Recent literature on environmental governance in China frequently ascribes blame for China's environmental problems to sub-national governments' lax environmental enforcement. Such research implicitly assumes that more central control would lead to better results but, as yet, the role of the centre in environmental governance remains underresearched. In the context of the current phase of recentralization, this article studies central and local interests, capacities and interactions across policy issues and government agencies. By “bringing the centre back” into the study of central–local relations in China, we examine both where such recentralization has in fact occurred and whether such recentralization efforts have improved environmental outcomes. We argue that centralization does not improve outcomes in every case. Further, central and local levels of governance are not as different as they might seem. Indeed, there are significant areas of overlapping interests and similar patterns of behaviour, both positive (enforcement) and negative (shirking), between central and local administrations. The results draw an empirically and theoretically rich picture of central–local relations that highlights the innate complexity of China's environmental governance patterns during the current phase of recentralization.

/pdf/central-local-relations-recentralization-and-environmental-53fq2ihsog.pdf

Central–Local Relations: Recentralization and Environmental Governance in China

Recent literature on environmental governance in China frequently ascribes blame for China’s environmental problems to subnational governments’ lax environmental enforcement. Such research implicitly assumes that more central control would lead to better results but, as yet, the role of the centre in environmental governance remains under-researched. In the context of the current phase of recentralization, this paper examines central and local interests, capacities, and interactions across policy issues and government agencies. By “bringing the centre back” into the study of central–local relations in China, we examine both where such recentralization has in fact occurred and whether such recentralization efforts have improved environmental outcomes. We argue that centralization does not improve outcomes in every case. Further, central and local levels of governance are not as different as they might seem. Indeed, there are significant areas of overlapping interests and similar patterns of behaviour, both positive (enforcement) and negative (shirking), between central and local administrations. The results draw an empirically and theoretically rich picture of central–local relations that highlights the innate complexity of China’s environmental governance patterns during the current phase of recentralization.

Flexible environmental policy, technological innovation and sustainable development of China’s industry: The moderating effect of environment regulatory enforcement

Scholars embrace multilevel governance as an analytical framework for complex problems, such as climate change or water pollution. However, the elements needed to comprehensively operationalize mul...

/pdf/multilevel-governance-framing-the-integration-of-top-down-2na3rfxlej.pdf

Multilevel Governance: Framing the Integration of Top-Down and Bottom-Up Policymaking

Does the Central Environmental Inspection actually work

Environmental pollution has become a major health concern and has escalated to a major political issue in China. It has been identified that enforcement of environmental regulation is the weakest link in environmental protection. Local government is often the focus of study because of its legal obligation for enforcement under national environmental law, and for its significance in the complex and intriguing central–local relations in the Chinese government system. We propose an interpretative framework to explain the local environmental enforcement dilemma in China, based on an institutional approach. Local governments tend to underperform. We argue that the overall national institutional environment that defines central–local relations in both political and financial terms is key for explaining why local governments fail to meet their obligations. Local governments tend to promote economic growth and maximize tax revenue, by attracting external investment and protecting polluting businesses, at the expense of environmental quality. Inadequate disclosure of environmental data and occasionally intentionally distorting information obstruct public participation and supervision – a key factor for ensuring the accountability of local enforcement. The policy implications of this analysis are that central government, in its capacity as the rule-maker, must take action to adjust the existing central–local relations with respect to the political promotion system and the tax-sharing mechanism. In addition, more stringent procedures and standards must be made by central government regarding the disclosure of environmental data to enable effective public participation. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment

Lingyun Zhang

Papers

Local Environmental Enforcement Constrained by Central–Local Relations in China