the British Electricity Spot Market

This paper examines some of the recent literature on the estimation of production functions. We focus on techniques suggested in two recent papers, Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). While there are some solid and intuitive identification ideas in these papers, we argue that the techniques can suffer from functional dependence problems. We suggest an alternative approach that is based on the ideas in these papers, but does not suffer from the functional dependence problems and produces consistent estimates under alternative data generating processes for which the original procedures do not.

/pdf/identification-properties-of-recent-production-function-1299028wit.pdf

Identification Properties of Recent Production Function Estimators

The Econometrics of Panel DataSpringer Handbook of Science and Technology IndicatorsPanel Data EconometricsThe Econometrics of Panel DataA Practitioner's Guide to Stochastic Frontier Analysis Using StataBenchmarking for Performance EvaluationEssays on Microeconomics and Industrial OrganisationHealth System EfficiencyInternational Journal of Production EconomicsEconometric Analysis of Model Selection and Model TestingInternational Applications of Productivity and Efficiency AnalysisAdvanced Robust and Nonparametric Methods in Efficiency AnalysisEconometrics and the Philosophy of EconomicsThe Measurement of Productive EfficiencyMeasuring Efficiency in Health CareFinancial, Macro and Micro Econometrics Using REconometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel DataApplied EconometricsProductivity and Efficiency AnalysisEconometric Model SelectionProductivity and Efficiency AnalysisStochastic Frontier AnalysisThe Oxford Handbook of Health EconomicsThe Measurement of Productive Efficiency and Productivity GrowthNew Directions in Productivity Measurement and Efficiency AnalysisA Primer on Efficiency Measurement for Utilities and Transport RegulatorsPanel Data EconometricsProduction and Efficiency Analysis with RApplications of Modern Production TheoryThe Measurement of Productive EfficiencyNonparametric Econometric Methods and ApplicationAn Introduction to Efficiency and Productivity AnalysisHealth, the Medical Profession, and RegulationThe Analysis of Household SurveysData Envelopment AnalysisProgramming Collective IntelligenceEfficiency AnalysisProductivity and Efficiency AnalysisMeasurement of Productivity and EfficiencyProduction Frontiers

The Econometric Approach to Efficiency Analysis

Large increases in productivity are typically realized as organizations gain experience in production. These "learning curves" have been found in many organizations. Organizations vary considerably in the rates at which they learn. Some organizations show remarkable productivity gains, whereas others show little or no learning. Reasons for the variation observed in organizational learning curves include organizational "forgetting," employee turnover, transfer of knowledge from other products and other organizations, and economies of scale.

https://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/247/4945/920.full.pdf

Learning curves in manufacturing.

Learning Curves In Manufacturing

We estimate economies of scale for U.S. firms producing electric power. Cross-section data for 1955 and 1970 are analyzed using the translog cost function. We find that in 1955 there were significant scale economies available to nearly all firms. By 1970, however, the bulk of U.S. electricity generation was by firms operating in the essentially flat area of the average cost curve. We conclude that a small number of extremely large firms are not required for efficient production and that policies designed to promote competition in electric power generation cannot be faulted in terms of sacrificing economies of scale.

Laurits R. Christensen

Papers

Economies of scale in U. S. electric power generation