Capitalism and Freedom

American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review 17 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Boston College Law Review 50 B.C. L. Rev., No. 3, May, 2009. Boston University Public Interest Law Journal 18 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution 10 Cardozo J. Conflict Resol., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Cardozo Public Law, Policy, & Ethics Journal 7 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol’y & Ethics J., No. 3, Summer, 2009. Chicago Journal of International Law 10 Chi. J. Int’l L., No. 1, Summer, 2009. Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 20 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y, No. 2, Winter, 2009. Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 32 Colum. J.L. & Arts, No. 3, Spring, 2009. Connecticut Public Interest Law Journal 8 Conn. Pub. Int. L.J., No. 2, Spring-Summer, 2009. Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 18 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y, No. 1, Fall, 2008. Cornell Law Review 94 Cornell L. Rev., No. 5, July, 2009. Creighton Law Review 42 Creighton L. Rev., No. 3, April, 2009. Criminal Law Forum 20 Crim. L. Forum, Nos. 2-3, Pp. 173-394, 2009. Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 34 Del. J. Corp. L., No. 2, Pp. 433-754, 2009. Environmental Law Reporter News & Analysis 39 Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis, No. 7, July, 2009. European Journal of International Law 20 Eur. J. Int’l L., No. 2, April, 2009. Family Law Quarterly 43 Fam. L.Q., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Georgetown Journal of International Law 40 Geo. J. Int’l L., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 22 Geo. J. Legal Ethics, No. 2, Spring, 2009. Golden Gate University Law Review 39 Golden Gate U. L. Rev., No. 2, Winter, 2009. Harvard Environmental Law Review 33 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 297-608, 2009. International Review of Law and Economics 29 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ., No. 1, March, 2009. Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation 24 J. Envtl. L. & Litig., No. 1, Pp. 1-201, 2009. Journal of Legislation 34 J. Legis., No. 1, Pp. 1-98, 2008. Journal of Technology Law & Policy 14 J. Tech. L. & Pol’y, No. 1, June, 2009. Labor Lawyer 24 Lab. Law., No. 3, Winter/Spring, 2009. Michigan Journal of International Law 30 Mich. J. Int’l L., No. 3, Spring, 2009. New Criminal Law Review 12 New Crim. L. Rev., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Northern Kentucky Law Review 36 N. Ky. L. Rev., No. 4, Pp. 445-654, 2009. Ohio Northern University Law Review 35 Ohio N.U. L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 445-886, 2009. Pace Law Review 29 Pace L. Rev., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Quinnipiac Health Law Journal 12 Quinnipiac Health L.J., No. 2, Pp. 209-332, 2008-2009. Real Property, Trust and Estate Law Journal 44 Real Prop. Tr. & Est. L.J., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Rutgers Race and the Law Review 10 Rutgers Race & L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 441-629, 2009. San Diego Law Review 46 San Diego L. Rev., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Seton Hall Law Review 39 Seton Hall L. Rev., No. 3, Pp. 725-1102, 2009. Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 18 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Stanford Environmental Law Journal 28 Stan. Envtl. L.J., No. 3, July, 2009. Tulsa Law Review 44 Tulsa L. Rev., No. 2, Winter, 2008. UMKC Law Review 77 UMKC L. Rev., No. 4, Summer, 2009. Washburn Law Journal 48 Washburn L.J., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Washington University Global Studies Law Review 8 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev., No. 3, Pp.451-617, 2009. Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 29 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y, Pp. 1-401, 2009. Washington University Law Review 86 Wash. U. L. Rev., No. 6, Pp. 1273-1521, 2009. William Mitchell Law Review 35 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev., No. 4, Pp. 1235-1609, 2009. Yale Journal of International Law 34 Yale J. Int’l L., No. 2, Summer, 2009. Yale Journal on Regulation 26 Yale J. on Reg., No. 2, Summer, 2009.

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Current index to legal periodicals

Introduction: Institutional Change, Capitalist Development PART I: GRADUAL CHANGE: FIVE SECTORAL TRAJECTORIES 1. Five Sectors 2. Industry-wide Collective Bargaining: Shrinking Core, Expanding Fringes 3. Intermediary Organization: Declining Membership, Rising Tensions 4. Social Policy: The Rise and Fall of Welfare Corporatism 5. Public Finance: The Fiscal Crisis of the Postwar State 6. Corporate Governance: The Decline of Germany Inc. PART II: SYSTEMIC CHANGE: PATTERNS AND CAUSES 7. Systemic Change: Five Parallel Trajectories 8. From System to Process 9. Endogenous Change: Time, Age, and the Self-Undermining of Institutions 10. Time's Up: Positive Externalities Turning Negative PART III: DISORGANIZATION: BRINGING CAPITALISM BACK IN 11. Disorganization as Liberalization 12. Convergence, Non-convergence, Divergence 13. 'Economizing' and the Evolution of Political-Economic Institutions 14. Internationalization 15. German Unification 16. History 17. Bringing Capitalism Back In

(Reseña) Re-Forming Capitalism: Institutional Change in the German Political Economy.

The traditional view of the professions is that they are largely free of the hierarchical forms of social control characteristic of other kinds of occupations; instead, they are self-regulating, subject only to informal collegial control. As a result of events in the past few decades in the United States, analysts now believe that the traditional autonomy of professions is eroding. This paper reviews two theories that emphasize this process, one focusing on deprofessionalization and the other on proletarianization. It concludes that the available evidence does not support either theory sufficiently to make them analytically useful; it advances an alternate theory that emphasizes the formalization of professional social control. This third viewpoint is based on the finding that the professions—as corporate bodies—have remained relatively autonomous. Antitrust decisions, political pressure to exercise more control over errant members, and the administrative requirement of greater accountability in large org...

The Changing Nature of Professional Control

The implications for labor markets of contracts to avoid hold-up of investments are assessed. Employment at will protects the returns on a firm's general and specific investments without wages increasing with tenure. With turnover costs, fixed but renegotiable wages can protect general investments by both firm and employee, and generage wage stickiness without adversely affecting employment. Employment contracts that induce efficient specific investments by both firm and employee are problematic so it makes sense, wherever possible, for one side to make all such investments. With private information, fixed wages may induce fewer inefficient separations than employment at will.

Contracts, hold-up and labor markets

The plight of low wage workers is drawing increased attention and with it proposals for a better address to the problem of wage theft. Giving workers legal voice via collective bargaining is not thought practicable. Consequently, the proposals offered thus far are directed to the labor inspectorates, federal and state, or call for better coordination with or reliance on voluntary groups in civil society, especially worker centers. This article essays a return to a model of representation geared to wage theft in coal mining a century ago. Thirteen states enacted such laws; some are still on the books. This essay proposes to revitalize this model as a means of assuring conformity with wage and hour laws and as a potential step toward collective representation.

Matthew W. Finkin

Papers

From Weight Checking to Wage Checking: Arming Workers to Combat Wage Theft

Minority Union Contracting: Unraveling Majestic Weaving