International Security Studies (ISS) has changed and diversified in many ways since 1945. This book provides the first intellectual history of the development of the subject in that period. It explains how ISS evolved from an initial concern with the strategic consequences of superpower rivalry and nuclear weapons, to its current diversity in which environmental, economic, human and other securities sit alongside military security, and in which approaches ranging from traditional Realist analysis to Feminism and Post-colonialism are in play. It sets out the driving forces that shaped debates in ISS, shows what makes ISS a single conversation across its diversity, and gives an authoritative account of debates on all the main topics within ISS. This is an unparalleled survey of the literature and institutions of ISS that will be an invaluable guide for all students and scholars of ISS, whether traditionalist, ‘new agenda’ or critical. • The first book to tell the post-1945 story of International Security Studies and offer an integrated historical sociology of the whole field • Opens the door to a long-overdue conversation about what ISS is and where it should be going • Provides a detailed institutional account of ISS in terms of its journals, departments, think tanks and funding sources

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The Evolution of International Security Studies

1. Introduction Part I. Restoring the Practical Logic of Peace: 2. The logic of practicality: a theory of practice of security communities 3. A 'sobjective' methodology for the study of practicality Part II. The Symbolic Power Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy: 4. The logic of practicality at the NATO-Russia council 5. The early steps: NATO, Russia and the double enlargement, 1992-7 6. The fallout: NATO and Russia from Kosovo to Georgia, 1998-2008 7. Conclusion.

International security in practice : the politics of NATO-Russia diplomacy

Why have nuclear weapons not been used since Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945? Nina Tannenwald disputes the conventional answer of 'deterrence' in favour of what she calls a nuclear taboo - a widespread inhibition on using nuclear weapons - which has arisen in global politics. Drawing on newly released archival sources, Tannenwald traces the rise of the nuclear taboo, the forces that produced it, and its influence, particularly on US leaders. She analyzes four critical instances where US leaders considered using nuclear weapons (Japan 1945, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Gulf War 1991) and examines how the nuclear taboo has repeatedly dissuaded US and other world leaders from resorting to these 'ultimate weapons'. Through a systematic analysis, Tannenwald challenges conventional conceptions of deterrence and offers a compelling argument on the moral bases of nuclear restraint as well as an important insight into how nuclear war can be avoided in the future.

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The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945

Digital Soviet Union : the Russian national segment of the Internet as a closed national network shaped by strategic cultural ideas

Despite spectacular twentieth century scientific and technological progress, the world is more inequitable than it was fifty years ago. This is evident both in terms of access to health care for individuals, and in relation to the health of whole populations. Disparities in wealth and health within and between nations are widening inexorably and the rapidly expanding global economy has failed to reduce poverty among those with little if any access to health care. In this context the Universal Declaration of Human Rights remains an unrealized aspiration for the majority of the world's people. Given these realities, no single discipline, or body of knowledge is likely to make much difference. For example, approaches based only on neo–liberal economics, as exemplified by the structural adjustment programmes of the World Bank, have not been successful in promoting health equity. The authors believe that an interdisciplinary approach is required, and that bioethics, an interdisciplinary field, can make a contribution towards improving health globally. To do this, the scope of bioethics should be expanded towards a results–oriented global health ethics, based upon widely shared and foundational values that could be carried forward through five transformational approaches.

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Global health ethics: the rationale for mutual caring

This study concentrates on the military roots of Soviet policy. It concentrates on how planning for the contingency of a world war shapes and distorts Soviet policy while producing a military posture and structure of forces that appear to the West as being far in excess of any legitimate defense needs. The focus is on the military-technical aspects of doctrine, which is the responsibility of the military to implement. The study does not dwell on the decisions that the Soviet political leaders would face in the course of a war except to note how the hierarchy of objectives would influence those decisions.

