This paper first presents a formulation for a class of hierarchial problems that show a two-stage decision making process; this formulation is termed multilevel programming and could be defined, in...

https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1057%2Fjors.1981.156.pdf

A Representation and Economic Interpretation of a Two-Level Programming Problem

This paper contains a bibliography of all references central to bilevel and multilevel programming that the authors know of. It should be regarded as a dynamic and permanent contribution since all the new and appropriate references that are brought to our attention will be periodically added to this bibliography. Readers are invited to suggest such additions, as well as corrections or modifications, and to obtain a copy of the LaTeX and BibTeX files that constitute this manuscript, using the guidelines contained in this paper. To classify some of the references in this bibliography a short overview of past and current research in bilevel and multilevel programming is included. For those who are interested in but unfamiliar with the references in this area, we hope that this bibliography facilitates and encourages their research.

Bilevel and multilevel programming: A bibliography review

Decentralized planning has long been recognized as an important decision making problem. Many approaches based on the concepts of large-scale system decomposition have generally lacked the ability to model the type of truly independent subsystems which often exist in practice. Multilevel programming models partition control over decision variables among ordered levels within a hierarchical planning structure. A planner at one level of the hierarchy may have his objective function and set of feasible decisions determined, in part, by other levels. However, his control instruments may allow him to influence the policies at other levels and thereby improve his own objective function. This paper examines the special case of the two-level linear programming problem. Geometric characterizations and algorithms are presented with some examples. The goal is to demonstrate the tractability of such problems and motivate a wider interest in their study.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2631591

Two-Level Linear Programming

In this bibliography main directions of research as well as main fields of applications of bilevel programming problems and mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints are summarized. Focus is also on the difficulties arising from nonuniqueness of lower-level optimal solutions and on optimality conditions.

Annotated Bibliography on Bilevel Programming and Mathematical Programs with Equilibrium Constraints

Decision problems involving multiple agents invariably lead to conflict and gaming. In recent years, multi-agent systems have been analyzed using approaches that explicitly assign to each agent a unique objective function and set of decision variables; the system is defined by a set of common constraints that affect all agents. The decisions made by each agent in these approaches affect the decisions made by the others and their objectives. When strategies are selected simultaneously, in a noncooperative manner, solutions are defined as equilibrium points [13,51] so that at optimality no player can do better by unilaterally altering his choice. There are other types of noncooperative decision problems, though, where there is a hierarchical ordering of the agents, and one set has the authority to strongly influence the preferences of the other agents. Such situations are analyzed using a concept known as a Stackelberg strategy [13, 14,46]. The hierarchical optimization problem [11, 16, 23] conceptually extends the open-loop Stackelberg model toK players. In this paper, we provide a brief introduction and survey of recent work in the literature, and summarize the contributions of this volume. It should be noted that the survey is not meant to be exhaustive, but rather to place recent papers in context.

Hierarchical optimization: an introduction

This paper presents a model for determining how a central government can most efficiently allocate resources among other levels of government. The model explicitly includes the fact that lower levels of government can make independent decisions once they have been given resources by the central government. A key feature of the model is the mathematical formulation of the central government's objective of distributing resources efficiently, while at the same time being as fair as possible to all those receiving allocations. An algorithm for solving the model is presented along with a numerical example.

M. J. L. Kirby

Papers

Efficient Distribution of Resources Through Three Levels of Government