2 1 The innovative transport systems and the CityMobil project 10 1.1 The research questions 10 2 The state of art in the field of automatic transport systems 12 2.1 Case studies and demand studies for innovative transport systems 12 3 The design and implementation of surveys 14 3.1 Definition of experimental design 14 3.2 Questionnaire design and delivery 16 3.3 First analyses on the collected sample 18 4 Calibration of Logit Multionomial demand models 21 4.1 Methodology 21 4.2 Calibration of the “full” model. 22 4.3 Calibration of the “final” model 24 4.4 The demand analysis through the final Multinomial Logit model 25 5 The analysis of interaction between the demand and socioeconomic attributes 31 5.1 Methodology 31 5.2 Application of Mixed Logit models to the demand 31 5.3 Analysis of the interactions between demand and socioeconomic attributes through Mixed Logit models 32 5.4 Mixed Logit model and interaction between age and the demand for the CTS 38 5.5 Demand analysis with Mixed Logit model 39 6 Final analyses and conclusions 45 6.1 Comparison between the results of the analyses 45 6.2 Conclusions 48 6.3 Answers to the research questions and future developments 52

The European commission

A rich body of knowledge links biodiversity to ecosystem functioning (BEF), but it is primarily focused on small scales. We review the current theory and identify six expectations for scale dependence in the BEF relationship: (1) a nonlinear change in the slope of the BEF relationship with spatial scale; (2) a scale-dependent relationship between ecosystem stability and spatial extent; (3) coexistence within and among sites will result in a positive BEF relationship at larger scales; (4) temporal autocorrelation in environmental variability affects species turnover and thus the change in BEF slope with scale; (5) connectivity in metacommunities generates nonlinear BEF and stability relationships by affecting population synchrony at local and regional scales; (6) spatial scaling in food web structure and diversity will generate scale dependence in ecosystem functioning. We suggest directions for synthesis that combine approaches in metaecosystem and metacommunity ecology and integrate cross-scale feedbacks. Tests of this theory may combine remote sensing with a generation of networked experiments that assess effects at multiple scales. We also show how anthropogenic land cover change may alter the scaling of the BEF relationship. New research on the role of scale in BEF will guide policy linking the goals of managing biodiversity and ecosystems.

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ele.13456

Scaling-up biodiversity-ecosystem functioning research.

In recent years circular migration has been promoted in international circles as a triple win solution, bringing benefits to destination countries, origin countries and migrant workers themselves – and a major mechanism to reap development benefits of labour migration. This paper reviews issues relating to the conceptual basis of circular migration, the claimed benefits of circular migration, and its wider implications for migrant rights and protection, in particular those relating to low skilled workers. The paper distinguishes between ‘Spontaneous circular migration’ and ‘managed’ or ‘regulated’ circular migration programmes. Recent years have seen increasing interest in these managed programmes as a migration policy tool to address a number of sensitive and contentious issues of today’s international migration.The paper highlights the shallow basis of the ‘triple wins’ argument, based on a survey of literature and reviews of some temporary and circular migration programmes. The author argues that there are few real differences between temporary labour migration and circular migration movements/programmes to brand the latter as an innovative tool.The study finds that the benefits of circular migration have been highly exaggerated in recent discussions. There is little evidence to support that circular migration represents the natural preferences of most migrants. It is difficult to see migrant workers as winners in circular schemes since they have limited choice regarding the jobs, change of employers, timing of return, and family unification, among others. Countries of origin are hardly winners either, given the small quotas of legal migration opportunities provided, if any, and the large concessions they have to make to gain such quotas. The current model seems to make the destination countries winners in providing them ‘labour without people,’ or ‘circular migrants’ with ill-defined rights, making it easier for employers to exploit workers, and to engage in flexible hiring and firing, in line with economic and business conditions, and short term savings in integration costs.The paper concludes that overall there has been little progress in developing circular migration programmes with the predicted triple wins. There are some managed circular migration programmes of a pilot nature, which are small in scale and unlikely to make any significant development impact in source countries facing problems of high unemployment, poverty and lack of decent work.The paper argues that the main focus of the debate on circular migration should be on its role as a mechanism for expanding legal avenues for workers from developing countries to destination countries rather than on diaspora engagement with home countries as interpreted by some researchers. Managed circular migration programmes are only one of the options – and hardly the best option – for expanding legal migration avenues. A comprehensive approach should look at permanent migration programmes to address permanent or long-term labour shortages induced by demographic and other factors, regular labour admission programmes with guaranteed rights for workers on a par with national workers, improved seasonal worker programmes, and other options in addition to circular migration. The author concludes that the foundation of any such programmes is respect, promotion and realization of human and labour rights of migrant workers in line with international instruments, which can deliver the promised wins. At the same time, the limited role that labour migration can play in economic and social transformation of countries of origin needs to be recognized.

