Evidence is reviewed which suggests that there may be little or no direct introspective access to higher order cognitive processes. Subjects are sometimes (a) unaware of the existence of a stimulus that importantly influenced a response, (b) unaware of the existence of the response, and (c) unaware that the stimulus has affected the response. It is proposed that when people attempt to report on their cognitive processes, that is, on the processes mediating the effects of a stimulus on a response, they do not do so on the basis of any true introspection. Instead, their reports are based on a priori, implicit causal theories, or judgments about the extent to which a particular stimulus is a plausible cause of a given response. This suggests that though people may not be able to observe directly their cognitive processes, they will sometimes be able to report accurately about them. Accurate reports will occur when influential stimuli are salient and are plausible causes of the responses they produce, and will not occur when stimuli are not salient or are not plausible causes.

/pdf/telling-more-than-we-can-know-verbal-reports-on-mental-57xv5dwuck.pdf

Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes.

Publisher Summary
This chapter outlines the two basic routes to persuasion. One route is based on the thoughtful consideration of arguments central to the issue, whereas the other is based on the affective associations or simple inferences tied to peripheral cues in the persuasion context. This chapter discusses a wide variety of variables that proved instrumental in affecting the elaboration likelihood, and thus the route to persuasion. One of the basic postulates of the Elaboration Likelihood Model—that variables may affect persuasion by increasing or decreasing scrutiny of message arguments—has been highly useful in accounting for the effects of a seemingly diverse list of variables. The reviewers of the attitude change literature have been disappointed with the many conflicting effects observed, even for ostensibly simple variables. The Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) attempts to place these many conflicting results and theories under one conceptual umbrella by specifying the major processes underlying persuasion and indicating the way many of the traditionally studied variables and theories relate to these basic processes. The ELM may prove useful in providing a guiding set of postulates from which to interpret previous work and in suggesting new hypotheses to be explored in future research.

/pdf/the-elaboration-likelihood-model-of-persuasion-3y2y5dyvfe.pdf

The elaboration likelihood model of persuasion

In Experiment 1, subjects read a persuasive message from a likable or unlikable communicator who presented six or two arguments concerning one of two topics. High response involvement subjects anticipated discussing the message topic at a future experimental session, whereas low involvement subjects anticipated discussing a different topic. For high involvement subjects, opinion change was significantly greater given six arguments but was unaffected by communicator likability. For low involvement subjects, opinion change was significantly greater given a likable communicator but was unaffected by the arguments manipulation. In Experiment 2, high issue involvement subjects showed slightly greater opinion change when exposed to five arguments from an unlikable (vs. one argument from a likable) communicator, whereas low involvement subjects exhibited significantly greater persuasion in response to one argument from a likable (vs. five arguments from an unlikable) communicator. These findings support the idea that high involvement leads message recipients to employ a systematic information processing strategy in which message-based cognitions mediate persuasion, whereas low involvement leads recipients to use a heuristic processing strategy in which simple decision rules mediate persuasion. Support was also obtained for the hypothesis that content-mediated (vs. source-mediated) opinion change would shower greater persistence.

/pdf/heuristic-versus-systematic-information-processing-and-the-u9kqfekmls.pdf

Heuristic versus systematic information processing and the use of source versus message cues in persuasion.

This article outlines a social information processing approach to explain job attitudes. In comparison with need-satisfaction and expectancy models to job attitudes and motivation, the social information processing perspective emphasizes the effects of context and the consequences of past choices, rather than individual predispositions and rational decision-making processes. When an individual develops statements about attitude or needs, he or she uses social information--information about past behavior and about what others think. The process of attributing attitudes or needs from behavior is itself affected by commitment processes, by the saliency and relevance of information, and by the need to develop socially acceptable and legitimate rationalizations for actions. Both attitudes and need statements, as well as characterizations of jobs, are affected by informational social influence. The implications of the social information processing perspective for organization development efforts and programs of job redesign are discussed.

A social information processing approach to job attitudes and task design.

Attentional control theory is an approach to anxiety and cognition representing a major development of Eysenck and Calvo's (1992) processing efficiency theory. It is assumed that anxiety impairs efficient functioning of the goal-directed attentional system and increases the extent to which processing is influenced by the stimulus-driven attentional system. In addition to decreasing attentional control, anxiety increases attention to threat-related stimuli. Adverse effects of anxiety on processing efficiency depend on two central executive functions involving attentional control: inhibition and shifting. However, anxiety may not impair performance effectiveness (quality of performance) when it leads to the use of compensatory strategies (e.g., enhanced effort; increased use of processing resources). Directions for future research are discussed.

Anxiety and cognitive performance: Attentional control theory.

Homeowners were interviewed and expected to be either personally identified (public commitment) or not identified (private commitment) as having agreed to attempt energy conservation. The response measure of energy usage was provided by utility-meter readings for the month following the interview. Homeowners under public commitment showed a lower rate of increase in the use levels for both natural gas (Experiment I) and electricity (Experiment II) than under private commitment or in the control (no interview condition). Results from a set of self-monitoring conditions suggested that conservation may be related to increased attention to energy use levels.

Commitment and Voluntary Energy Conservation

General motivational effects of dissonance arousal.

In two experiments, performance on a modified version of the Stroop color-word task varied systematically with level of task-irrelevant arousal. Performance under low response competition was facilitated while performance under high response competition was impaired by arousal manipulated via threat of impending electric shock. The present results were thus consistent with traditional theory relating arousal or drive and response competition and suggest that Stroop task performance may thereby provide a behavioral index of arousal level.

/pdf/the-effect-of-arousal-on-stroop-color-word-task-performance-50g5ppx5tt.pdf

Michael S. Pallak

Papers

Commitment and Voluntary Energy Conservation

General motivational effects of dissonance arousal.

The effect of arousal on Stroop color-word task performance

Effect of commitment on responsiveness to an extreme consonant communication.

Commitment, ego-involvement, and resistance to attack