Michael C. Anderson
Bio: Michael C. Anderson is an academic researcher from Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit. The author has contributed to research in topics: Forgetting & Retrieval-induced forgetting. The author has an hindex of 48, co-authored 101 publications receiving 11262 citations. Previous affiliations of Michael C. Anderson include VA Boston Healthcare System & University of St Andrews.
Papers published on a yearly basis
TL;DR: A critical role for suppression in models of retrieval inhibition and a retrieval-induced forgetting that implicate the retrieval process itself in everyday forgetting are suggested.
Abstract: Three studies show that the retrieval process itself causes long-lasting forgetting. Ss studied 8 categories (e.g., Fruit). Half the members of half the categories were then repeatedly practiced through retrieval tests (e.g., Fruit Or ). Category-cued recall of unpracticed members of practiced categories was impaired on a delayed test. Experiments 2 and 3 identified 2 significant features of this retrieval-induced forgetting: The impairment remains when output interference is controlled, suggesting a retrieval-base d suppression that endures for 20 min or more, and the impairment appears restricted to high-frequenc y members. Low-frequency members show little impairment, even in the presence of strong, practiced competitors that might be expected to block access to those items. These findings suggest a critical role for suppression in models of retrieval inhibition and implicate the retrieval process itself in everyday forgetting. A striking implication of current memory theory is that the very act of remembering may cause forgetting. It is not that the remembered item itself becomes more susceptible to forgetting; in fact, recalling an item increases the likelihood that it will be recallable again at a later time. Rather, it is other items—items that are associated to the same cue or cues guiding retrieval—that may be put in greater jeopardy of being forgotten. Impaired recall of such related items may arise if access to them is blocked by the newly acquired strength of their successfully retrieved competitors (Blaxton & Neely, 1983; Brown, 1981; Brown, Whiteman, Cattoi, & Bradley, 1985; Roediger, 1974, 1978; Roediger & Schmidt, 1980; Rundus, 1973). This implication follows from three assumptions underlying what we herein refer to as strength-dependent competition models of interference: (a) the competition assumption—that memories associated to a common cue compete for access to conscious recall when that cue is presented; (b) the strengthdependence assumption—that the cued recall of an item will decrease as a function of increases in the strengths of its
TL;DR: Functional magnetic resonance imaging is used to identify the neural systems involved in keeping unwanted memories out of awareness and establish a neurobiological model for guiding inquiry into motivated forgetting.
Abstract: Over a century ago, Freud proposed that unwanted memories can be excluded from awareness, a process called repression. It is unknown, however, how repression occurs in the brain. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging to identify the neural systems involved in keeping unwanted memories out of awareness. Controlling unwanted memories was associated with increased dorsolateral prefrontal activation, reduced hippocampal activation, and impaired retention of those memories. Both prefrontal cortical and right hippocampal activations predicted the magnitude of forgetting. These results confirm the existence of an active forgetting process and establish a neurobiological model for guiding inquiry into motivated forgetting.
TL;DR: It is shown that executive control processes not uniquely tied to trauma may provide a viable model for repression, and that this cognitive act has enduring consequences for the rejected memories.
Abstract: Freud proposed that unwanted memories can be forgotten by pushing them into the unconscious, a process called repression1. The existence of repression has remained controversial for more than a century, in part because of its strong coupling with trauma, and the ethical and practical difficulties of studying such processes in controlled experiments. However, behavioural and neurobiological research on memory and attention shows that people have executive control processes directed at minimizing perceptual distraction2,3, overcoming interference during short and long-term memory tasks3,4,5,6,7 and stopping strong habitual responses to stimuli8,9,10,11,12,13. Here we show that these mechanisms can be recruited to prevent unwanted declarative memories from entering awareness, and that this cognitive act has enduring consequences for the rejected memories. When people encounter cues that remind them of an unwanted memory and they consistently try to prevent awareness of it, the later recall of the rejected memory becomes more difficult. The forgetting increases with the number of times the memory is avoided, resists incentives for accurate recall and is caused by processes that suppress the memory itself. These results show that executive control processes not uniquely tied to trauma may provide a viable model for repression.
TL;DR: In this article, it is argued that forgetting is not a passive side effect of storing new memories, but results from inhibitory control mechanisms recruited to override prepotent responses, and the relation between this executive control theory of forgetting and classical accounts of interference is discussed.
