/pdf/the-theory-of-industrial-organization-19bejph0ej.pdf

The Theory of Industrial Organization

No wonder you activities are, reading will be always needed. It is not only to fulfil the duties that you need to finish in deadline time. Reading will encourage your mind and thoughts. Of course, reading will greatly develop your experiences about everything. Reading invisible colleges diffusion of knowledge in scientific communities is also a way as one of the collective books that gives many advantages. The advantages are not only for you, but for the other peoples with those meaningful benefits.

Invisible colleges : diffusion of knowledge in scientific communities

Technology's contribution to economic growth and competitiveness has been the subject of vigorous debate in recent years. This book demonstrates the importance of a historical perspective in understanding the role of technological innovation in the economy. The authors examine key episodes and institutions in the development of the U.S. research system and in the development of the research systems of other industrial economies. They argue that the large potential contributions of economics to the understanding of technology and economic growth have been constrained by the narrow theoretical framework employed within neoclassical economies. A richer framework, they believe, will support a more fruitful dialogue among economists, policymakers, and managers on the organization of public and private institutions for innovation. David Mowery is Associate Professor of Business and Public Policy at the School of Business Administration, University of California, Berkeley. Nathan S. Rosenberg is Fairleigh Dickinson Professor of Economics at Stanford University. He is the author of Inside the Black Box: Technology and Economics (CUP, 1983).

Technology and the Pursuit of Economic Growth.

The social logic of space: Buildings and their genotypes

The original edition of this book summarized more than a decade of work on communications flow in science and engineering organizations, showing how human and organizational systems could be restructured to bring about improved productivity and better person-to-person contact. While many studies have been done since then, few of them invalidate the general conclusions and recommendations Allen offers. In a new preface he points out new developments, noting areas that need some modification, elaboration, or extension, and directing readers to the appropriate journal articles where the findings, are reported. The first three chapters provide an overview of the communication system in technology, present the author's research methods, and describe differences in the career paths and goals of engineers and scientists that cause special problems for organizations. The book then discusses how technological information is acquired by the R & D organization, shows how critical technical communication within the laboratory is for R & D performance, and originates the idea of the \"gatekeeper,\" the person who links his or her organization to the world at large. Concluding chapters take up the influence of formal and informal organization and of architecture and office layouts on communication. Many of these ideas have been successfully incorporated by architects and managers in the design of new R & D facilities and complexes. Suggested Citation Handle: RePEc:mtp:titles:0262510278 Download reference as HTML Thomas J. Allen, 1984. \"Managing the Flow of Technology: Technology Transfer and the Dissemination of Technological Information Within the R&D Organization,\" MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262510278, November. More services and features MyIDEAS Follow serials, authors, keywords & more New papers by email Subscribe to new additions to RePEc Author registration Public profiles for Economics researchers MPRA Upload your paper to be listed on RePEc and IDEAS EconAcademics Blog aggregator for economics research Plagiarism Cases of plagiarism in Economics Rankings Various rankings of research in Economics & related fields RePEc Genealogy Who was a student of whom, using RePEc RePEc Biblio Curated articles & papers on various economics topics Job market papers RePEc working paper series dedicated to the job market Fantasy league Pretend you are at the helm of an economics department Services from the StL Fed Data, research, apps & more from the St. Louis Fed IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.

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Managing the Flow of Technology: Technology Transfer and the Dissemination of Technological Information Within the R&D Organization (Book Review)

In this paper we survey several cross-section studies of cartels and a large sample of case studies of cartels in individual industries. We compare the findings of these studies of cartel activity from the 1800s through the 1980s with the characteristics of a sample of international cartels from the 1990s, and present preliminary evidence on whether the stylized facts regarding industry characteristics for historical cartels also hold for contemporary cartels. The hard lesson learned from our survey of the empirical work is that it is difficult to generalize about cartel behavior. Our examination of cartel duration concludes that cartels are neither short-lived nor long-lived; they are both. Similarly, our analysis of the effect of cartels on prices and profitability finds that there is enormous variance in cartel success at raising price to the joint-profit maximizing level. In our examination of cartel breakdowns we find, as suggested by recent theoretical literature, that cheating is a common cause. Occurring even more frequently, however, are entry, external shocks, and bargaining problems, suggesting that these issues should be given deeper consideration in future work. Stigler's hypothesis that large customers contribute to cartel breakdowns is borne out in a few case studies. But there appear to be more cases in our sample in which large customers help to stabilize the cartel. Only the oldest of suppositions, that highly concentrated industries are more prone to cartelization, seems to hold true across studies. Our inability to find more commonality among these studies and among cartels does not simply reflect our ignorance of cartel operations or secrecy on the part of cartels (or the different methodological approaches covered in this survey). Rather, it reflects the innumerable possibilities for organizing a successful cartel, and the interdependence of those factors determining cartel success.

