Previous work shows that average returns on common stocks are related to firm characteristics like size, earnings/price, cash flow/price, book-to-market equity, past sales growth, long-term past return, and short-term past return. Because these patterns in average returns apparently are not explained by the CAPM, they are called anomalies. We find that, except for the continuation of short-term returns, the anomalies largely disappear in a three-factor model. Our results are consistent with rational ICAPM or APT asset pricing, but we also consider irrational pricing and data problems as possible explanations. RESEARCHERS HAVE IDENTIFIED MANY patterns in average stock returns. For example, DeBondt and Thaler (1985) find a reversal in long-term returns; stocks with low long-term past returns tend to have higher future returns. In contrast, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) find that short-term returns tend to continue; stocks with higher returns in the previous twelve months tend to have higher future returns. Others show that a firm's average stock return is related to its size (ME, stock price times number of shares), book-to-marketequity (BE/ME, the ratio of the book value of common equity to its market value), earnings/price (E/P), cash flow/price (C/P), and past sales growth. (Banz (1981), Basu (1983), Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein (1985), and Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994).) Because these patterns in average stock returns are not explained by the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965), they are typically called anomalies. This paper argues that many of the CAPM average-return anomalies are related, and they are captured by the three-factor model in Fama and French (FF 1993). The model says that the expected return on a portfolio in excess of the risk-free rate [E(Ri) - Rf] is explained by the sensitivity of its return to three factors: (i) the excess return on a broad market portfolio (RM - Rf); (ii) the difference between the return on a portfolio of small stocks and the return on a portfolio of large stocks (SMB, small minus big); and (iii) the difference between the return on a portfolio of high-book-to-market stocks and the return on a portfolio of low-book-to-market stocks (HML, high minus low). Specifically, the expected excess return on portfolio i is,

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1996.tb05202.x

Multifactor Explanations of Asset Pricing Anomalies

https://w4.stern.nyu.edu/finance/docs/WP/2000/pdf/wpa00041.pdf

Illiquidity and stock returns: cross-section and time-series effects $

New tests are presented on the effects of stock illiquidity on stock return. Over time, expected market illiquidity positively affects ex ante stock excess return (usually called â¬Srisk premiumâ¬?). This complements the positive cross-sectional return-illiquidity relationship. The illiquidity measure here is the average daily ratio of absolute stock return to dollar volume, which is easily obtained from daily stock data for long time series in most stock markets. Illiquidity affects more strongly small firms stocks, suggesting an explanation for the changes â¬Ssmall firm effectâ¬? over time. The impact of market illiquidity on stock excess return suggests the existence of illiquidity premium and helps explain the equity premium puzzle.

Illiquidity and Stock Returns: Cross-Section and Time-Series Effects

Theoretical models of financial markets built on the assumption that some investors are overconfident yield one central prediction: overconfident investors will trade too much. We test this prediction by partitioning investors on the basis of a variable that provides a natural proxy for overconfidence--gender. Psychological research has established that men are more prone to overconfidence than women. Thus, models of investor overconfidence predict that men will trade more and perform worse than women. Using account data for over 35,000 households from a large discount brokerage firm, we analyze the common stock investments of men and women from February 1991 through January 1997. Consistent with the predictions of the overconfidence models, we document that men trade 45 percent more than women and earn annual risk-adjusted net returns that are 1.4 percent less than those earned by women. These differences are more pronounced between single men and single women; single men trade 67 percent more than single women and earn annual risk-adjusted net returns that are 2.3 percent less than those earned by single women.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/98110615.pdf?abstractid=139415&rulid=175370&mirid=3

Boys Will Be Boys: Gender, Overconfidence, and Common Stock Investment

Theoretical models predict that overconedent investors trade excessively We test this prediction by partitioning investors on gender Psychological research demonstrates that, in areas such as enance, men are more overconedent than women Thus, theory predicts that men will trade more excessively than women Using account data for over 35,000 households from a large discount brokerage, we analyze the common stock investments of men and women from February 1991 through January 1997 We document that men trade 45 percent more than women Trading reduces men’s net returns by 265 percentage points a year as opposed to 172 percentage points for women It’s not what a man don’t know that makes him a fool, but what he does know that ain’t so Josh Billings, nineteenth century American humorist It is difecult to reconcile the volume of trading observed in equity markets with the trading needs of rational investors Rational investors make periodic contributions and withdrawals from their investment portfolios, rebalance their portfolios, and trade to minimize their taxes Those possessed of superior information may trade speculatively, although rational speculative traders will generally not choose to trade with each other It is unlikely that rational trading needs account for a turnover rate of

