M
María Gutiérrez Urtiaga
Researcher at Charles III University of Madrid
Publications - 21
Citations - 288
María Gutiérrez Urtiaga is an academic researcher from Charles III University of Madrid. The author has contributed to research in topics: Corporate law & Shareholder. The author has an hindex of 7, co-authored 21 publications receiving 263 citations. Previous affiliations of María Gutiérrez Urtiaga include Carlos III Health Institute.
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Board Composition, Political Connections and Performance in State-Owned Enterprises
TL;DR: In this paper, the effects of board composition on the behaviour and performance of a sample of 114 Italian local public utilities during 1994-2004 has been analyzed. But the analysis was limited to the case where the board size and board composition were not considered.
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Board Composition, Political Connections and Performance in State-Owned Enterprises
TL;DR: In this paper, the effects of board composition on the behaviour and performance of a sample of 114 Italian local public utilities during 1994-2004 has been analyzed. But the analysis was limited to the case where the board size and board composition were not considered.
Journal ArticleDOI
An Economic Analysis of Corporate Directors' Fiduciary Duties
TL;DR: In this paper, a principal-agent model is presented where the shareholders can obtain a verifiable but costly and imperfect signal on the director's fulfillment of his fiduciary duties by taking legal action against him.
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Corporate Groups: Corporate Law, Private Contracting and Equal Ownership
TL;DR: In this article, the authors provide a simple and general framework that explains the nature of groups, their corporate governance problems and their ownership structures as the result of the double nature of the controlling shareholders in the group as both shareholder and stakeholder of the subsidiary.
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A Contractual Approach to Discipline Self-Dealing by Controlling Shareholders
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors analyze the legal regulations on self-dealing transactions and compare the outcomes produced by these regimes, both in terms of total welfare generated by the firm, and of minority expropriation, with the outcome that can be achieved with a contractual solution.