WHEN T H E BROOKINGS Panel on Economic Activity began in 1970, the world economy roughly accorded with the idea of three distinct economic systems: a capitalist first world, a socialist second world, and a developing third world which aimed for a middle way between the first two. The third world was characterized not only by its low levels of per capita GDP, but also by a distinctive economic system that assigned the state sector the predominant role in industrialization, although not the monopoly on industrial ownership as in the socialist economies. The years between 1970 and 1995, and especially the last decade, have witnessed the most remarkable institutional harmonization and economic integration among nations in world history. While economic integration was increasing throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the extent of integration has come sharply into focus only since the collapse of communism in 1989. In 1995 one dominant global economic system is emerging. The common set of institutions is exemplified by the new World Trade Organization (WTO), which was established by agreement of more than 120 economies, with almost all the rest eager to join as rapidly as possible. Part of the new trade agreement involves a codification of basic principles governing trade in goods and services. Similarly, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) now boasts nearly universal membership, with member countries pledged to basic principles of currency convertibility. Most programs of economic reform now underway in the developing world and in the post-communist world have as their strategic aim the

/pdf/economic-reform-and-the-process-of-global-integration-29a1wosjcb.pdf

Economic Reform and the Process of Global Integration

Econometric policy evaluation: A critique

This paper solves explicitly a simple equilibrium model with liquidity risk. In our liquidityadjusted capital asset pricing model, a security s required return depends on its expected liquidity as well as on the covariances of its own return and liquidity with the market return and liquidity. In addition, a persistent negative shock to a security s liquidity results in low contemporaneous returns and high predicted future returns. The model provides a unified framework for understanding the various channels through which liquidity risk may affect asset prices. Our empirical results shed light on the total and relative economic significance of these channels and provide evidence of flight to liquidity. r 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Market Liquidity: Asset Pricing with Liquidity Risk

Financial systems are crucial to the allocation of resources in a modern economy. They channel household savings to the corporate sector and allocate investment funds among firms; they allow intertemporal smoothing of consumption by households and expenditures by firms; and they enable households and firms to share risks. These functions are common to the financial systems of most developed economies. Yet the form of these financial systems varies widely. In the United States and the United Kingdom competitive markets dominate the financial landscape, whereas in France, Germany, and Japan banks have traditionally played the most important role. Why do different countries have such different financial systems? Is one system better than all the others? Do different systems merely represent alternative ways of satisfying similar needs? Is the current trend toward market-based systems desirable? Franklin Allen and Douglas Gale argue that the view that market-based systems are best is simplistic. A more nuanced approach is necessary. For example, financial markets may be bad for risk sharing; competition in banking may be inefficient; financial crises can be good as well as bad; and separation of ownership and control can be optimal. Financial institutions are not simply veils, disguising the allocation mechanism without affecting it, but are crucial to overcoming market imperfections. An optimal financial system relies on both financial markets and financial intermediaries.

比较金融系统 = Comparing financial systems

1. Introduction: 1.A Motivation 1.B Objectives and contributions 1.C Key findings: a brief synopsis 1.D Guide to the book 2. Contrasting approaches to bank regulation: 2.A Two approaches to bank regulation: 2.A.1 Public interest approach 2.A.2 Private interest view of regulation 2.B Bank regulation: how 2.C The Basel Committee and regulatory convergence 2.D Conclusion 3. How are banks regulated and supervised around the world?: 3.A Overview 3.B Structure, scope and independence of regulation and supervision 3.C What is a 'bank'? 3.D Entry into banking, capital requirements and supervisory powers 3.E Explicit deposit insurance schemes 3.F Private monitoring and external governance 3.G Does bank ownership type affect the choice of regulations and supervisory practices? 3.H Forces for greater harmonization of regulation and supervision among countries 4. What works best: 4.A Goals and boundaries 4.B Bank regulation and supervision and bank development 4.C Bank supervision, regulation, and stability 4.D Bank supervision, regulation, and bank efficiency 4.E Bank supervision, regulation, and bank lending 4.F Supervision, regulation, and bank governance 4.G Summary of results 5. Choosing bank regulations 5.A Recap and motivation 5.B Motivating example: Mexico and the United States 5.C Conceptual framework 5.D Empirical framework and data 5.E Summary remarks 6. Rethinking bank regulation: 6.A Approach and context 6.B Lessons and implications.