/pdf/boys-will-be-boys-gender-overconfidence-and-common-stock-2ctwfizezu.pdf

Boys will be Boys: Gender, Overconfidence, and Common Stock Investment

Using a sample free of survivor bias, I demonstrate that common factors in stock returns and investment expenses almost completely explain persistence in equity mutual funds' mean and risk-adjusted returns Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser's (1993) "hot hands" result is mostly driven by the one-year momentum effect of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), but individual funds do not earn higher returns from following the momentum strategy in stocks The only significant persistence not explained is concentrated in strong underperformance by the worst-return mutual funds The results do not support the existence of skilled or informed mutual fund portfolio managers PERSISTENCE IN MUTUAL FUND performance does not reflect superior stock-picking skill Rather, common factors in stock returns and persistent differences in mutual fund expenses and transaction costs explain almost all of the predictability in mutual fund returns Only the strong, persistent underperformance by the worst-return mutual funds remains anomalous Mutual fund persistence is well documented in the finance literature, but not well explained Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993), Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1994), Brown and Goetzmann (1995), and Wermers (1996) find evidence of persistence in mutual fund performance over short-term horizons of one to three years, and attribute the persistence to "hot hands" or common investment strategies Grinblatt and Titman (1992), Elton, Gruber, Das, and Hlavka (1993), and Elton, Gruber, Das, and Blake (1996) document mutual fund return predictability over longer horizons of five to ten years, and attribute this to manager differential information or stock-picking talent Contrary evidence comes from Jensen (1969), who does not find that good subsequent performance follows good past performance Carhart (1992) shows that persistence in expense ratios drives much of the long-term persistence in mutual fund performance My analysis indicates that Jegadeesh and Titman's (1993) one-year momentum in stock returns accounts for Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser's (1993) hot hands effect in mutual fund performance However, funds that earn higher

/pdf/on-persistence-in-mutual-fund-performance-hff1y6xdm1.pdf

On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance

Using a sample free of survivor bias, I demonstrate that common factors in stock returns and investment expenses almost completely explain persistence in equity mutual funds' mean and risk-adjusted returns. Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser's (1993) "hot hands" result is mostly driven by the one-year momentum effect of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), but individual funds do not earn higher returns from following the momentum strategy in stocks. The only significant persistence not explained is concentrated in strong underperformance by the worst-return mutual funds. The results do not support the existence of skilled or informed mutual fund portfolio managers.

We present evidence that fund managers inf late quarter-end portfolio prices with last-minute purchases of stocks already held. The magnitude of price inf lation ranges from 0.5 percent per year for large-cap funds to well over 2 percent for small-cap funds. We find that the cross section of inf lation matches the cross section of incentives from the f low0performance relation, that a surge of trading in the quarter’s last minutes coincides with a surge in equity prices, and that the inf lation is greatest for the stocks held by funds with the most incentive to inf late, controlling for the stocks’ size and performance. QUARTER-END AND ESPECIALLY YEAR-END equity mutual fund prices are abnormally high. We present strong evidence that some mutual fund managers mark up their holdings at quarter end through aggressive trading of stocks they already hold. Funds with the greatest ability and most incentive to improve their performance exhibit the largest turn-of-quarter effect. Intradaily data show a surge of transactions and transaction prices in the quarter’s last few minutes, and fund-holdings data show a larger effect in the funds with the most incentive to mark up. Considering that open-end equity funds intermediate $3.46 trillion ~year-end 1999!, 1 this turn-of-quarter inf lation of their prices is a significant opportunity for potential sellers, and a significant hazard for everybody else. In general, open-end domestic equity mutual funds calculate their net asset values per share ~NAVs! from the closing transaction prices of their holdings.

/pdf/leaning-for-the-tape-evidence-of-gaming-behavior-in-equity-1wvdien81k.pdf

Leaning for the Tape: Evidence of Gaming Behavior in Equity Mutual Funds

This paper offers a comprehensive study of survivorship issues, in the context of mutual fund research, using the mutual fund data set of Carhart (1997). We find that funds in our sample disappear primarily because of multi-year poor performance. Then we demonstrate analytically that this survival rule typically causes the survivor bias in average performance to increase in the length of the sample period, though it is possible to construct counterexamples. In the data, we find a strong positive relation between the survivor bias in average performance and sample period length. The bias is economically small at 17 basis points per annum for one-year samples, but a significantly larger one percent per annum for samples longer than fifteen years. We also find evidence of performance persistence in our sample and, consistent with the presence of a multi-period survival rule, we find that the persistence is weakened by survivorship bias. Finally, we explain how the relation between performance and fund characteristics can be affected by the use of a survivor-only sample and show that the magnitudes of the biases in the slope coefficients are large for fund size, expenses, turnover and load fees in our sample. Because survivorship issues are relevant for many data sets used in finance, the analysis in this paper has potential applications in areas of financial economics beyond just mutual fund research.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/2451_26703.pdf?abstractid=1295241

Mutual Fund Survivorship

This article provides a comprehensive study of survivorship issues using the mutual fund data of Carhart (1997). We demonstrate theoretically that when survival depends on multiperiod performance, the survivorship bias in average performance typically increases with the sample length. This is empirically relevant because evidence suggests a multiyear survival rule for U.S. mutual funds. In the data we find the annual bias increases from 0.07% for 1-year samples to 1% for samples longer than 15 years. We find that survivor conditioning weakens evidence of performance persistence. Finally, we explain how survivor conditioning affects the relation between performance and fund characteristics. Fund disappearance, or attrition, affects almost every study of mutual funds, hedge funds, or pension funds. Many commercial datasets include only funds currently in operation. Test methodologies often require funds to survive a minimum time period to be included in the analysis. These forms of survivoronly conditioning can bias test results. This article offers a theoretical and empirical analysis of the biases introduced by conditioning on survival. We study the effect of survivor conditioning on (1) estimates of average performance, (2) tests of performance persistence, and (3) cross-sectional estimates of the relation between performance and fund attributes. In each case, the empirical results are consistent with our theoretical predictions.

/pdf/mutual-fund-survivorship-1uqte9e5c0.pdf

Mark M. Carhart

Papers

On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance

On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance

Leaning for the Tape: Evidence of Gaming Behavior in Equity Mutual Funds

Mutual Fund Survivorship

Mutual Fund Survivorship