EU and national policy-makers argue that the single services market is a key to EU growth, but that many barriers to services market access remain. Grasping the scope, nature and economic meaning of these barriers, however, has proven rather difficult. This is exactly what the present CEPS Special Report helps the reader to do. We trace all market access barriers in services, as far as the data allow, and attempt to understand their nature and economic meaning (given that they are usually forms of domestic regulation) and discuss aspects of the measurement of restrictiveness. We make a sharp distinction between market access barriers restrictions in a non-EU WTO/GATS environment and intra-EU ones, and demonstrate the significant difference in ambition between the two. The paper specifies in detail the progress made by the EU's horizontal reform in services markets, documenting the removal of many cross-border obstacles to trade in services and establishment. Finally, following these conceptual and descriptive analyses, a brief assessment of access restrictiveness indices is provided for both the non-EU WTO environment and for intra-EU services access barriers.

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Access Barriers to Services Markets Mapping, tracing, understanding and measuring

Legislation, even when well-intended, sometimes fails to provide the desired results. By design, the legislative process suffers from “noise” and is typically driven by diverse motives. Inevitably, then, the legislative process generates some mistakes. In spite of these mistakes, the legal discussion of the mechanics of the legislative process is partial and underdeveloped. Focusing on consumer protection legislation, this chapter aims to fill some of this gap. It makes two complementary arguments. Descriptively, the chapter succinctly points to some predominant weaknesses in the legislative process. It illustrates how consumer protection laws may not only fail to achieve their desired results but can also backfire and harm consumers. Normatively and prescriptively, the chapter calls for a nuanced and holistic attitude to consumer protection legislation. It argues for more cautious and tailored consumer protection legislation, which benefits from healthy skepticism. The chapter identifies four principles for improving the process of consumer law-making. First is a more careful approach to legislation, where legislatures progress in a gradual and moderate way. The second proposed principle is to approach the legislative process from a multi-disciplinary, evidence-based, empirical perspective. The third principle suggests adopting a humble decision-making process, which employs temporary consumer protection laws. Finally, the fourth principle offers diffusing and delegating some, or perhaps more, legislative and policy responsibility to administrative agencies and consumer organisations. The chapter draws on consumer protection examples from Europe, North America, Australia, New Zealand and Israel. However, it is largely general in nature. If proven successful, the proposed design principles may be scaled up and implemented in additional jurisdictions and other domains.

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Key Lessons for the Design of Consumer Protection Legislation

Over the past thirty years, the Single European Market has been the core business of the European Union, and enormous progress has been achieved in both ‘widening’ the economic activities covered by EU legislation and ‘deepening’ the acquis to overcome emerging gaps in integration in areas already covered by legislation. And yet, empirical evidence indicates that market integration has stalled on many fronts and, more importantly, that the expected economic benefits of integration in terms of higher growth of incomes, jobs, and productivity have fallen short of expectations, notably in the long-established EU-15 member states. The situation has not improved since the introduction of the euro. This paper reviews the main developments in Single European Market (SEM) legislation and regulatory activities over the past three decades; it summarises the results of the SEM programme in market integration, highlighting areas where gaps appear to be more evident; and discusses the impact of economic integration within the SEM, including aspects that play an important role in feeding popular resistance to integration.

Thirty Years of the Single European Market

Values and Norms

Competition policy is an important beyond-the-border element of the single market and production base envisioned in the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). The targets for competition policy in the AEC Blueprint have been largely met. Looking beyond 2015, ASEAN needs to consider broadening the policy measures for competition policy to encompass the state's presence and interventions that affect the level playing field within markets. In the longer term, the main challenge for AEC will be related to the depth of integration desired in terms of harmonization of competition policy. Deeper integration may require fundamental changes in ASEAN institutions.

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Competition Policy Challenges of Single Market and Production Base

In 2012, the European Single Market will celebrate its 20th anniversary. Thanks to the May 2010 Monti report and the release of the European Commission’s “Towards a Single Market Act” six months later, renewed scrutiny is being given to the market’s achievements and failings over the previous two decades. In this issue’s Forum, our authors analyse this progress from diverse viewpoints and draw different conclusions as to the future path to be taken. DOI: 10.1007/s10272-011-0367-6

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The European Single Market – How Far from Completion?

The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership will reduce tariffs and lower regulatory hurdles that currently impair trade between the EU and the US. However, TTIP has been controversial from the outset. Non-governmental organisations are concerned about lowered health and environmental standards, unions fear a further weakening of labour conditions, and economists debate whether or not there will actually be any noticeable impact on employment and GDP growth. This Forum, featuring contributions by the speakers at the 2015 Intereconomics conference, presents a balanced overview of both the prospective benefits as well as the possible drawbacks to the potentially monumental trade agreement.

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TTIP: Political and Economic Rationale and Implications

Behavioural economics can be a powerful tool in achieving consumer policy goals, by nudging people to make healthy, sustainable and cost-conscious choices It can also, however, be used against consumers’ interests by misleading and deceiving them by exploiting their biases

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Using Behavioural Economics For Rather than Against Consumers – A Practitioner’s Perspective

One of the most discussed contemporary ideas in policy making is Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein’s proposal to infl uence people’s choices without coercing them by improving the “architecture” of their choices. Many governments have implemented behaviourally informed policies, focusing on “nudges” – interventions that preserve freedom of choice, but that also steer people in certain directions. In many countries, behavioural science has become fundamental to policy choices in areas that include consumer protection, health care, environmental protection, tax policy, poverty, retirement and much more. The European Commission has been a front-runner in applying behavioural insights to its policy making over the past decade. What are the opportunities and challenges presented by the application of behavioural insights to policy at a supranational regulating body? What does it mean to apply behavioural insights to policy making? When it comes to consumer legislation, could behavioural economics be used as a tool for bringing the EU closer to its citizens? What do citizens actually think about behaviourally informed policies? Is this method of infl uencing choices ethically acceptable? Finally, should the fi ndings of behavioural economics be alarming to normative economists, in that they threaten the grounds upon which economists evaluate alternatives? If preferences, especially as shown in the choices people actually make, do not reliably indicate what is good for individuals, then normative economics requires a drastic rethinking.

Monique Goyens

Papers

The European Single Market – How Far from Completion?

TTIP: Political and Economic Rationale and Implications

Using Behavioural Economics For Rather than Against Consumers – A Practitioner’s Perspective

Nudging in Public Policy: Application, Opportunities and Challenges