Rethinking Bank Regulation: Till Angels Govern

Since the successful first edition of The Gold Standard in Theory and History was published in 1985, much new research has been completed. This updated version contains five new essays including: * post 1990 literature on exchange rate target zones * a discussion of the light shed by the gold standard on the European Monetary Union debate * a new introduction by Eichengreen with Marc Flandreau This will be an invaluable resource for students of macroeconomics, international economics and economic history at all levels.

The gold standard in theory and history

Much as Paul David described the invention of the mechanical typewriter – it was invented 51 times before being patented by Christopher Sholes in 1867, licensed to the Remington Company and successfully commercialized – the connections between the gold-exchange standard and the Great Depression have been discovered repeatedly. They were discovered by Ehsan Choudhri and Levis Kochin in a seminal article in 1980. They were discovered by Barry Eichengreen and Jeffrey Sachs in articles published in 1985 and 1986. They were discovered by James Hamilton in an insightful article published in 1988. They were discovered by Peter Temin in his Robbins Lectures published in 1989. They were discovered by the now chairman of the Federal Reserve Board in his 1994 Journal of Money Credit and Banking Lecture. Moreover, these contributors to the contemporary literature had important antecedents, including Robert Triffin in the 1950s, Ragnar Nurkse in the 1940s, and Leo Pasvolsky in the 1930s.

/pdf/the-rise-and-fall-of-the-dollar-or-when-did-the-dollar-5gck25ybst.pdf

The rise and fall of the dollar (or when did the dollar replace sterling as the leading reserve currency

The gold standard was a system of fixed exchange rates that offered little opportunity for carrying out monetary policies, short of suspending gold convertibility. Trade integration and capital mobility were very high. It is worthwhile asking whether there are useful lessons to draw for EMU from European experience during that period. One clear lesson is that debts matter. Another basic finding is that the stability of the European gold standard depended on the underlying price trend. Deflation prior to 1895 resulted in rising public debt burdens, which forced some countries to leave the system. Once gold was discovered and deflation gave way to inflation, real interest service fell, debts grew more slowly and a high degree of convergence allowed most countries to return to gold. For EMU, this result implies that stability will hinge on the ECB’s policy not being too restrictive. Other lessons concern the fragility of institutions in the face of deep public finance difficulties, the risks for the single market of leaving out countries that have not fully converged, and the existence of a virtuous cycle including low real interest rates, fast growth and debt deccumulation.

https://hal-sciencespo.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01037858/document

Stability without a pact? Lessons from the European Gold Standard, 1880-1913

This article attempts to provide a new view of how the bimetallic standard was maintained before 1873 and how it came to change into a monometallic gold standard between 1870 and 1880. The conventional view that the gold standard emerged out of the contradictions of bimetallism is not persuasive. Instead, this article claims that bimetallism might have survived and provides an alternative explanation of the emergence of the gold standard. Political and historical factors proved essential in precipitating the uncoordinated emergence of the international gold standard.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2123513.pdf

The French Crime of 1873: An Essay on the Emergence of the International Gold Standard, 1870–1880

Stability pacts

European lessons from the gold standard

The gold standard was a system of fixed exchange rates that offered little opportunity for carrying out monetary policies, short of suspending gold convertibility. Trade integration and capital mobility were very high. It is worthwhile asking whether there are useful lessons to draw for EMU from European experience during that period. One clear lesson is that debts matter. Another basic finding is that the stability of the European gold standard depended on the underlying price trend. Deflation prior to 1895 resulted in rising public debt burdens, which forced some countries to leave the system. Once gold was discovered and deflation gave way to inflation, real interest service fell, debts grew more slowly and a high degree of convergence allowed most countries to return to gold. For EMU, this result implies that stability will hinge on the ECB's policy not being too restrictive. Other lessons concern the fragility of institutions in the face of deep public finance difficulties, the risks for the single market of leaving out countries that have not fully converged, and the existence of a virtuous cycle including low real interest rates, fast growth and debt reduction

— Marc Flandreau, Jacques Le Cacheux and Frederic Zumer

Marc Flandreau

Papers

The gold standard in theory and history

The rise and fall of the dollar (or when did the dollar replace sterling as the leading reserve currency

Stability without a pact? Lessons from the European Gold Standard, 1880-1913

The French Crime of 1873: An Essay on the Emergence of the International Gold Standard, 1870–1880

Stability without a pact? Lessons from the European gold standard, 1880—1914