Abstract: Interference provides an account of one of the most basic problems in the science of memory: forgetting. Historically, theories of this process were shaped by models of associative learning prevalent when interference research began. In this article, I argue that we should reconsider the long-standing conceptualization of interference as a learning phenomenon and reframe interference as arising from systems that achieve mental and behavioral control. Specifically, it is argued that forgetting is not a passive side effect of storing new memories, but results from inhibitory control mechanisms recruited to override prepotent responses. In support of this idea, I discuss two control situations in which response override is necessary—selection and stopping—and show how these situations have direct parallels in retrieval. I then review evidence that in both of these situations, the need to override prepotent, distracting memories is supported by inhibitory mechanisms that ultimately cause forgetting. The theoretical properties of these inhibitory effects are outlined, along with critical factors known to modulate or mask inhibition. The relation between this executive control theory of forgetting and classical accounts of interference is discussed.
TL;DR: It is argued that inhibitory processes are used to resolve computational problems of selection common to memory retrieval and selective attention and that retrieval is best regarded as conceptually focused selective attention.
Abstract: Theories of cognition frequently assume the existence of inhibitory mechanisms that deactivate mental representations. Justifying this assumption is difficult because cognitive effects thought to reflect inhibition can often be explained without recourse to inhibitory processes. This article addresses the uncertain status of cognitive inhibitory mechanisms, focusing on their function in memory retrieval. On the basis of a novel form of forgetting reported herein, it is shown that classical associative theories of interference are insufficient as accounts of forgetting and that inhibitory processes must be at work. It is argued that inhibitory processes are used to resolve computational problems of selection common to memory retrieval and selective attention and that retrieval is best regarded as conceptually focused selective attention.
28 Jul 2005
01 Jan 1964
TL;DR: In this paper, the notion of a collective unconscious was introduced as a theory of remembering in social psychology, and a study of remembering as a study in Social Psychology was carried out.
Abstract: Part I. Experimental Studies: 2. Experiment in psychology 3. Experiments on perceiving III Experiments on imaging 4-8. Experiments on remembering: (a) The method of description (b) The method of repeated reproduction (c) The method of picture writing (d) The method of serial reproduction (e) The method of serial reproduction picture material 9. Perceiving, recognizing, remembering 10. A theory of remembering 11. Images and their functions 12. Meaning Part II. Remembering as a Study in Social Psychology: 13. Social psychology 14. Social psychology and the matter of recall 15. Social psychology and the manner of recall 16. Conventionalism 17. The notion of a collective unconscious 18. The basis of social recall 19. A summary and some conclusions.
TL;DR: It is shown how this model can be used to draw together a wide range of diverse data from cognitive, social, developmental, personality, clinical, and neuropsychological autobiographical memory research.
Abstract: The authors describe a model of autobiographical memory in which memories are transitory mental constructions within a self-memory system (SMS). The SMS contains an autobiographical knowledge base and current goals of the working self. Within the SMS, control processes modulate access to the knowledge base by successively shaping cues used to activate autobiographical memory knowledge structures and, in this way, form specific memories. The relation of the knowledge base to active goals is reciprocal, and the knowledge base "grounds" the goals of the working self. It is shown how this model can be used to draw together a wide range of diverse data from cognitive, social, developmental, personality, clinical, and neuropsychological autobiographical memory research.
TL;DR: Advances in human lesion-mapping support the functional localization of such inhibition to right IFC alone, and future research should investigate the generality of this proposed inhibitory function to other task domains, and its interaction within a wider network.
Abstract: It is controversial whether different cognitive functions can be mapped to discrete regions of the prefrontal cortex (PFC). The localisationist tradition has associated one cognitive function - inhibition - by turns with dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), inferior frontal cortex (IFC), or orbital frontal cortex (OFC). Inhibition is postulated to be a mechanism by which PFC exerts its effects on subcortical and posterior-cortical regions to implement executive control. We review evidence concerning inhibition of responses and task-sets. Whereas neuroimaging implicates diverse PFC foci, advances in human lesion-mapping support the functional localization of such inhibition to right IFC alone. Future research should investigate the generality of this proposed inhibitory function to other task domains, and its interaction within a wider network.