Military objectives in Soviet foreign policy

We are told that Kosovo marks a new era of humanitarian intervention, when promoting and protecting values will be reason enough for coercive military action. However, a review of the evidence, as outlined in this article, suggests that it was Western interests, rather than values, that led to the largely unintended bombing campaign. One can identify two objectives underlying NATO policy—one substantive and the other relating to image. It was the latter that determined the timing of NATO's response to the Kosovo crisis, which had such damaging consequences, many yet to be fully realized. Kosovo shared several characteristics with the Suez crisis that turned out to have been a watershed in the post-Second World War world; so, too, may Kosovo turn out to have been a watershed in the post-Cold War world.

Why did we bomb Belgrade

European security depends on the effective collaboration of the five major powers; it will be undermined by the extension of NATO, a policy driven by US domestic politics. The main threats to security are: the breakdown of political and economic stability; unintended nuclear proliferation and/or failure of the START process; Russia's evolving political and territorial aspirations. All three will remain marginal as long as Russia is constructively engaged with the West. NATO expansion threatens that engagement. It is seen by all strands of Russian opinion as violating the bargain struck in 1990 and will likely lead to the withdrawal of cooperation. Invitations to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic cannot be rescinded, but the consequences can be mitigated by refraining from integrating them into NATO's military structure, by ceasing to insist that NATO membership is open to all, and by perpetuating the de facto nuclear-weapons-free zone that presently exists in Central and Eastern Europe. Britain's stance could be pivotal.

NATO expansion: 'a policy error of historic importance'

Radical changes in Eastern Europe, the withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan, and significant force reductions by the Soviet army signal a new era in U.S.-Soviet relations. Much has been written about these breakthroughs, but there are few satisfactory explanations of why they came about. Yet there is an explanation, and it is essential to understanding the full implications. In this major new book, Michael MccGwire describes the radical rethinking of Soviet national security that together with the decision to democratize Soviet politics prompted these developments. MccGwire was among the first to recognize the shift and foresee the implications. He masterfully laces the redefinition of Soviet security requirements in the broader context of world wide foreign policy and explains the implications for the United States. As MccGwire traces the whole Perestroika process, he explains that Soviet military from 1948 to 1986 had been driven by the possibility of wold war and the compelling objective of not losing. He then describes the course of events and the reasons underlying the fundamental change in Soviet defense and foreign policy that first became apparent in 1987. The Soviets at that point redefined their military doctrine: a world war could and would be averted by political means. MccGwire doesn't attribute the reorientation of Soviet policy to the confrontational policies of the Reagan administration during the 1980s, which almost certainly delayed the process, but rather to the bankruptcy of established Soviet policies, autonomous new rethinking, and concern about the danger of war. The book focuses on the 1981-1990 period, but MccGwire also reinterprets Soviet defense and foreignpolicy since World War II, including an original explanation of Soviet arms control behavior. Perestroika and Soviet National Security describes the truly momentous developments within the Soviet Union that have changed the face of Europe and our global interaction with the rest of the world. And most important, it looks at the hidden objectives that underlie policy to help clarify the fast-changing events and what they may mean for the future.

Perestroika and Soviet national security

To address this question, Michael MccGwire postulates two futures: a low-salience nuclear (LSN) world, as advocated by Michael Quinlan in his article; and a nuclearweapons-free world. MccGwire bases his comparative assessment on the five tasks that Quinlan indentified as requiring a continuing Western nuclear capability and concludes that for only one of the five are nuclear weapons essential, and that one would lapse in an NW47F world. Widening the argument to include other requirements, risks and opportunities, the explicit goal of an NW41F world is shown to offer considerably shortand long-term advantage. Achievable in principle, the major obstacle is a mind-set shaped by the Cold War, which inhibits Western officialdom from addressing the question seriously.

Michael MccGwire

Papers

Military objectives in Soviet foreign policy

Why did we bomb Belgrade

NATO expansion: 'a policy error of historic importance'

Perestroika and Soviet national security

Is there a future for nuclear weapons