Why would government officials in authoritarian and transitional systems where formal democratic and bureaucratic institutions of accountability are often weak ever provide more than the minimum level of public goods needed to maintain social stability? Findings from a unique combination of in-depth case study research and an original survey of 316 villages in rural China indicate that even when formal accountability is weak, local officials can be subject to unofficial rules and norms that establish and enforce their public obligations. These informal institutions of accountability can be provided by encompassing and embedding solidary groups. Villages where these types of groups exist are more likely to have better local governmental public goods provision than villages without these solidary groups, all other things being equal.

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Solidary Groups, Informal Accountability, and Local Public Goods Provision in Rural China

1. Governance and informal institutions of accountability 2. Decentralization and local governmental performance 3. Local governmental performance: assessing village public goods provision 4. Informal accountability and the structure of solidary groups 5. Temples and churches in rural China 6. Lineages and local governance 7. Accountability and village democratic reforms 8. The limitations of formal party and bureaucratic institutions 9. Conclusion.

Accountability without Democracy: Solidary Groups and Public Goods Provision in Rural China

Urban pluvial flooding and stormwater management: A contemporary review of China’s challenges and “sponge cities” strategy

This paper examines significant changes (and continuities) in the realm of government in contemporary China through drawing upon the insights of governmentality studies. It summarizes the organizing concerns of governmentality studies, arguing that they have functioned, albeit by default, to preclude a consideration of how governmentality is played out in non-liberal contexts. This argument is developed by outlining shifts in the nature of government in China, in particular the shift from a concept of ‘government’ to one of ‘governance’, and subsequently suggesting that the Chinese Party-state is ‘regrouping’ rather than ‘retreating’. The conclusion highlights the significance of the papers contained in this issue of Economy and Society in terms of extending the study of governmentality to both non-Western and authoritarian contexts.

Chinese Governmentalities: government, governance and the socialist market economy

This paper explains how climate change may increase future migration, and which risks are associated with such migration. It also examines how some of this migration may enhance the capacity of communities to adapt to climate change. Climate change is likely to result in some increase above baseline rates of migration in the next 40 years. Most of this migration will occur within developing countries. There is little reason to think that such migration will increase the risk of violent conflict. Not all movements in response to climate change will have negative outcomes for the people that move, or the places they come from and go to. Migration, a proven development strategy, can increase the capacity of communities to adapt to climate change. The fewer choices people have about moving, however, the less likely it is that the outcomes of that movement will be positive. Involuntary resettlement should be a last resort. Many of the most dire risks arising from climate-motivated migration can be avoided through careful policy. Policy responses to minimize the risks associated with migration in response to climate change, and to maximize migrations contribution to adaptive capacity include: ensuring that migrants have the same rights and opportunities as host communities; reducing the costs of moving money and people between areas of origin and destination; facilitating mutual understanding among migrants and host communities; clarifying property rights where they are contested; ensuring that efforts to assist migrants include host communities; and strengthening regional and international emergency response systems.

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Accommodating migration to promote adaptation to climate change

The Chinese party-state is restructuring its governing institutions, and is reinventing itself in the process. China is not only remaking its public management, but it is also restructuring its party-state organisation. This project applies a local perspective to study state transformation and the focus is on the introduction of the cadre responsibility system at the local level. It is suggested that part of the radical reform proposals of the 1980s have in fact been carried out at the local level. Findings show that the CCP is ridding itself of some functions to enable it to become more efficient in carrying out others. Neither decentralisation nor re-centralisation is a linear process.

Remaking the Communist Party-State: The Cadre Responsibility System at the Local Level in China

(2003). Local state corporatism and private business. The Journal of Peasant Studies: Vol. 30, No. 3-4, pp. 278-295.

Maria Edin

Papers

Remaking the Communist Party-State: The Cadre Responsibility System at the Local Level in China

Local state corporatism and private business