1. Introduction 2. Fear, interest and honor 3. The spirit and its expression 4. The ancient world 5. Medieval Europe 6. From Sun King to Revolution 7. Imperialism and World War I 8. World War II 9. Hitler to Bush and beyond 10. General findings and conclusions.

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A Cultural Theory of International Relations

During the nineteenth century, states routinely defeated insurgent foes. Over the twentieth century, however, this pattern reversed itself, with states increasingly less likely to defeat insurgents or avoid meeting at least some of their demands. What accounts for this pattern of outcomes in counterinsurgency (COIN) wars? We argue that increasing mechanization within state militaries after World War I is primarily responsible for this shift. Unlike their nineteenth-century predecessors, modern militaries possess force structures that inhibit information collection among local populations. This not only complicates the process of sifting insurgents from noncombatants but increases the difficulty of selectively applying rewards and punishment among the fence-sitting population. Modern militaries may therefore inadvertently fuel, rather than deter, insurgencies. We test this argument with a new data set of 286 insurgencies (1800–2005) and a paired comparison of two U.S. Army divisions in Iraq (2003–2004). We find that higher levels of mechanization, along with external support for insurgents and the counterinsurgent's status as an occupier, are associated with an increased probability of state defeat. By contrast, we find only partial support for conventional power- and regime-based explanations, and no support for the view that rough terrain favors insurgent success.

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Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars

Charles I concentrated his energies on the construction of a new royal palace at Whitehall. Designed in the classical style by John Webb, the new Whitehall was to be the fulallment of the king’s lifelong dream to replace the sprawling and obsolete palace that he had inherited from the Tudors with one that would match the splendor and majesty of the Louvre or the Escorial. Charles I desired nothing else than that his surroundings should reoect the magniacence of his rule: “Here, at last, would be a seat of government appropriate to the system of ‘Personal Rule’ Charles I had established since dispensing with Parliament in 1629. At least until 1639, it was from here that Charles could expect to govern his realms, resplendent amid Webb’s Baroque courtyards and colonnades, during the next decade and beyond.”1 In making such ambitious plans, Charles I displayed supreme conadence that his regime would not only survive but thrive well into the future. Unfortunately for the king, his reign did not last out the 1630s. If the conventional historical wisdom that “the collapse of Charles I’s regime during the 1630s appeared ‘inevitable’” is correct, then Charles obviously suffered from selfdelusion—an unreality all too characteristic of remote and isolated rulers.2 International politics, too, has seen many instances of this type of folly, where threatened countries have failed to recognize a clear and present danger or, more typically, have simply not reacted to it or, more typically still, have responded in paltry and imprudent ways. This behavior, which I call “underbalancing,” runs directly contrary to the core prediction of structural realist

Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing

I wish to thank Dale Copeland, Bernard Finel, Benjamin Frankel, Benjamin Miller, Jennifer Sterling-Folker, and the anonymous reviewers for International Security for comments on various drafts. I am responsible for any remaining errors or omissions. Earlier versions of this article were presented at the 1999 annual meetings of the International Studies Association and the American Political Science Association.

Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited

A method of demolishing a consolidated and hardened iron ore powder body contained in a hold of an iron ore carrier, which comprises the steps of: placing at least one mechanical member in the hold of the iron ore carrier, before the iron ore in a slurry state is charged into the hold; loading the iron in a slurry state into the hold; and causing the mechanical member to move relative to the iron ore body in which the member is buried, at the time of unloading the iron ore which has already been consolidated and hardened.

The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World

1. Introduction Williamson Murray and MacGregor Knox 2. 'As if a new sun had arisen': England's fourteenth-century RMA Clifford J. Rogers 3. Forging the Western army in seventeenth-century France John A. Lynn 4. Mass politics and nationalism as military revolution: the French Revolution and after MacGregor Knox 5. Surviving military revolution: the US Civil War Mark Grimsley 6. The Prusso-German RMA, 1840-71 Dennis E. Showalter 7. The battlefleet revolution, 1885-1914 Holger H. Herwig 8. The First World War and the birth of modern warfare Jonathan B. A. Bailey 9. May 1940: contingency and fragility of the German RMA Williamson Murray 10. Conclusion: the future behind us Williamson Murray and MacGregor Knox.

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The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050

Introduction: war and revolution in Europe, 1789-1945 Part I. Origins and Dynamics: 1. Italy and Germany from unification to militant dictatorship, 1860-1933 2. Conquest, foreign and domestic, in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany Part II. Foreign Policies and Military Instruments: 3. Fascism and Italian foreign polity: continuity and break 4. The Italian army at war, 1940-43: a study in combat effectiveness 5. The Prussian idea of freedom and the 'career open to talent': battlefield initiative and social ascent from Prussian reform to Nazi revolution, 1807-1944 Conclusion: expansionist zeal, fighting power, and staying power in the Italian and German dictatorships.

MacGregor Knox

Papers

The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050

Common Destiny: Dictatorship, Foreign Policy, and War in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany

The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War.

Common Destiny: Dictatorship, Foreign Policy, and War in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany

Mussolini Unleashed, 1939-1941: Politics and Strategy in Fascist Italy's Last War