Richard Boyd’s Homeostatic Property Cluster (HPC) Theory is becoming the received view of natural kinds in the philosophy of science. However, a problem with HPC Theory is that it neglects many kinds highlighted by scientific classifications while at the same time endorsing kinds rejected by science. In other words, there is a mismatch between HPC kinds and the kinds of science. An adequate account of natural kinds should accurately track the classifications of successful science. We offer an alternative account of natural kinds that better recognizes the diversity of epistemic aims scientists have for constructing classifications. That account introduces the idea of a classificatory program and provides criteria for judging whether a classificatory program identifies natural kinds.

Scientific kinds

I argue that examining the explanatory power of the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC) offers a fruitful approach to the problem of cognitive system demarcation. Although in the discussions on HEC it has become common to refer to considerations of explanatory power as a means for assessing the plausibility of the extended cognition approach, to date no satisfying account of explanatory power has been presented in the literature. I suggest that the currently most prominent theory of explanation in the special sciences, James Woodward's contrastive-counterfactual theory, and an account of explanatory virtues building on that theory can be used to develop a systematic picture of cognitive system demarcation in the psychological sciences. A major difference between my differential influence (DI) account and most other theories of cognitive extension is the cognitive systems pluralism implied by my approach. By examining the explanatory power of competing traditions in psychological memory research, I conc...

Explanatory power of extended cognition

Human behavior is not always independent of the ways in which humans are scientifically classified. That there are looping effects of human kinds has been used as an argument for the methodological...

Looping Kinds and Social Mechanisms

Cognitive archaeology without behavioral modernity: An eliminativist attempt

In this article, we review some important controversies about concepts in the philosophy of psychology, focusing particularly on the theories of concepts developed in philosophy, on the debate about the homogeneity of concepts, on neo-empiricism, and on concept learning. WIREs Cogn Sci 2012, 3:265-279. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1166 For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website.

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Philosophical issues about concepts.

Machery argues that concepts do not constitute a natural kind. We argue that this is a mistake. When appropriately construed, his discussion in fact bolsters the claim that concepts are a natural kind.

Michael Joseph Ferreira

Papers

Why don't concepts constitute a natural kind?