Commitment to an ontological perspective is a primary aspect of reasoning about the physical world For complex analytic tasks, the ability to switch between different ontologies to represent the same target system can be critical Supplementing the standard device ontology for electronic circuits, we outline elements of a charge-carrier (CC) ontology for reasoning about electronics Having two ontologies extends our range of reasoning, but raises the issue of how to control their application We propose a set of ontological-choice rules to govern the process of ontological shift and demonstrate its effectiveness with examples involving the two ontologies in reasoning about electronic circuits

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Shifting ontological perspectives in reasoning about physical systems

The attempts at presenting the methodology of science as razor-sharp decision-procedures, which arose with the philosophical union of logic and espistemology, has carved science as scientists know it out of inquiry. Rarely are philosophers concerned with the design of methodological standards for other than the testing of special classes of theories. Even rarer is the philosopher who is willing to look beyond codifications of the intellectual history of scientific successes to the very messy guts of theory construction or scientific communication and dialogue. My argument here is that we need a new program for discussing and analyzing the methodology of science, a program based on an “interrogative theory of scientific inquiry”. As an added bonus, I expect that this theory will also provide grounds for the inclusion of significantly broader classes of questions in the scope of science that those circumscribed by the abbreviated playing field of current dogmas.

A Prolegomenon to an Interrogative Theory of Scientific Inquiry

THOMAS AQUINAS ON THE APPREHENSION OF BEING: THE ROLE OF JUDGMENT IN LIGHT OF THIRTEENTH-CENTURY SEMANTICS Rosa E Vargas Della Casa, MA Marquette University, 2013 Aquinas’ famous comments in his early Scriptum on the Sentences (In I Sent, d 38, q 1, a 3) regarding the intellect’s apprehension of essence and esse have traditionally been interpreted as grounding Aquinas’ doctrine on the judgment of esse For Aquinas, it appears, what the intellect apprehends in a simple concept is essence Since esse, for him, is not an essence, it cannot, on the received view, be the object of conceptualization Therefore, esse is grasped by the intellect only in judgment The claim that no genuine concept of esse is possible, however, is inconsistent with Aquinas’ theory of signification A term’s signification is constituted, at least in part, in its “signing relation” with some “concept” in the mind If, as on the traditional reading, there is no concept of esse, the term ‘esse’ is left without signification To respond that the term ‘esse’ signs, not a concept, but the judgment in which esse is apprehended is in direct conflict with Aquinas’ claim elsewhere that no term, including ‘ens’ and ‘esse’, signifies a judgment I propose an alternative interpretation to In I Sent, d 38, q 1, a 3, one that allows for the possibility of a conceptual apprehension of esse The alternative reading explains Aquinas’ remarks there in light of the theoretical context of the discussion, in particular the theory of propositions and their objects I show how and why Aquinas develops a distinctive theory of the object of the proposition, that it is concerned with “the esse of a thing” as a complex Although this complex includes the simple act of being, as for the traditional position (contrary to its major critics), it cannot be reduced to anything simple Despite the Sentences’ affirmation of a real distinction between a thing’s esse and essence, to which correspond two different operations of the intellect, it does not follow that the human intellect cannot conceive esse, just as it conceives essences, in a simple conception

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Thomas Aquinas on the apprehension of being: The role of judgment in light of thirteenth-century semantics

Sobocinski in his paper on Leśniewski's solution to Russell's paradox (1949b) argued that Leśniewski has succeeded in explaining it away. The general strategy of this alleged explanation is presented. The key element of this attempt is the distinction between the collective (mereological) and the distributive (set-theoretic) understanding of the set. The mereological part of the solution, although correct, is likely to fall short of providing foundations of mathematics. I argue that the remaining part of the solution which suggests a specific reading of the distributive interpretation is unacceptable. It follows from it that every individual is an element of every individual. Finally, another Leśniewskian-style approach which uses so-called higher-order epsilon connectives is used and its weakness is indicated.

Leśniewski and Russell's Paradox: Some Problems

Jerome Shaffer (1962) claimed that Kant's view on existence leads to two problems—what I call "the problem of contradiction" and "the problem of insignificance." The former shows that existential propositions are analytic, while Kant asserted that they are synthetic. According to the latter, Kant's view implies that in the act of predicating either, the subjects do not have and cannot capture their exact extensions and/or no predicate could be a "real" predicate. After formulating the two problems, Ibn-Sīnā's views concerning essence, existence, and their relations are explained. Then, it is shown how the problems can find satisfactory solutions on the basis of Ibn-Sīnā's views.

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Milton Karl Munitz

Papers

Existence and logic