With digital equipment becoming increasingly networked, either on wired or wireless networks, for personal and professional use alike, distributed software systems have become a crucial element in information and communications technologies. The study of these systems forms the core of the ARLES' work, which is specifically concerned with defining new system software architectures, based on the use of emerging networking technologies. In this context, we concentrate on the study of distributed systems which bring to life the vision of ubiquitous computing systems, also known as ambient intelligence.

반도체 공정 overview

The recent wave of financial globalization since the mid-1980s has been marked by a surge in capital flows among industrial countries and, more notably, between industrial and developing countries. While these capital flows have been associated with high growth rates in some developing countries, a number of countries have experienced periodic collapse in growth rates and significant financial crises over the same period, crises that have exacted a serious toll in terms of macroeconomic and social costs. As a result, an intense debate has emerged in both academic and policy circles on the effects of financial integration for developing economies. But much of the debate has been based on only casual and limited empirical evidence.

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Effects of Financial Globalization on Developing Countries: Some Empirical Evidence

https://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/temi-discussione/1998/1998-0343/tema_343_98.pdf

What Caused the Asian Currency and Financial Crisis

In this paper we examine closely the financial events following the Mexican peso devaluation to uncover new lessons about the nature of financial crises. We explore the question of why, during 1995, some emerging markets were hit by financial crises while others were not. To this end, we ask whether there are some fundamentals that help explain the variation in financial crises across countries or whether the variation just reflects contagion. We present a simple model identifying three factors that determine whether a country is more vulnerable to suffer a financial crisis: a high real exchange rate appreciation, a recent lending boom, and low reserves. We find that for a set of 20 emerging markets, differences in these fundamentals go far in explaining why during 1995 some emerging markets were hit by financial crises while others were not. We also find that alternative hypotheses that have been put forth to explain such crises often do not seem to be supported by the data, such as high current account deficits, excessive capital inflows and loose fiscal policies.

Financial Crises in Emerging Markets: The Lessons from 1995

relationship. All subsequent studies confirmed it (see for example King and Levine, 1993, and the review in: Pagano, 1993). Goldsmith used a sample of 35 countries for the period between 1860 and 1963 to show the relationship between income and financial depth measured by the ratio between bank's assets and GDP. He also showed that in periods of rapid growth, financial depth grows faster than income. More details about measuring financial depth can be found in this paper. FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH Velimir Šonje

/pdf/financial-development-and-economic-growth-1933kuo17q.pdf

Financial development and economic growth

This paper presents evidence on the relative importance of alternative contagion channels during the Thai, Russian, and Brazilian crises. Results show that when crises are measured by changes in sovereign bond spreads, financial competition seems to explain almost all contagion episodes. However, when crises are measured by stock market returns, trade links and neighborhood effects appear to be relevant contagion channels during the Thai and Brazilian crises, while financial competition remains the only relevant channel in the case of the Russian crisis.

What Drives Contagion: Trade Neighborhood, or Financial Links?

Following the 1997–1998 financial turmoil, crisis countries in Asia moved away from exchange rate arrangements featuring “soft” exchange rate pegs with open capital accounts. While this development is superficially consistent with the bipolar view of exchange rate regimes and the “hollow middle” hypothesis, some observers have claimed that, despite the changes in their de jure exchange rate regimes, the crisis countries' exchange rate policies have in fact been very similar in the post- and pre-crisis periods. This paper analyzes the evidence and concludes that, except for Malaysia, which adopted an official peg buttressed by capital controls, the other crisis countries have actually moved to intermediate regimes in which they are floating more than before, though less than “real” floaters do. The intermediate exchange rate policies pursued by most of the crisis countries during the post-crisis can be justified on second-best arguments.

https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/seminar/2001/err/eng/hernan.pdf

Post-crisis exchange rate policy in five Asian countries: Filling in the “hollow middle”?

Capital inflows to some developing countries have increased sharply in recent years. Impelled by better economic prospects in those countries, lower international interest rates, and a slowdown of economic activity in the capital exporting countries, the inflows have furnished financing much needed to increase the use of existing capacity and to stimulate investment. But capital inflows can bring with them their own problems. Typical macroeconomic repercussions have been appreciation of the real exchange rate, expansion of non-tradable at the expense of tradable, larger trade deficits, and, in regimes with a fixed exchange rate, higher inflation and an accumulation of foreign reserves. Should government intervene to limit some of these side effects- and if so, how? The question is especially pressing in the wake of the Mexican crisis of December 1994. This article looks for answers in the experience of four Latin American and five East Asian countries between 1986 and 1993, examining the effects of the capital inflows on the economy and comparing the different ways in which these countries responded to the problem of too much capital.

/pdf/macroeconomic-adjustment-to-capital-inflows-lessons-from-2nh5zvnsch.pdf

Macroeconomic adjustment to capital inflows : lessons from recent Latin American and East Asian experience

What drives contagion: Trade, neighborhood, or financial links?

New empirical evidence with regards to the effectiveness and efficiency of Chile’s capital controls is provided here, based on more and better data on the range of controls and a broad assessment of their costs and benefits. The paper concludes that capital controls have been partially effective by raising the wedge between domestic and foreign interest rates, reducing aggregate net capital inflows, and changing the debt composition toward longer maturities, without significantly altering the real exchange rate. Part of these effects is temporary as the effectiveness of controls is eroded over time for a given interest rates differential. Controls may have been crucial by contributing to Chile’s lower exposure to short-term foreign liabilities at the time of the 1997-98 international financial turmoil. However, achieving temporary macroeconomic benefits by relying on capital controls involves incurring in financial and growth effects that raise concerns about their efficiency. The costs that resulted from the policy mix that comprised the capital controls, in terms of quasi-fiscal losses and lower investment and growth, were probably not negligible. Resumen Este trabajo presenta nueva evidencia empirica sobre la efectividad y eficiencia de los controles de capital en Chile. La evidencia se basa en mas y mejores datos sobre estos controles y en una estimacion aproximada de algunos de sus costos y beneficios potenciales. En el trabajo se concluye que los controles de capital han sido parcialmente efectivos en aumentar la diferencia entre las tasas de interes internas y externas, reducir los flujos netos de capitales, y cambiar la madurez de los pasivos externos, aunque sin afectar significativamente al tipo de cambio real. El efecto sobre la madurez de los pasivos externos (hacia plazos mas largos) pudo haber jugado un rol trascendente durante la crisis financiera internacional de 1997-98. Sin embargo, parte de estos efectos son transitorios debido a que la efectividad de los controles se erosiona a traves del tiempo por la existencia de diferenciales positivos de tasas de interes. Los controles de capitales, no obstante generar beneficios macroeconomicos transitorios, tambien producen efectos financieros y sobre el crecimiento, los que deben ser tomados en cuenta para evaluar su eficiencia. Existen costos importantes, en terminos de deficits cuasi-fiscales y menores tasas de inversion y crecimiento, resultantes de la combinacion de politicas de las cuales el encaje es parte integrante.

/pdf/capital-controls-in-chile-effective-efficient-59v0ocoki6.pdf

Leonardo Hernández

Papers

What Drives Contagion: Trade Neighborhood, or Financial Links?

Post-crisis exchange rate policy in five Asian countries: Filling in the “hollow middle”?

Macroeconomic adjustment to capital inflows : lessons from recent Latin American and East Asian experience

What drives contagion: Trade, neighborhood, or financial links?

Capital Controls in Chile: Effective? Efficient?