Showing papers by "Marco Chiesa published in 2012"
01 Jan 2012
TL;DR: If message timings are unrestricted, BGP can simulate a combinational logic circuit, which allows us to prove the NP-hardness of a new variant of a well-known BGP problem.
Abstract: Because of its practical relevance, the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) has been the target of a huge research and industrial effort since more than a decade and a BGP routing theory has been developed out of that effort. In this paper, we show that there exists a mapping between BGP and a logic circuit. We show simple networks with routers with elementary BGP configurations that simulate logic gates, clocks and flip-flops, and we show how to interconnect them to simulate arbitrary logic circuits. We then investigate the implications of such a mapping on the computational complexity of BGP problems. We show that, under reasonable assumptions on message timings, BGP has the same computing power as a Turing Machine. As a consequence, we devise a new method for studying the complexity of analyzing BGP configurations and exploit such a method to give several new complexity bounds. Also, if message timings are unrestricted, BGP can simulate a combinational logic circuit, which allows us to prove the NP-hardness of a new variant of a well-known BGP problem. Finally, we investigate whether the mapping is still feasible when BGP policies are restricted, e.g., in iBGP or when Local Transit Policies or Gao-Rexford conditions are enforced.
4 citations
Posted Content•
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors study how difficult it is for a malicious AS to devise a strategy for hijacking or intercepting a traffic flow between two autonomous systems (ASes) and show that this problem marks a sharp difference between BGP and S-BGP.
Abstract: Harmful Internet hijacking incidents put in evidence how fragile the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is, which is used to exchange routing information between Autonomous Systems (ASes). As proved by recent research contributions, even S-BGP, the secure variant of BGP that is being deployed, is not fully able to blunt traffic attraction attacks. Given a traffic flow between two ASes, we study how difficult it is for a malicious AS to devise a strategy for hijacking or intercepting that flow. We show that this problem marks a sharp difference between BGP and S-BGP. Namely, while it is solvable, under reasonable assumptions, in polynomial time for the type of attacks that are usually performed in BGP, it is NP-hard for S-BGP. Our study has several by-products. E.g., we solve a problem left open in the literature, stating when performing a hijacking in S-BGP is equivalent to performing an interception.
3 citations
09 Jul 2012
TL;DR: It is shown that while it is solvable, under reasonable assumptions, in polynomial time for the type of attacks that are usually performed in BGP, it is NP-hard for S-BGP.
Abstract: Harmful Internet hijacking incidents put in evidence how fragile the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is, which is used to exchange routing information between Autonomous Systems (ASes). As proved by recent research contributions, even S-BGP, the secure variant of BGP that is being deployed, is not fully able to blunt traffic attraction attacks. Given a traffic flow between two ASes, we study how difficult it is for a malicious AS to devise a strategy for hijacking or intercepting that flow. We show that this problem marks a sharp difference between BGP and S-BGP. Namely, while it is solvable, under reasonable assumptions, in polynomial time for the type of attacks that are usually performed in BGP, it is NP-hard for S-BGP. Our study has several by-products. E.g., we solve a problem left open in the literature, stating when performing a hijacking in S-BGP is equivalent to performing an interception.
2 citations