If child labor as a mass phenomenon occurs not because of parental selfishness but because of the parents' concern for the household's survival, the popular argument for banning child labor loses much of its force. However, this assumption about parental decision-making coupled with the assumption of substitutability in production between child and adult labor could result in multiple equilibria in the labor market, with one equilibrium where children work and another where adult wage is high and children do not work. The paper establishes this result and discusses its policy implications.

The Economics of Child Labor

An increase in the size of the informal sector hurts growth by reducing the availability for public services for everyone in the economy and increasing the number of activities that use some existing public services less efficiently or not at all. Loayza presents the view that informal economies arise when governments impose excessive taxes and regulations that they are unable to enforce. Loayza studies the determinants and effects of the informal sector using an endogenous growth model whose production technology depends essentially on congestable public services. In this model, changes (in both policy parameters and the quality of government institutions) that promote an increase in the relative size of the informal economy will also generate a reduction in the rate of economic growth. Using data from Latin American countries in the early 1990s, Loayza tests some of the model's implications and estimates the size of the informal sector in these countries - identifying the size of the informal sector to latent variable for which multiple causes and indicators exist. The results suggest that: The size of the informal sector depends positively on proxies for tax burden and restrictions on the labor market. It depends negatively on a proxy for the quality of government institutions. An increase in the size of the informal sector hurts growth by reducing the availability of public services for everyone in the economy and by increasing the number of activities that use some existing public services less efficiently or not at all. This paper - a product of the Macroeconomics and Growth Division, Policy Research Department - is part of a larger effort in the department to examine the determinants of economic growth.

The Economics of the Informal Sector: A Simple Model and Some Empirical Evidence from Latin America

Should child labor be banned outright? Should the World Trade Organization be given the responsibility to discourage child labor using trade sanctions? The answer to this complicated problem depends on the economic milieu, says Basu. At least 120 million of the world's children aged 5 to 14 worked full-time in 1995, most of them under hazardous, unhygienic conditions, for more than 10 hours a day. This is an old problem worldwide but particularly so in Third World countries in recent decades. What has changed, with globalization, is our awareness of these child laborers. (The International Labour Organisation distinguishes between child work, which could include light household chores and could have some learning value, and child labor, a pejorative phrase.) By bringing together the main theoretical ideas, Basu hopes to encourage both more theoretical research and empirical work with a better theoretical foundation. Among other things, Basu observes that: ° The problem is most serious in Africa, where the child-labor participation rate is 26.2 percent. The rate is 12.8 percent in Asia. But since 1950, the trend is a decline in that participation rate worldwide. For most Latin American countries, the decline is notable but less marked than in Asia. In large parts of Africa, including Ethiopia, the problem has been extremely persistent, but even there the trend is downward. ° Child labor has not always been considered evil, and there is no consensus on why it began to decline. In some (not all) countries legislative acts declared it illegal, in some there were rules about compulsory education, and increasing prosperity generally made families less likely to experience poverty if their children weren't working. ° Mandating compulsory education is regarded as more effective than outlawing child labor, because attendance at school is easier to monitor, but some experts believe economic progress is the answer to the problem. The justification for many interventions is that the state is more concerned about the well-being of children than their parents are; Basu believes such an assumption to be wrong when child labor occurs as a mass phenomenon rather than as isolated abuse. Basu argues that, in some economies, the market for labor may exhibit multiple equilibria, with one equilibrium having low adult wage and a high incidence of child labor and another equilibrium exhibiting high adult wage and no child labor. The model is used to provide a framework for analyzing the role of international labor standards. This paper - a product of the Office of the Senior Vice President, Development Economics - is part of a larger effort in the Bank to promote understanding of the causes of child labor. The study was funded by the Bank`s Research Support Budget under the research project Literacy and Child Labor (RPO 683-07). The author may be contacted at kbasu@worldbank.org.

Child Labor: Cause, Consequence, and Cure, with Remarks on International Labor Standards

Agrifood industry transformation and small farmers in developing countries

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The economics of the informal sector : a simple model and some empirical evidence from Latin America

Rural-urban migration, informal sector and development policies: a theoretical analysis.

The paper presents a theory of interest rate determination on informal credit in backward agriculture when there is a market for formal credit. The farmer has to bribe the official of the formal credit agency in order to get formal credit. The official and the moneylender play a non-cooperative game in choosing the amount of formal credit and the informal interest rate, respectively. The informal-sector interest rate and the effective formal-sector interest rate (incorporating the bribe) are equal in equilibrium. A reduction in the formal interest rate and/or an increase in the price of the product may lead to an increase in the equilibrium bribing rate and the informal interest rate when the formal credit and the informal credit are complementary to each other.

Formal Credit, Corruption and the Informal Credit Market in Agriculture: a Theoretical Analysis

This article considers a competitive general equilibrium model of a small, open less developed economy which exports products using child labour, the supply of which varies inversely with the rate of unemployment in the adult labour market. The effects of policies such as trade sanctions and the subsidisation or protection of adult labour are analysed. It is suggested that the former may actually aggravate the child labour problem, if the unemployment effect dominates the wage effect. On the other hand, theoretical analysis indicates that trade and fiscal policies influencing the effective producers' price of the products of adult labour might be a more effective approach to the problem.

Trade Sanctions, Adult Unemployment and the Supply of Child Labour: A Theoretical Analysis

A theory of wage determination of a child worker is presented using the consumption efficiency hypothesis and the Nash bargaining technique. The employer and the guardian of the child play the bargaining game. The model shows some interesting results regarding the split of the wage between the consumption of the child and the income of the guardian.

Manash Ranjan Gupta

Papers

Rural-urban migration, informal sector and development policies: a theoretical analysis.

Formal Credit, Corruption and the Informal Credit Market in Agriculture: a Theoretical Analysis

Trade Sanctions, Adult Unemployment and the Supply of Child Labour: A Theoretical Analysis

Trade Sanctions, Adult Unemployment and the Supply of Child Labour: A Theoretical Analysis

Wage Determination of a Child Worker: A Theoretical Analysis