Tobit models: A survey

Arguments that relate regimes to growth focus on property rights, pressures for immediate consumption, and the autonomy of dictators. While everyone seems to agree that secure property rights foster growth, it is controversial whether democracies or dictatorships better secure these rights. The main mechanism by which democracy is thought to hinder growth is pressure for immediate consumption, which reduces investment. Only states that are institutionally insulated from such pressures can resist them, and democratic states are not. The main argument against dictatorships is that authoritarian rulers have no interest in maximizing total output. These views are summarized in turn.

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Political Regimes and Economic Growth

The field of strategic management is predicated fundamentally on the idea that managements' decisions are endogenous to their expected performance implications. Yet, based on a review of more than a decade of empirical research in the Strategic Management Journal, we find that few papers econometrically correct for such endogeneity. In response, we now describe the endogeneity problem for cross-sectional and panel data, referring specifically to management's choice among discrete strategies with continuous performance outcomes. We then present readily implementable econometric methods to correct for endogeneity and, when feasible, provide STATA code to ease implementation. We also discuss extensions and nuances of these models that are sometimes difficult to decipher in more standard treatments. These extensions are not typically discussed in the strategy literature, but they are, in fact, highly pertinent to empirical strategic management research.

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Correcting for Endogeneity in Strategic Management Research

Alternative methods for evaluating the impact of interventions

A structural model of the demand for college attendance is derived from the theory of comparative advantage and recent statistical models of self-selection and unobserved components. Estimates from NBEr-Thorndike data strongly support the theory. First, expected lifetime earnings gains influence the decision to attend college. Second, those who did not attend college would have earned less than measurably similar people who did attend, while those who attended college would have earned less as high school graduates than measurably similar people who stopped after high school. Positive selection in both groups implies no "ability bias" in these data.

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Education and Self-Selection

A large number of studies have been made on the impact of labor unions on wage rates of workers. These studies generally have found positive and significant effects of unionism on wage rates. More recently, a few authors have studied the simultaneous effects between unionism and wages. Ashenfelter and Johnson [1972] used aggregated U.S. Manufacturing Industries Data and found that unionism had no significant impact on wage rates, but that the wage rate had a significant effect on the extent of unionism. Since the data they used were quite limited, they could only conclude that the magnitude of the effects of unionism on wage rates was uncertain. Schmidt and Strauss [1976] reached similar conclusions using macroeconomic data. Their mixed logit approach, however, is not based on choice behavior and does not fit into a traditional econometric framework. This study extends recent investigations of the joint determination of the extent of unionism and the effects of unions on wage rates, using macroeconomic data from the Survey of Economic Opportunity Sample of 1967. Economic considerations suggest that the propensity to join a union depends on the net wage gains that might result from trade union membership. The explicit inclusion of this interdependence between the wage gain equation and the union membership equation in the model represents our point of departure from the previous work of Ashenfelter and Johnson and Schmidt and Strauss. The model is a variant of a traditional simultaneous equations model with a binary qualitative variable (union membership) and limited dependent variables. In Section 2, the conceptual framework of the model is discussed. Properties of the data are presented in Section 3. Section 4 briefly discusses estimation methods, and empirical estimates are presented in Section 5. Finally, in Section 6, conclusions are drawn.

Lung Fei Lee

Papers

Unionism and Wage Rates: A Simultaneous Equations Model with Qualitative and Limited Dependent Variables