List of Figures. List of Tables. Preface. Foreword. 1. Basic Concepts. 2. Evolutionary Algorithm MOP Approaches. 3. MOEA Test Suites. 4. MOEA Testing and Analysis. 5. MOEA Theory and Issues. 3. MOEA Theoretical Issues. 6. Applications. 7. MOEA Parallelization. 8. Multi-Criteria Decision Making. 9. Special Topics. 10. Epilog. Appendix A: MOEA Classification and Technique Analysis. Appendix B: MOPs in the Literature. Appendix C: Ptrue & PFtrue for Selected Numeric MOPs. Appendix D: Ptrue & PFtrue for Side-Constrained MOPs. Appendix E: MOEA Software Availability. Appendix F: MOEA-Related Information. Index. References.

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Evolutionary algorithms for solving multi-objective problems

Focuses on a study which examined perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Overview of the strategic approach adopted for the study; Details of the bargaining situation used; Discussion on perfect equilibrium. (From Ebsco)

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Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model

Highlighting the problems posed by a ''unitary'' conceptualization of the household, a number of economists have in recent years proposed alternative models. These models, especially those embodying the bargaining approach, provide a useful framework for analyzing gender relations and throwing some light on how gender asymmetries are constructed and contested. At the same time, the models have paid inadequate or no attention to some critical aspects of intra-household gender dynamics, such as: What factors (especially qualitative ones) affect bargaining power? What is the role of social norms and social perceptions in the bargaining process and how might these factors themselves be bargained over? Are women less motivated than men by self-interest and might this affect bargaining outcomes? Most discussions on bargaining also say little about gender relations beyond the household, and about the links between extra-household and intra-household bargaining power. This paper spells out the nature of these com...

/pdf/bargaining-and-gender-relations-within-and-beyond-the-5g820qwzac.pdf

''Bargaining'' and Gender Relations: Within and Beyond the Household

Following a recession, the aggregate labor market is slack-employment remains below normal and recruiting efforts of employers, as measured by help-wanted advertising and vacancies, are low. A model of matching friction explains the qualitative responses of the labor market to adverse shocks, but requires implausibly large shocks to account for the magnitude of observed fluctuations. The incorporation of wage stickiness vastly increases the sensitivity of the model to driving forces. I develop a new model of the way that wage stickiness affects unemployment. The stickiness arises in an economic equilibrium and satisfies the condition that no worker-employer pair has an unexploited opportunity for mutual improvement. Sticky wages neither interfere with the efficient formation of employment matches nor cause inefficient job loss. Thus the model provides an answer to the fundamental criticism previously directed at sticky-wage models of fluctuations.

http://web.stanford.edu/~rehall/EmpFlucAERMarch2005.pdf

Employment Fluctuations with Equilibrium Wage Stickiness

We model an oligopoly facing uncertain demand in which each firm chooses as its strategy a "supply function" relating its quantity to its price. Such a strategy allows a firm to adapt better to the uncertain environment than either setting a fixed price or setting a fixed quantity; commitment to a supply function may be accomplished in practice by the choice of the firm's size and structure, its culture and values, and the incentive systems and decision rules for its employees. In the absence of uncertainty, there exists an enormous multiplicity of equilibria in supply functions, but uncertainty, by forcing each firm's supply function to be optimal against a range of possible residual demand curves, dramatically reduces the set of equilibria. Under uncertainty, we prove the existence of a Nash, equilibrium in supply functions for a symmetric oligopoly producing a homogeneous good and give sufficient conditions for uniqueness. We perform comparative statics with respect to firms' costs, the industry demand, the nature of the demand uncertainty, and the number of firms, and sketch the extension to differentiated products. Firms' equilibrium supply functions are steeper with marginal cost curves that are steeper relative to demand, fewer firms, more highly differentiated products, and demand uncertainty that is relatively greater at higher prices. The steeper are the supply functions firms choose in equilibrium, the more closely competition resembles the Cournot model (which exogenously imposes vertical supply functions-fixed quantities); with flatter equilibrium supply functions, competition is closer to the Bertrand model (which exogenously imposes horizontal supply functions-fixed prices).

Michael Bacharach

Papers

Two-person Cooperative Games