Chapter 1: The functional source of innovation general patterns economic explanation shifting and predicting the sources of innovation innovation as a distributed process. Chapter 2: Users as innovators. Chapter 3: Variations in the functional source of innovation. Chapter 4: Why does the functional source of innovation vary? How do innovators benefit from innovations? Do benefit expectations differ? Chapter 5: The hypothesis in testable form methods five empirical studies discussion. Chapter 6: Shifting the functional source of innovation. Chapter 7: Root of the problem: market research constrained by user experience Lead users as a solution testing the method discussion. Chapter 8: Innovation cooperation between competing firms applications for innovation management.

The sources of innovation

To assess the effects of a firm's network of relations on innovation, this paper elaborates a theoretical framework that relates three aspects of a firm's ego network—direct ties, indirect ties, an...

/pdf/collaboration-networks-structural-holes-and-innovation-a-43oz2jtxxk.pdf

Collaboration Networks, Structural Holes, and Innovation: A Longitudinal Study:

Fabio Arcangeli, Paul David, Frank Engelman, Christopher Freeman, Massimo Moggi, Richard Nelson, Luigi Orsenigo, Nathan Rosenberg, Michele Salvati, G. N. von Tunzelman, two anonymous referees, and the participants at the meeting of the Committee on Distribution, Growth, and Technical Progress of the Italian National Research Council (CNR), Rome, November 16, 1985, have helped with various redraftings. A particularly grateful acknowledgment is for the insightful and patient help of Moses Abramovitz. This work has been undertaken at the Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU), University of Sussex, as part of the research program of the Designated Research Centre, sponsored by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). Earlier support to the research that led to this paper by the Italian National Research Council (CNR) is also gratefully acknowledged. The statistical research has been undertaken with the assistance of Stephano Brioschi, Ilaria Fornari, and Giovannu Prennushi.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/info/2726526

Sources, Procedures, and Microeconomic Effects of Innovation

Recent theories of economic growth, including Romer (1986), Porter (1989) and Jacobs (1969), have stressed the role of technological spillovers in generating growth. Because such knowledge spillovers are particularly effective in cities, where communication between people is more extensive, data on the growth of industries in different cities allows us to test some of these theories. Using a new data set on the growth of large industries in 170 U.S. cities between 1956 and 1987, we find that local competition and urban variety, but not regional specialization, encourage employment growth in industries. The evidence suggests that important knowledge spillovers might be between, rather than within industries, consistent with the theories of Jacobs (1969).

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/nber_w3787.pdf?abstractid=258503&mirid=1

Growth in Cities

Recent theories of economic growth, including those of Romer, Porter, and Jacobs, have stressed the role of technological spillovers in generating growth. Because such knowledge spillovers are particularly effective in cities, where communication between people is more extensive, data on the growth of industries in different cities allow us to test some of these theories. Using a new data set on the growth of large industries in 170 U.S. cities between 1956 and 1987, we find that local competition and urban variety, but not regional specialization, encourage employment growth in industries. The evidence suggests that important knowledge spillovers might occur between rather than within industries, consistent with the theories of Jacobs.

Preface 1. The emergence of an economics of technical advance 2. Schumpeterian hypotheses 3. empirical studies of the Schumpeterian hypotheses 4. Modern theories of market structure and innovation: the decision theoretic approach 5. Modern theories of market structure and innovation: the game theoretic approach 6. Summary and prospectus References Author index Subject index.

Market structure and innovation

We analyze the effects of R&D cartelization and research joint ventures on firms that engage in either Cournot or Bertrand competition in their product market. Research efforts, which precede production, are directed to reducing unit cost and are subject to various degrees of spillovers. It is shown that creating a competitive research joint venture reduces the equilibrium level of technological improvement and increases equilibrium prices compared to when firms conduct R&D independently. A research joint venture that cooperates in its R&D decisions yields the highest consumer plus producer surplus under Cournot competition and, in most cases, under Bertrand competition. (JEL 031)

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2117479.pdf

Research Joint Ventures and R&D Cartels

Technical advance requires resources and is motivated by the quest for profits; therefore, the rate and direction of advance is determined by the economic system. Recognition of this fact has focused attention on the performance of the market economy in the allocation of resources to technical advance, and the consequent body of research is surveyed and synthesised in this book. The theories of market structure and innovation proposed by Schumpeter, Galbraith, Arrow, Schmookler, Scherer, Mansfield, Phillips, Barzel, Kamien and Schwartz, Loury, Nelson and Winter, Grabowski, Dasgupta and Stiglitz, and others are presented in an integrated form. These theories deal with the nature of competition, the incentives to innovate and the pace of innovative activity under different market structures, and the existence of a market structure that yields the most rapid rate of innovation. In addition, the findings of seventy empirical studies dealing with various facets of the microeconomics of technical innovation are presented. The book is designed to be accessible to economists working in a variety of situations - in universities, business and government - and who are concerned with questions of technical innovation. It is also suitable for senior-level undergraduates and first year graduate students approaching the subject in a comprehensive way for the first time.

Market Structure and Innovation

ECONOMICS, we all recite, deals with allocation of limited resources towards satisfaction of unlimited wants. Resources are typically identified as land, labor, and capital plus a technology that determines their transformation into consumer goods. Disparity between the available goods and services and the desired gives rise to scarcity and the question of what, how, and for whom to produce. The focus then shifts to description and evaluation of alternative resource allocation mechanisms for making the choices. The Pareto criterion, by which an allocation of resources is deemed efficient if any reallocation improving the position of some individual worsens the position of others, is a commonly employed gauge of a mechanism's performance. In the absence of externalities, increasing returns to scale, and uncertainty, a perfectly competitive market system yields a Pareto optimal allocation of resources; this underlies the view that individual self-interest is compatible with society's interest. The further conclusion that Pareto optimality may not be achieved via the market system in the presence of monopoly elements provides an economic rationale for antitrust laws. The objective of a resource allocation mechanism appears to be, according to the analysis described above, to make the best of available resources. The alternative objective of relaxing constraints through expanding the resource base or developing new technology seems to be beyond its scope. Thus, until rather recently, technical advance had been regarded, in the mainstream of economic theory, as unmotivated by the quest for profits and substantially unaffected by resource allocation. Instead, as J. Schmookler observed, technology had been viewed as a parameter like the weather, affecting the outcome of resource allocations but itself unaffected by them [84, 1965]. Evidence that technological progress has significantly contributed to growth in productivity, together with a substantial increase in research and development activity, largely financed by government and carried out by industry (see F. Machlup [51, 1962]), may have spurred reconsideration of this view. Once technical advance is regarded as an economic variable, it is natural to in-

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2722211.pdf

Market Structure and Innovation: A Survey

We compare how much profit an owner of a patented cost-reducing invention can realize by licensing it to an oligopolistic industry producing a homogeneous product, by means of a fixed fee or a per unit royalty. Our analysis is conducted in terms of a noncooperative game involving n + 1 players: the inventor and the n firms. In this game the inventor acts as a Stackelberg leader, and it has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies. It is shown that licensing by means of a fixed fee is superior to licensing by means of a royalty for both the inventor and consumers. Only a "drastic" innovation is licensed to a single producer.

/pdf/fees-versus-royalties-and-the-private-value-of-a-patent-1jhnsmm6m2.pdf

Morton I. Kamien

Papers

Market structure and innovation

Research Joint Ventures and R&D Cartels

Market Structure and Innovation

Market Structure and Innovation: A Survey

Fees Versus Royalties and the Private Value of a Patent