Growth in this model is driven by technological change that arises from intentional investment decisions made by profit maximizing agents. The distinguishing feature of the technology as an input is that it is neither a conventional good nor a public good; it is a nonrival, partially excludable good. Because of the nonconvexity introduced by a nonrival good, price-taking competition cannot be supported, and instead, the equilibriumis one with monopolistic competition. The main conclusions are that the stock of human capital determines the rate of growth, that too little human capital is devoted to research in equilibrium, that integration into world markets will increase growth rates, and that having a large population is not sufficient to generate growth.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/nber_w3210.pdf?abstractid=226703&mirid=1

Endogenous Technological Change

https://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/downloads/academic/The_Future_of_Employment.pdf

The future of employment: How susceptible are jobs to computerisation?

Hierarchies and adaptive cycles comprise the basis of ecosystems and social-ecological systems across scales. Together they form a panarchy. The panarchy describes how a healthy system can invent and experiment, benefiting from inventions that create opportunity while being kept safe from those that destabilize because of their nature or excessive exuberance. Each level is allowed to operate at its own pace, protected from above by slower, larger levels but invigorated from below by faster, smaller cycles of innovation. The whole panarchy is therefore both creative and conserving. The interactions between cycles in a panarchy combine learning with continuity. An analysis of this process helps to clarify the meaning of “sustainable development.” Sustainability is the capacity to create, test, and maintain adaptive capability. Development is the process of creating, testing, and maintaining opportunity. The phrase that combines the two, “sustainable development,” thus refers to the goal of fostering adaptive capabilities and creating opportunities. It is therefore not an oxymoron but a term that describes a logical partnership.

/pdf/understanding-the-complexity-of-economic-ecological-and-3gdlpnkevq.pdf

Understanding the Complexity of Economic, Ecological, and Social Systems

List of Figures ix List of Tables xi Preface and Acknowledgments xiii Introduction 1 PART I: VETO PLAYERS THEORY 17 One: Individual Veto Players 19 Two: Collective Veto Players 38 PART II: VETO PLAYERS AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 65 Three: Regimes: Nondemocratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary 67 Four: Governments and Parliaments 91 Five: Referendums 116 Six: Federalism, Bicameralism, and Qualified Majorities 136 PART III: POLICY EFFECTS OF VETO PLAYERS 161 Seven: Legislation 165 Eight: Macroeconomic Policies 187 PART IV: SYSTEMIC EFFECTS OF VETO PLAYERS 207 Nine: Government Stability 209 Ten: Judiciary and Bureaucracies 222 Eleven: Veto Players Analysis of European Union Institutions 248 Conclusion 283 Bibliography 291 Index 309

Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work

We investigate born-global firms as early adopters of internationalization – that is, companies that expand into foreign markets and exhibit international business prowess and superior performance, from or near their founding. Our explication highlights the critical role of innovative culture, as well as knowledge and capabilities, in this unique breed of international, entrepreneurial firm. Case studies are analyzed to better understand the early internationalization phenomenon and reveal key orientations and strategies that engender international success among these innovative firms. Case findings are then validated in a survey-based study. Despite the scarce resources typical of young firms, our findings reveal that born-global firms leverage a distinctive mix of orientations and strategies that allow them to succeed in diverse international markets. Findings have important implications for the internationalization of contemporary firms.

/pdf/innovation-organizational-capabilities-and-the-born-global-4c1llrvdxw.pdf

Innovation, organizational capabilities, and the born-global firm

C A P I T A L IS M and socialism are generally taken to be irreconcilable opposites, and the conflict between their adherents has seemed so intense as to threaten the survival of the human species. In practice, no doubt, all sorts of compromises, accommodations and mixtures of the two are possible, but conceptually, considered as blueprints for the organization of society, capitalist and socialist ownership of the means of production appear mutually exclysive. I shall argue that this is by no means the case-that capitalism and socialism are, in fact, conceptually quite compatible; that a society be at the same time capitalist and socialist (by that I do not refer to a 'mixed economy') involves no contradiction. For it turns out, on closer examination than the matter usually receives, that capitalism and socialism are features of different parts of the social structure, and are therefore not necessarily in competition or conflict with one another-at least, not conceptually (whether they could in practice coexist with one another is a different and empirical question, which is raised by, for example, 'functionalist' theories of social structure'). In brief, while capitalism is a feature of society's economic organization, socialism is rather an aspect of its political system. In fact, as we shall see, socialism is a part of political democracy, and any democratic political system is therefore necessarily socialist.

Capitalism, socialism and democracy

https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1057%2Fpalgrave.cpt.9300199.pdf

The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation

Every developed society has a system of law; that is, of rules prescribing the infliction of various deprivations, minor and severe, on persons who behave in specified ways. Law, in other words, entails punishment. That organized society thus deliberately imposes suffering on certain of its members inevitably calls for justification. Historically, two major, and conflicting, justifications of punishment have been suggested-the retributive theory, and the utilitarian theory. I wish to argue that the latter is essentially correct, and that this has been obscured by an ambiguity of the word ' justification '. By 'the retributive theory', I mean the view that what justifies the suffering inflicted by punishment is the moral culpability of the behaviour that is punished; that persons who have committed morally wrong acts (or at least seriously culpable ones), and only such persons, ought to be punished; and that the severity of punishment ought to be, so far as possible, in proportion to the moral culpability of the act punished.1 On this view, the consequences of punishment, other than the immediate deprivation suffered by the criminal, are irrelevant to its justification. On the utilitarian view, by contrast, it is entirely by its beneficial consequences that punishment is justified, and not by any obligation to visit suffering on the perpetrators of immoral acts; specifically, punishment is justified in so far as it tends to reduce the occurrence of crimes, that is, of seriously undesirable or bad acts.2 Punishment may reduce the occurrence of bad acts in two ways: namely, through fear-the discouraging effect on those contemplating criminal acts of the possibility of suffering legal sanctions as a result (commonly called deterrence); or through moral education-the salutary effect of punishment on the moral personality of the individual punished, or of members of society generally, so that they become disinclined, for reasons of moral principle, to perform acts of the kind punished.3 I am here concerned with utilitarian and retributive theories of punishment, and not with utilitarianism or retributivism as broader ethical theories. Nothing is implied by either of the theories I am considering as to what, in

Two Justifications of Punishment

Human Rights and Human Diversity: An Essay in the Philosophy of Human Rights

JOHN RAWLS’ THEORY OF JUSTICE , JOHN RAWLS’ THEORY OF JUSTICE , کتابخانه دیجیتال دفتر تبلیغات اسلامی

Michael Lessnoff

Papers

Capitalism, socialism and democracy

The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation

Two Justifications of Punishment

Human Rights and Human Diversity: An Essay in the Philosophy of Human Rights

John Rawls' Theory of Justice: