How critical is brain criticality?

Temporo-spatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC) – Bridging the gap of neuronal activity and phenomenal states

Various studies demonstrate a special role of the right compared to the left anterior insula in mediating our self. However, the neural features of the right insula that allow for its special role remain unclear. Presupposing a spatiotemporal model of self—“Basis model of self-specificity” (BMSS)—we here address the following question: what spatial-topographic and temporal-dynamic features render neural activity in the right insula to be more suitable in mediating self-specificity than the left insula? First, applying fMRI, we demonstrate that the right insula (i) exhibits higher degrees of centrality in rest, and (ii) higher context-dependent functional connectivity in a self-specific task among regions of distinct layers of self (intero-, extero-proprioceptive, and mental). Second, using EEG in rest and task, we show that the right insula shows longer autocorrelation window (ACW) in its neural activity than both left insula and other regions of the different layers of self. Together, we demonstrate special topographic, i.e., high functional connectivity, and dynamic, i.e., long ACW, neural features of the right insula compared to both left insula and other regions of the distinct layers of self. This suits neural activity in the right insula ideally for high functional integration and temporal continuity as key features of the self including its intero-, extero-proprioceptive, and mental layers.

The Self and Its Right Insula—Differential Topography and Dynamic of Right vs. Left Insula

Human cerebral organoids are three-dimensional biological cultures grown in the laboratory to mimic as closely as possible the cellular composition, structure, and function of the corresponding organ, the brain. For now, cerebral organoids lack blood vessels and other characteristics of the human brain, but are also capable of having coordinated electrical activity. They have been usefully employed for the study of several diseases and the development of the nervous system in unprecedented ways. Research on human cerebral organoids is proceeding at a very fast pace and their complexity is bound to improve. This raises the question of whether cerebral organoids will also be able to develop the unique feature of the human brain, consciousness. If this is the case, some ethical issues would arise. In this article, we discuss the necessary neural correlates and constraints for the emergence of consciousness according to some of the most debated neuroscientific theories. Based on this, we consider what the moral status of a potentially conscious brain organoid might be, in light of ethical and ontological arguments. We conclude by proposing a precautionary principle and some leads for further investigation. In particular, we consider the outcomes of some very recent experiments as entities of a potential new kind. 

Consciousness in a Rotor? Science and Ethics of Potentially Conscious Human Cerebral Organoids

Time is a key element of consciousness as it includes multiple timescales from shorter to longer ones. This is reflected in our experience of various short-term phenomenal contents at discrete points in time as part of an ongoing, more continuous, and long-term ‘stream of consciousness’. Can Integrated Information Theory (IIT) account for this multitude of timescales of consciousness? According to the theory, the relevant spatiotemporal scale for consciousness is the one in which the system reaches the maximum cause-effect power; IIT currently predicts that experience occurs on the order of short timescales, namely, between 100 and 300 ms (theta and alpha frequency range). This can well account for the integration of single inputs into a particular phenomenal content. However, such short timescales leave open the temporal relation of specific phenomenal contents to others during the course of the ongoing time, that is, the stream of consciousness. For that purpose, we converge the IIT with the Temporo-spatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC), which, assuming a multitude of different timescales, can take into view the temporal integration of specific phenomenal contents with other phenomenal contents over time. On the neuronal side, this is detailed by considering those neuronal mechanisms driving the non-additive interaction of pre-stimulus activity with the input resulting in stimulus-related activity. Due to their non-additive interaction, the single input is not only integrated with others in the short-term timescales of 100–300 ms (alpha and theta frequencies) (as predicted by IIT) but, at the same time, also virtually expanded in its temporal (and spatial) features; this is related to the longer timescales (delta and slower frequencies) that are carried over from pre-stimulus to stimulus-related activity. Such a non-additive pre-stimulus-input interaction amounts to temporo-spatial expansion as a key mechanism of TTC for the constitution of phenomenal contents including their embedding or nesting within the ongoing temporal dynamic, i.e., the stream of consciousness. In conclusion, we propose converging the short-term integration of inputs postulated in IIT (100–300 ms as in the alpha and theta frequency range) with the longer timescales (in delta and slower frequencies) of temporo-spatial expansion in TTC.

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From Shorter to Longer Timescales: Converging Integrated Information Theory (IIT) with the Temporo-Spatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC)

We process and integrate multiple timescales into one meaningful whole. Recent evidence suggests that the brain displays a complex multiscale temporal organization. Different regions exhibit different timescales as described by the concept of intrinsic neural timescales (INT); however, their function and neural mechanisms remains unclear. We review recent literature on INT and propose that they are key for input processing. Specifically, they are shared across different species, i.e., input sharing. This suggests a role of INT in encoding inputs through matching the inputs' stochastics with the ongoing temporal statistics of the brain's neural activity, i.e., input encoding. Following simulation and empirical data, we point out input integration versus segregation and input sampling as key temporal mechanisms of input processing. This deeply grounds the brain within its environmental and evolutionary context. It carries major implications in understanding mental features and psychiatric disorders, as well as going beyond the brain in integrating timescales into artificial intelligence.

/pdf/the-brain-and-its-time-intrinsic-neural-timescales-are-key-3t6wbnuoma.pdf

Nareg Berberian

Papers

The brain and its time: intrinsic neural timescales are key for input processing