International Security Studies (ISS) has changed and diversified in many ways since 1945. This book provides the first intellectual history of the development of the subject in that period. It explains how ISS evolved from an initial concern with the strategic consequences of superpower rivalry and nuclear weapons, to its current diversity in which environmental, economic, human and other securities sit alongside military security, and in which approaches ranging from traditional Realist analysis to Feminism and Post-colonialism are in play. It sets out the driving forces that shaped debates in ISS, shows what makes ISS a single conversation across its diversity, and gives an authoritative account of debates on all the main topics within ISS. This is an unparalleled survey of the literature and institutions of ISS that will be an invaluable guide for all students and scholars of ISS, whether traditionalist, ‘new agenda’ or critical. • The first book to tell the post-1945 story of International Security Studies and offer an integrated historical sociology of the whole field • Opens the door to a long-overdue conversation about what ISS is and where it should be going • Provides a detailed institutional account of ISS in terms of its journals, departments, think tanks and funding sources

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The Evolution of International Security Studies

We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History

Two assumptions dominate current foreign policy debates in the United States and China. First, the United States is in decline relative to China. Second, much of this decline is the result of globalization and the hegemonic burdens the United States bears to sustain globalization. Both of these assumptions are wrong. The United States is not in decline; in fact, it is now wealthier, more innovative, and more militarily powerful compared to China than it was in 1991. Moreover, globalization and hegemony do not erode U.S. power; they reinforce it. The United States derives competitive advantages from its hegemonic position, and globalization allows it to exploit these advantages, attracting economic activity and manipulating the international system to its benefit. The United States should therefore continue to prop up the global economy and maintain a robust diplomatic and military presence abroad.

China's Century?: Why America's Edge Will Endure

The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone

Previous studies of U.S. foreign aid have firmly established that foreign policy and domestic considerations strongly influence allocations of military and economic development assistance. Uncharted, however, is the question of similar influences on U.S. humanitarian aid. Analyzing U.S. foreign disaster assistance data from 1964 through 1995, this paper concludes that foreign policy and domestic factors not only influence disaster assistance allocations but that they are the overriding determinant. This impact is, however, somewhat differential: the initial “yes/no” decision to grant disaster assistance is markedly political, but the subsequent “how much” decision is also not devoid of political considerations.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2005.00324.x

The Politics of Humanitarian Aid: U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, 1964–1995

Despite new tensions surrounding the March 2004 presidential elections on Taiwan, the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC) have witnessed over the last two years an impressive and unexpected warming of relations. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, there have been a series of high-level meetings between U.S. and Chinese leaders. China backed U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan and actively supports the new regime of Hamid Karzai in Kabul.' The past year has seen substantial U.S.-Chinese cooperation in the sphere of counterterrorism, including the sharing of intelligence and the arrest of several suspected terrorists.2 Surprising many, Beijing has supported the United States on all major United Nations Security Council resolutions related to the 2003 Iraq war. Even more significant, China's quiet efforts to resolve the nuclear standoff on the Korean Peninsula have profoundly impressed American observers.3 Many experts are convinced that a major corner has been turned in the United States-China relationship, with Beijing embracing a much more proAmerican foreign policy. An alternative explanation, however, holds that Chinese leaders have instead opted for a pause in the evolving Sino-American strategic rivalry. Diplomatic gestures support the optimistic view of United States-China relations, but close inspection of ongoing Chinese military developments provides ample evidence for both caution and concern. Indeed, while the U.S. military remains focused on the Middle East, the Korean Peninsula, and Central Asia, China continues its rapid military modern-

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/4137452.pdf

Undersea Dragons: China's Maturing Submarine Force

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The Great North Korean Famine:Famine, Politics, and Foreign Policy

: This article, published in 2004 in China's most prestigious military journal, China Military Science, merits special attention as a cogent explanation for the recent acceleration in China's naval development that has been manifested by the wide array of sophisticated warships that have emerged from Chinese shipyards since 2000. Xu asserts that contemporary Chinese maritime geostrategy is powerfully informed by a tragic history in which "China's rulers shut the door to the outside world [and] the sea . . . was neglected. . . . [Thus,] the sea became a springboard for invaders." But the geostrategic environment for China's maritime expansion is now favorable, because of a confluence of global trends, including the collapse of the USSR, the 9/11 attacks on the United States, the emergence of a "large Chinese economic bloc" as a global force, and Beijing's newly agile diplomacy. The author reviews a number of aspects of China's maritime development, ranging from expanding commerce to new construction projects in the Indian Ocean. Senior Captain Xu's rationale for an expanded PLA Navy rests on his contention that China's "long period of prosperity [as well as] the Chinese nation's existence, development, and great resurgence [all] increasingly rely on the sea." He also is frank in his concern about "a concentration of strategic power in the Asia-Pacific region on [China's] maritime flank."

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Maritime Geostrategy and the Development of the Chinese Navy in the Early Twenty-first Century

One of the key issues facing naval strategists and planners is whether China poses a threat. The editors of this hot-topic book - professors and analysts at the U.S. Naval War College and co-founders of the new China Maritime Studies Group - have compiled together the thinking of today's leading experts in the field to focus on one aspect of that potential threat: the emergence of a viable Chinese nuclear submarine force. Conceding that no one can know for certain China's intentions in terms of future conflict, the editors invoke the "fleet in being" and deterrence strategic concepts, contending that actual usage of offensive weapons is virtually irrelevant; the mere existence of a Chinese maritime threat requires that the United States be prepared to defend against it no matter if it is ever actually employed. To do otherwise is the height of strategic folly and inexcusable negligence in terms of national defense. Packed with useful data and cogent analysis, the essays in this book are essential reading for anyone with an interest in the future of the U.S. Navy and the nation that it defends.

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China’s Future Nuclear Submarine Force

This research reveals a new consensus among scholars in both Moscow and Beijing that the 1969 Sino-Soviet border crisis was a premeditated act of violence orchestrated by the Chinese side. International and domestic causes are investigated for their strength in explaining China's belligerence. There has been a widespread belief among sinologists that China acted out of desperation against Soviet strength and aggressiveness, which had been demonstrated most clearly by the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia and the associated “Brezhnev Doctrine.” The author presents evidence that challenges this traditional interpretation. Rather, a stronger explanation for China's aggressiveness in March 1969 is Mao's need at that particular time for an external threat to unify the country. The article additionally explores the implications of these revelations for the study of Chinese foreign policy and international relations generally.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3657368.pdf

Lyle Goldstein

Papers

Undersea Dragons: China's Maturing Submarine Force

The Great North Korean Famine:Famine, Politics, and Foreign Policy

Maritime Geostrategy and the Development of the Chinese Navy in the Early Twenty-first Century

China’s Future Nuclear Submarine Force

Return to Zhenbao Island: Who Started Shooting and Why it Matters