What Determines Cartel Success

Following George Stigler (1964), many economists assume that incentive problems undermine attempts by firms to collude to raise prices and restrict output. But the potential profits from collusion can create a powerful incentive as well. Theory cannot tell us, a priori, which effect will dominate: whether or when cartels succeed is thus an empirical question. We examine a wide variety of empirical studies of cartels to answer the following questions: (1) Can cartels succeed? (2) If so, for how long? (3) What impact do cartels have? (4) What causes cartels to break up? We conclude that many cartels do survive, and that the distribution of duration is bimodal. While the average duration of cartels across a range of studies is about five years, many cartels break up very quickly (i.e., in less than a year). But there are many others that last between five and ten years, and some that last decades. Limited evidence suggests that cartels are able to increase prices and profits, to varying degrees. Cartels can also affect other non-price variables, including advertising, innovation, investment, barriers to entry, and concentration. Cartels break up occasionally because of cheating or lack of effective monitoring, but the biggest challenges cartels face are entry and adjustment of the collusive agreement in response to changing economic conditions. Cartels that develop organizational structures that allow them the flexibility to respond to these changing conditions are more likely to survive. Price wars that erupt are often the result of bargaining issues that arise in such circumstances. Sophisticated cartel organizations are also able to develop multipronged strategies to monitor one another to deter cheating and a variety of interventions to increase barriers to entry.

https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/105725/1/2002-01.pdf

What determines cartel success

We estimate the impact of cartel organizational features, as well as macroeconomic fluctuations and industry structure, on cartel duration using a data set of contemporary international cartels. We estimate a proportional hazards model with competing risks, distinguishing factors that increase the risk of “death by antitrust” from those that affect natural death, including defection, dissension, and entry. Our analysis indicates that the probability of cartel death from any cause increased significantly after 1995, when competition authorities expanded enforcement efforts toward international cartels. We find that fluctuations in firm-specific discount rates have a significant effect on cartel duration, whereas market interest rates do not. Cartels with a compensation scheme—a plan for how the cartel will handle variations in demand—are significantly less likely to break up. In contrast, retaliatory punishments in response to perceived cheating significantly increase the likelihood of natural dea...

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Breaking Up Is Hard to Do: Determinants of Cartel Duration

http://www-personal.umich.edu/~jdos/pdfs/Kaboetal_2014_RP.pdf

Proximity effects on the dynamics and outcomes of scientific collaborations

Social media enable promising new approaches to measuring economic activity and analyzing economic behavior at high frequency and in real time using information independent from standard survey and administrative sources. This paper uses data from Twitter to create indexes of job loss, job search, and job posting. Signals are derived by counting job-related phrases in Tweets such as "lost my job." The social media indexes are constructed from the principal components of these signals. The University of Michigan Social Media Job Loss Index tracks initial claims for unemployment insurance at medium and high frequencies and predicts 15 to 20 percent of the variance of the prediction error of the consensus forecast for initial claims. The social media indexes provide real-time indicators of events such as Hurricane Sandy and the 2013 government shutdown. Comparing the job loss index with the search and posting indexes indicates that the Beveridge Curve has been shifting inward since 2011. The University of Michigan Social Media Job Loss index is update weekly and is available athttp://econprediction.eecs.umich.edu/.Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Margaret C. Levenstein

Papers

What Determines Cartel Success

What determines cartel success

Breaking Up Is Hard to Do: Determinants of Cartel Duration

Proximity effects on the dynamics and outcomes of scientific collaborations

Using Social Media to Measure Labor Market Flows