1.. HARD CASES 5. Legal Rights A. Legislation . . . We might therefore do well to consider how a philosophical judge might develop, in appropriate cases, theories of what legislative purpose and legal principles require. We shall find that he would construct these theories in the same manner as a philosophical referee would construct the character of a game. I have invented, for this purpose, a lawyer of superhuman skill, learning, patience and acumen, whom I shall call Hercules. I suppose that Hercules is a judge in some representative American jurisdiction. I assume that he accepts the main uncontroversial constitutive and regulative rules of the law in his jurisdiction. He accepts, that is, that statutes have the general power to create and extinguish legal rights, and that judges have the general duty to follow earlier decisions of their court or higher courts whose rationale, as l

Taking Rights Seriously

In the first two volumes of this work, Paul Ricoeur examined the relations between time and narrative in historical writing, fiction, and theories of literature. This final volume, a comprehensive reexamination and synthesis of the ideas developed in volumes 1 and 2, stands as Ricoeur's most complete and satisfying presentation of his own philosophy.

Time and Narrative

Genevieve Lloyd has edited a comprehensive collection of learned critical discussions of Spinoza's philosophy, covering the intellectual context in which he worked and the influence of his thought, as well as the published works.

The political writings

Buying time: The delayed crisis of democratic capitalism

Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace. Lawrence Lessig. New York: Basic Books, 1999. 230 pp. $21 hbk. Lawrence Lessig's Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace is perhaps the most original book yet written about cyberspace law. With an accessible style that is rich in anecdotes and metaphors and surprisingly low on legal and technical jargon, Lessig, a constitutional law scholar at Harvard and a consultant on the Microsoft antitrust case, writes for a wide scholarly audience. Even more than the recent The Control Revolution (New York: Century Foundation, 1999) by Andrew Shapiro, Lessig has managed to write about a rapidly evolving subject at a level of abstraction and theoretical sophistication that ensures that his contribution will long remain relevant. Central to Lessig's theoretical framework is his breakdown of four modalities of regulation: law, economic markets, norms, and an intriguing category he calls "architecture." Architecture includes constraints that the natural world imposes or that people construct-for example, speed bumps on roads. The architecture in cyberspace is computer code: code constructs the cyber-world. Consider the example of pornography regulation. Lessig contrasts how these four modalities of regulation control access to pornography in "real space" and in cyberspace, vividly demonstrating why a simple translation of existing law from "real space" to cyberspace is often impossible. In real space, pornography is extensively regulated through all four modalities, in ways that limit children's access to it. Laws require that vendors sell pornography only to adults. Markets prevent children from accessing pornography because it costs money. Norms help limit children's access to pornography, both by stigmatizing pornography and stigmatizing dealers who would sell it to children. In the category of real space "architecture," there is the simple matter of how a child is: even if a child attempted to disguise himself as an adult, he would probably notbe successful at fooling a salesperson. These four kinds of constraints may be imperfect, but are reasonably effective in limiting children's access to pornography in real space, Lessig contends. In cyberspace, however, the modalities of regulation of pornography operate differently and less effectively. Law is unsettled. Markets are different in at least two ways: distribution of digital files is much cheaper than distribution of printed material or videos, and though there are plenty of commercial pornography sites, much pornography can be accessed at no cost through newsgroups. Differences in the "architecture" of cyberspace are crucial because they allow faceless transactions. Faceless transactions may make disguising identity and age simple, therefore allowing a child to avoid the restrictions of law and norms. Thus the "real space" regulatory regime is upset, making pornography generally more available to children in cyberspace. Ways of filtering content or zoning the Internet are now extensively debated, but no simple transfer of the offline constraints to cyberspace seems possible. As he applies his theory to pornography regulation and the regulation of intellectual property and privacy, Lessig emphasizes that not only the codes of law but computer codethe "architecture" of cyberspace-an "embed" values and enable government and private actors to control behavior. …

Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace

What is the material context of constitutional order? The purpose of this paper is to offer an answer to that question by sketching a theory of the material constitution. After examining the historical origins of the material turn in the interwar constitutional theories of Heller and Mortati, the paper outlines the basic elements of the material constitution, specifying its four ordering forces. These are political unity, the dominant form of which remains the modern nation-state; a set of institutions, including but not limited to formal governmental branches such as courts, parliaments, executives, administrations; a network of social relations, including class interests and social movements, and a set of fundamental political objectives (or teloi). These forces constitute the material substance and dynamic process of constitutional ordering. They are not external to the formal constitution but are in internal relation with it. Because these ordering forces are multiple, and in tension with one another, there is no single determining factor of constitutional development. Neither is order as such guaranteed. The conflict that characterizes the modern human condition might but need not be internalised by the process of constitutional ordering. The theory of the material constitution offers an account of the basic elements of this process as well as its internal dynamic.

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The material constitution

The antagonism between legal and political constitutionalism has almost monopolized the discussion on constitutional theory during the last years. For this reason, political constitutionalism has been assessed mainly as an alternative to legal constitutionalism. Moving beyond this perspective, this article intends to focus exclusively on political constitutionalism and its internal tensions. After having outlined the main tenets of this theory, two internal critiques are put forward, both concerning the understanding of the political aspect of constitutionalism: first, political constitutionalists propose a reductive account of the principle of political equality; second, their exclusive focus on ordinary politics as the centre of constitutional life is misleading and precludes a correct evaluation of constitutional politics.

Two internal critiques of political constitutionalism

Even though he is mainly known for his concept of constituent power, Sieyes was one of the first constitutional theorists to ask for a guardian of the constitution which closely resembles contemporary constitutional courts. This article reconstructs the main tenets of his proposal, puts them in the larger context of his constitutional theory and then assesses the constitutional nature and functions of this institution. The judgment is mixed: as an organ, Sieyes’ constitutional jury is a hybrid institution, neither a real third chamber nor a full-fledged constitutional court; however, its functions not only are a clear anticipation of the control of constitutionality, but are also intended to tame constituent power and to protect the rights of man in case of legal gaps.

At the Origins of Constitutional Review: Sieyès’ Constitutional Jury and the Taming of Constituent Power

Human rights protection - Proportionality - Deference - Procedural rationality - Process-review - Interplay national courts and Strasbourg court

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S1574019614001059

Marco Goldoni

Papers

The material constitution

Two internal critiques of political constitutionalism

At the Origins of Constitutional Review: Sieyès’ Constitutional Jury and the Taming of Constituent Power

The early warning system and the Monti II regulation: : the case for a political interpretation

The constitution's gift. A constitutional theory for a democratic European Union