Recent large-N studies of civil war conclude that inequality does not increase the risk of violent conflict. This article argues that such conclusions may be premature because these studies, which usually test the conflict potential of ‘vertical inequality’ (i.e. income inequality between individuals), tend to neglect the group aspect of inequality. Case studies suggest that what matters for conflict is a concept closely linked to both economic and ethnic polarization: ‘horizontal inequalities’, or inequalities that coincide with identity-based cleavages. Horizontal inequalities may enhance both grievances and group cohesion among the relatively deprived and thus facilitate mobilization for conflict. This article provides a quantitative test of this argument, exploring whether various forms of polarization and horizontal inequalities affect the probability of civil conflict onset across 36 developing countries in the period 1986–2004. National household data from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) are used to construct measures of ethnic, social and economic polarization, as well as vertical and horizontal inequalities along two dimensions: social and economic. The article also introduces a combined measure of ethnic/socioeconomic polarization as an alternative to the horizontal inequality measure. Robust results from panel and cross-section analyses show that social polarization and horizontal social inequality are positively related to conflict outbreak. Variables for purely ethnic polarization, inter-individual inequalities and combined ethnic/socio-economic polarization are not significant.

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Polarization, Horizontal Inequalities and Violent Civil Conflict:

A Study of War.

Contradictory findings, that economic inequality may have a positive, negative, or no impact on political conflict, are a puzzle for conflict studies. Three approaches have been used t o explain the inconsistent findings of the EI-PC (Economic Inequality-Political Conflict) nexus: statistical modeling, formal modeling, and theory building. Because analysts have tended to possess different research skills, these three approaches have been employed in isolation from one another. Singly, however, all three approaches have proved deficient and are unlikely to solve the EI-PC puzzle. The most fruitful approach is to combine the assumptions of the theory builders and the deductive approach of the formal modelers with the various empirical tests of the statistical modelers. Such an approach to the EI-PC puzzle produces a crucial test of the Deprived Actor and Rational Actor theories of conflict. The approach is also our best hope for solving the other long-standing puzzles in conflict studies.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0043887100010789

An Evaluation of “Does Economic Inequality Breed Political Conflict?” Studies

This article argues that social welfare policies may reduce international and domestic terrorism. Social policies likely affect terrorism in offsetting ways but, on balance, should diminish prefere...

On Welfare and Terror: Social Welfare Policies and Political-Economic Roots of Terrorism

Previous studies have identified but failed to explain satisfactorily the positive relationship between income inequality and homicide rates. This paper proposes an explanation based on the concept of relative deprivation, but also reviews the criminological literature in a search for other theoretically relevant variables. After assessing problems of sampling and measurement, and using a considerably larger sample than used in previous studies, multiple regression analyses reveal positive net effects of both inequality and population growth (reflecting a higher proportion of young people) on homicide rates. Further analyses show that the effects of inequality on homicide are more pronounced in more democratic nations, a finding supporting the relative deprivation explanation. Income inequality also has stronger effects in more densely populated countries, in wealthier nations, and in countries with larger internal security forces.

Income inequality and homicide rates: cross-national data and criminological theories

Some degree of political unrest and thus potential for violence exists in all societies at all times. In recent years, the causes of political unrest are attributed to one or more sociopsychological traits or geopolitical factors. Economic explanations are absent or lack modern quantitative approach. This study is an attempt to test some of the old and new theories of political unrest, and to extend, modify, and synthetize others in a unified theoretical framework. Thus, etiologically, universal economic factors in contrast to noneconomic, particular, or local factors are considered and methodologically a multifactor analysis is adopted. Theoretically, neither exclusivity nor primacy of economic factors is assumed; however, empirical results demonstrate their importance as main explanatory variables of political violence. In contrast to general belief, it is shown that political unrest is not a monotonically explained variable for the entire range of explanatory factors such as relative deprivation. Thus,...

Economic Determinants of Political Unrest: An Econometric Approach

There exists a need in less---as well as more---advanced economies for human resource development as an integral part of a planning program and a means of avoiding structural or sectoral unemployment. As a first approximation in planning a human capital structure for a given country, a set of ratios such as students per teacher, inhabitants per physician, nurse or lawyer, etc., may be considered a long-run plan objective. In this paper, economic as well as demographic and educational factors and parameters are used to construct a production function for human capital structure which is called the technical model. The technical model is subsequently used as a constraint in the determination and analysis of the least-cost condition of achieving alternative plans.

One of the theoretical results here is that such ratios become larger as the average percentage of student “dropouts” per year increase. The model shows that the marginal cost of improving the quality of human capital by a requirement for a longer training period or by the establishment of stiffer educational standards is an increasing function of such educational variables. Finally, the model gives an explicit algebraic expression for the qualitative-quantitative transformation-professional expertise vs. the number of personnel produced-existing in the production of human capital for equal or comparable costs. The model can be used for regional as well as global planning and in a mixed capitalist as well as a socialist economy.

/pdf/planning-human-capital-structure-a-study-of-economic-3l016a3yap.pdf

Manoucher Parvin

Papers

Economic Determinants of Political Unrest: An Econometric Approach

Planning Human Capital Structure: A Study of Economic, Demographic and Educational Determinants: Erratum