Circular Migration: A Triple Win or a Dead End

Centre on Migration, Policy and Society

Executive dominance in the contemporary EU is part of a wider migration of executive power towards types of decision making that eschew electoral accountability and popular democratic control. This democratic gap is fed by far-going secrecy arrangements and practices exercised in a concerted fashion by the various executive actors at different levels of governance and resulting in the blacking out of crucial information and documents - even for parliaments. Beyond a deconstruction exercise on the nature and location of EU executive power and secretive working practices, this article focuses on the challenges facing parliaments in particular. It seeks to reconstruct a more pro-active and networked role of parliaments - both national and European - as countervailing power. In this vision parliaments must assert themselves in a manner that is true to their role in the political system and that is not dictated by government at any level.

/pdf/challenging-executive-dominance-in-european-democracy-2igbgiqf9x.pdf

Challenging Executive Dominance in European Democracy

The European External Action Service: Living Forwards by Understanding Backwards

Third countries are actors in EU external migration policy, not merely passive recipients of policy proposals. In order to understand policy outcomes, it is necessary to understand why third countries decide to participate (or not) in EU migration policy initiatives. The conditionality model provides an explanation which focuses on the domestic preferences of and processes in the third countries. In 2007, the EU introduced the Mobility Partnerships. These partnerships are intended to be the framework for migration relations between the EU and third countries in Eastern Europe and Africa. The Cape Verdean government decided to sign a Mobility Partnership because the benefits of this cooperation with the EU outweighed the costs. The Senegalese government refused to sign because the Mobility Partnership would have implied significant, unacceptable costs.

The Role of Third Countries in EU Migration Policy: The Mobility Partnerships

In order to increase the effectiveness of migration management, the EU increasingly enters into agreements with third countries. Such co-operation aims to engage third countries in migration control mechanisms in exchange for enhanced legal migration opportunities, yet this externalization of migration policy is highly selective with regard to both participating Member States and third countries. In this paper we develop a three-level game perspective to explain why Member States and third countries participate in EU external migration policy initiatives. The three-level game links three sets of actors in two strategic interactions: Member States, EU institutions and third countries. We argue that two factors determine the outcome of negotiations: the cost of no agreement and the autonomy of central decision-makers. The model is illustrated by the successful and failed Mobility Partnership negotiations between EU Member States, the European Commission and, respectively, Cape Verde and Senegal.

Three-Level Games in EU External Migration Policy: Negotiating Mobility Partnerships in West Africa†

Although EU migration policy has become increasingly supranationalised, the member states still find ways to limit the involvement of the supranational institutions. Legal migration in particular is still seen by member states as their ‘domain reservee’. However, member states will still sometimes choose cooperation at the EU level. How can this choice be explained? The article argues that member states cooperate at the EU level where this can help them to achieve their nationally formulated preferences. In the decision-making process on the Mobility Partnerships, member states demonstrated their determination to remain in control, resulting in a limited role for the Commission and no role at all for the Parliament and Court of Justice. Some member states identified a fit between the Mobility Partnerships and their national migration policies, and therefore chose to participate. Other member states were very opposed to the Mobility Partnerships, because they contradict national migration policy.

Deciding on EU External Migration Policy: The Member States and the Mobility Partnerships

This chapter offers an analysis of the eu mobility partnerships as one case in point for policy intersectionality, within the framework of the multi-level governance literature. It argues that the governance of mobility partnerships is characterized by its multi-actor nature, and focuses on the consequences of different actors’ preferences and interactions for policy-making and implementation. In particular, it emphasises the roles of the non-eu countries and member states in making and shaping eu external migration policy. Finally, the chapter analyses implementation, something which has been understudied in the literature to date. It argues that the multi-actor nature of eu external migration policy presents obstacles to implementation due to the different policy visions of the different actors, and the non-hierarchical structure which links them.

Natasja Reslow

Papers

The European External Action Service: Living Forwards by Understanding Backwards

The Role of Third Countries in EU Migration Policy: The Mobility Partnerships

Three-Level Games in EU External Migration Policy: Negotiating Mobility Partnerships in West Africa†

Deciding on EU External Migration Policy: The Member States and the Mobility Partnerships

Making and Implementing Multi-Actor EU External Migration Policy: the Mobility Partnerships