http://www.maths.qmul.ac.uk/%7Elatora/report_06.pdf

Complex networks: Structure and dynamics

A Course in Game Theory presents the main ideas of game theory at a level suitable for graduate students and advanced undergraduates, emphasizing the theory's foundations and interpretations of its basic concepts. The authors provide precise definitions and full proofs of results, sacrificing generalities and limiting the scope of the material in order to do so. The text is organized in four parts: strategic games, extensive games with perfect information, extensive games with imperfect information, and coalitional games. It includes over 100 exercises.

A Course in Game Theory

Statistical physics has proven to be a fruitful framework to describe phenomena outside the realm of traditional physics. Recent years have witnessed an attempt by physicists to study collective phenomena emerging from the interactions of individuals as elementary units in social structures. A wide list of topics are reviewed ranging from opinion and cultural and language dynamics to crowd behavior, hierarchy formation, human dynamics, and social spreading. The connections between these problems and other, more traditional, topics of statistical physics are highlighted. Comparison of model results with empirical data from social systems are also emphasized.

Statistical physics of social dynamics

From the Publisher:
This is the first comprehensive introduction to multiagent systems and contemporary distributed artificial intelligence. The book provides detailed coverage of basic topics as well as several closely related ones and is suitable as a textbook. The book can be used for teaching as well as self-study, and it is designed to meet the needs of both researchers and practitioners. In view of the interdisciplinary nature of the field, it will be a useful reference not only for computer scientists and engineers, but for social scientists and management and organization scientists as well.

Multiagent Systems : A Modern Approach to Distributed Artificial Intelligence

Realist and other scholars commonly hold that rationally led states can and sometimes do fight when no peaceful bargains exist that both would prefer to war. Against this view, I show that under very broad conditions there will exist negotiated settlements that genuinely rational states would mutually prefer to a risky and costly fight. Popular rationalist and realist explanations for war fail either to address or to explain adequately what would prevent leaders from locating a less costly bargain. Essentially just two mechanisms can resolve this puzzle on strictly rationalist terms. The first turns on the fact that states have both private information about capabilities and resolve and the incentive to misrepresent it. The second turns on the fact that in specific strategic contexts states may be unable credibly to commit to uphold a mutually preferable bargain. Historical examples suggest that both mechanisms are empirically plausible.

https://web.stanford.edu/group/fearon-research/cgi-bin/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Rationalist-Explanations-for-War.pdf

Rationalist explanations for war

Game-theoretic reasoning pervades economic theory and is used widely in other social and behavioural sciences. An Introduction to Game Theory International Edition, by Martin J. Osborne, presents the main principles of game theory and shows how they can be used to understand economics, social, political, and biological phenomena. The book introduces in an accessible manner the main ideas behind the theory rather than their mathematical expression. All concepts are defined precisely, and logical reasoning is used throughout. The book requires an understanding of basic mathematics but assumes no specific knowledge of economics, political science, or other social or behavioural sciences. Coverage includes the fundamental concepts of strategic games, extensive games with perfect information, and coalitional games; the more advanced subjects of Bayesian games and extensive games with imperfect information; and the topics of repeated games, bargaining theory, evolutionary equilibrium, rationalizability, and maxminimization. The book offers a wide variety of illustrations from the social and behavioural sciences. Each topic features examples that highlight theoretical points and illustrations that demonstrate how the theory may be used.

/pdf/an-introduction-to-game-theory-xg92vp7zes.pdf

An Introduction to Game Theory

Introduction. Bargaining Theory: The Axiomatic Approach. Nash's Solution. The Strategic Approach. A Model of Alternating Offers. The Relation between the Axiomatic and Strategic Approaches. A Strategic Model of Bargaining between Incompletely Informed Players. Models of Decentralized Trade: First Approach Using the Nash Solution. Strategic Bargaining in a Steady State Market. Strategic Bargaining in a Market with One-Time Entry. The Role of the Trading Procedure. The Role of Anonymity. References. Index.

/pdf/bargaining-and-markets-4ckfvjprp1.pdf

Bargaining and Markets

The authors develop a model of electoral competition in which citizens choose whether or not to run as candidates. A winner implements her favorite policy. The equilibrium number of candidates depends negatively on the cost of running and positively on the benefits of winning. For some parameter values, all equilibria under plurality rule have exactly two candidates, whose positions are distinct. Two-candidate elections are more likely under plurality rule than under a runoff system. The candidates' positions are less differentiated under a runoff system. There exist equilibria under both systems in which some candidates have no chance of winning.

/pdf/a-model-of-political-competition-with-citizen-candidates-51lc73c25d.pdf

Martin J. Osborne

Papers

A Course in Game Theory

An Introduction to Game Theory

Bargaining and Markets

A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates

Price competition in a capacity-constrained duopoly