Showing papers by "Martin J. Osborne published in 1995"

Spatial Models of Political Competition under Plurality Rule: A Survey of Some Explanations of the Number of Candidates and the Positions They Take

Abstract: This paper surveys work that uses spatial models of political competition to explain the number of candidates and the positions that they take in plurality rule elections.

Crime, Punishment, and Social Expenditure

Abstract: Criminal activity can be controlled by punishment, and by social expenditure both on enforcement and redistributive transfers which increase the opportunity cost of imprisonment. Individuals may differ in the combinations of these policies that they prefer. We study the dependence of these preferences on the individuals’ characteristics and the nature of the crime under consideration. A political mechanism determines the policy adopted by society. Differences in the policies adopted across societies are explained by the nature of the political mechanism and the initial distribution and level of incomes.

A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates

Abstract: We develop a model of electoral competition in which citizens choose whether or not to run as candidates; a winner implements her favorite policy. The equilibrium number of candidates depends negatively on the cost of run ning and positively on the bene ts of winning. For some parameter values all equilibria under plurality rule have exactly two candidates, whose positions are distinct. Two candidate elections are more likely under plurality rule than under a runoff system. There exists equilibria under both systems in which some candidates have no chance of winning.