Land policies are of fundamental importance to sustainable growth, good governance, and the well-being of, and the economic opportunities open to, both rural and urban dwellers - particularly the poor. To this end, research on land policy, and analysis of interventions related to the subject, have long been of interest to the Bank's Research Department, and other academic, and civil society institutions. The report aims to strengthen the effectiveness of land policy in support of development, and poverty reduction, by setting out the results of recent research in a way that is accessible to a wide audience of policymakers, nongovernmental organizations, academics in the Bank's client countries, donor agency officials, and the broader development community. Its main message rests on three principles: 1) provision of secure tenure to land improves the welfare of the poor, particularly by enhancing the asset base of those whose land rights are often neglected, and, creates incentives needed for investment, paramount to sustainable economic growth; 2) facilitation of land exchange, and distribution, whether as an asset or for current services, at low cost, through markets, and non-market channels, will expedite land access by productive, but land-poor producers, so that once economic growth improves, financial markets would rely on the use of land as collateral; and, 3) governments' contribution to the promotion of socially desirable land allocation, and utilization. The report discusses mechanisms to promote tenure security, demonstrates the importance of rental market transactions, arguing the removal of impediments to these can generate equity advantages, and positive investments. It also illustrates mechanisms, ranging from taxation, to regulation and land use planning to address these issues.

Land policies for growth and poverty reduction

This paper analyzes the linkages between the reform strategies in transition countries and economic performance The authors focus on agriculture because of the sharpness of the policy changes, fundamental differences among countries, and relative simplicity of agricultural relationships The authors document post reform performance in the transition countries of Asia and Europe The authors show how: (a) pricing reform and subsidy reductions; (b) land rights reform and policies that affect farm restructuring; and (c) the presence institutions that facilitate exchange (either markets or market substitutes) affect output and productivity The paper ends with general lessons on reforms and transition

https://www.sfu.ca/~akaraiva/e455/Rozelle.pdf

Success and failure of reform : insights from the transition of agriculture

The authors review the role of land policies in the evolving farm structure of transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). They show how different policies for land property rights, degrees of control of land rental and sale markets, and procedures for restructuring former collective or state farms resulted in significantly different farm structures in CEE countries compared with those in the CIS. In particular, secure land rights, greater emphasis on indivualization of land, and more liberal land market policies in CEE generated a farming sector with a relatively large share of family farms and viable corporate farms. On the other hand, limited tenure security, ineffective individualization of land rights, and restrictive land policies in most of the CIS produced a farming structure dominated by large and generally nonviable jointly-owned farms that function much like the old collective farms. Family farms are slow to emerge in transition countries with inadequate land policies. The agricultural sector in countries dominated by inefficient farm organizations is characterized by low productivity and misallocation of resources.

Land policies and evolving farm structures in transition countries

Reforms, globalization, and endogenous agricultural structures

Almost all former socialist countries are introducing private farming as part of land reform. In countries where such farming existed one or two generations ago, land might be restituted to former owners. In Turkmenistan, where there had been little private agriculture and no small landowners, land was distributed to new beneficiaries. This paper shows that the previous position of the new farm “owners” strongly affected what resources they had (land, capital, water) and how effectively they used them. The study is based on a survey conducted in 2000 on a sample of 143 farmers from Turkmenistan’s all five administrative regions. The farmers were divided for analysis into five categories, according to previous positions (managers, middle-level specialists, skilled and unskilled workers, and administrative staff). On the average, all categories of farmers turned a profit. However, the most successful were the middle-level specialists (agronomists, engineers). They had the largest plots, the best land, and the best-equipped farms. Like the managers and the administrative staff, they had savings, some of which they used as startup capital. They diversified their production more than others, and were better able to obtain credit. Former unskilled workers were the least successful, lacking capital, and unable to afford risks, thus growing only wheat and cotton at the expense of other crops and of livestock. Earlier studies have shown that former position affected the share of resources received by individuals in the ex Soviet Union. In addition to confirming the finding, we have shown that former position also affected the use of those resources, and the economic performance of the users. Unfortunately, the sample size was small, and our conclusions remain thus tentative.

Turkmenistan's new private farmers: the effect of human capital on performance

Turkmenistan's unique approach to land reform and farm restructuring has produced a significant shift to individual or household-based farming, with more than three-quarters of the arable land leased to individual households or small groups Most leaseholders consider this land to be rightfully theirs, and they expect to keep it in the future, either as private owners, or through extension of their leasehold However, individual production is administratively circumscribed by a pervasive system of state orders and central planning The lease contracts rigidly specify the crop that each leaseholder is required to produce (typically cotton or wheat) and set a specific quantity target for delivery to the state at prices much below the level of prices on international markets Managers and leaseholders universally express the view that the prices they receive from the state for wheat and cotton are too low, and identify the chance to sell freely at open market proces as a key factor that would improve the economic situation on farms Both managers and leaseholders expressed enthusiasm for the reform at the time of the survey This is a natural psychological reaction to the dramatic transition to a new system, and to avoid disillusionment, the initial change must be followed by further meaningful reforms, including abolition of state orders, transfer of land to individual control, and elimination of constraints on individual choice

Lerman, Zvi Brooks, Karen

Papers

Turkmenistan: An Assessment of Leasehold-Based Farm Restructuring