This research was set in the People’s Republic of China. As former socialist China moves from central planning toward a more market-driven economy, improved knowledge about the new environment and firm decisions within such an environment has significant implications. For organizational researchers, such a transition represents a genuine shift of paradigm, and thus offers a unique opportunity to test existing organizational theories and develop new ones. For multinational businesses seeking business opportunities, they have to compete or cooperate with these Chinese firms, whether state-owned or privately owned. Motivated by a deep curiosity in, using the language of Williamson (1996), “What is going on there” behind the “bamboo curtain,” and underpinned by a strong conviction that organizational researchers have much to gain as well as to offer by focusing on transitional economies, I undertook this study to examine characteristics of a regulatory environment and the impact on innovation and risk-taking among Chinese managers and entrepreneurs. I collected original primary data that represents managers from large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and entrepreneurs from small privately-owned enterprises (POEs) through personal interviews and a survey. Significant differences were found between managers and entrepreneurs in their reported environmental characteristics, strategic orientations, size, and firm performance, indicating that managers are not as innovative and are less willing to make risky decisions than entrepreneurs. Being smaller and faster than SOEs, entrepreneurial firms have adopted some strategies that distinguish them from their larger and more established competitors. Speed, stealth, and sound execution allow entrepreneurs to harvest first-mover advantages and thus increase their chances for survival in a turbulent environment.

Innovation and Risk-Taking in a Transitional Economy: A Comparative Study of Chinese Managers and Entrepreneurs

Innovation and risk-taking in a transitional economy: A comparative study of chinese managers and entrepreneurs

This study develops a model grounded in the contingency theory (i.e., context–structure–performance) applicable to Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Using data from a sample of 205 industrial SOEs, the study shows that SOE growth performance relative to the industry is positively predicted by formal control, inversely predicted by decentralization, and positively predicted by the interaction of the two. Customer product knowledge utilization, unrelated to growth performance relative to the industry, is positively predicted by formal control and the interaction of formal control with decentralization. Foreign induced industry competitiveness, technological turbulence, size, and production technology routineness are treated as context variables and modeled accordingly. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Organizational structure, context, customer orientation, and performance: lessons from Chinese state-owned enterprises

Innovation strategy and performance during economic transition : evidences in Beijing, China

Treasures in the China house A review of management and organizational research on Greater China

This paper focuses on the fundamental changes in the management of state enterprises that are taking place in China. Specifically, we discuss the expansion of enterprise autonomy and changes in the managerial decision-making structure. The genesis of the reform programme is traced back to inefficiencies caused by the over-centralized state planning system which reduced enterprise management to little more than an administrative function dominated by the Party secretary. As a consequence, managerial and technical cadres became demoralized and the growth of staff functions such as accounting, marketing and personnel management was stunted. From a series of experiments launched in 1978 has grown the realization that tinkering around with the state planning apparatus is insufficient to stimulate entrepreneurship and vigorous industrial expansion. Accordingly, reform has been launched on a broad front both within the state apparatus, in an endeavour to roll back external constraints on enterprise, and within the enterprise itself, by seeking to provide powerful incentives both to managerial cadres and workers through a system stressing individual responsibility and rewards commensurate with results. A number of severe constraints on the reform programme are analysed, in particular, the changing balance of power within the enterprise between the factory director, the Party secretary, the workers’congress and the trade union. Contradictions exist within the new structure of decision-making but, given a period of political stability and sustained economic growth, there should be sufficient surplus to mollify discontent and stifle those who refuse to give up their belief in the virtues of having‘politics in command’of the industrial enterprise.

Mee Kau Nyaw

Papers

Introducing market forces into managerial decision‐making in chinese industrial enterprises