This paper presents SimCLR: a simple framework for contrastive learning of visual representations. We simplify recently proposed contrastive self-supervised learning algorithms without requiring specialized architectures or a memory bank. In order to understand what enables the contrastive prediction tasks to learn useful representations, we systematically study the major components of our framework. We show that (1) composition of data augmentations plays a critical role in defining effective predictive tasks, (2) introducing a learnable nonlinear transformation between the representation and the contrastive loss substantially improves the quality of the learned representations, and (3) contrastive learning benefits from larger batch sizes and more training steps compared to supervised learning. By combining these findings, we are able to considerably outperform previous methods for self-supervised and semi-supervised learning on ImageNet. A linear classifier trained on self-supervised representations learned by SimCLR achieves 76.5% top-1 accuracy, which is a 7% relative improvement over previous state-of-the-art, matching the performance of a supervised ResNet-50. When fine-tuned on only 1% of the labels, we achieve 85.8% top-5 accuracy, outperforming AlexNet with 100X fewer labels.

A Simple Framework for Contrastive Learning of Visual Representations

Neural networks provide state-of-the-art results for most machine learning tasks. Unfortunately, neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples: given an input x and any target classification t, it is possible to find a new input x' that is similar to x but classified as t. This makes it difficult to apply neural networks in security-critical areas. Defensive distillation is a recently proposed approach that can take an arbitrary neural network, and increase its robustness, reducing the success rate of current attacks' ability to find adversarial examples from 95% to 0.5%.In this paper, we demonstrate that defensive distillation does not significantly increase the robustness of neural networks by introducing three new attack algorithms that are successful on both distilled and undistilled neural networks with 100% probability. Our attacks are tailored to three distance metrics used previously in the literature, and when compared to previous adversarial example generation algorithms, our attacks are often much more effective (and never worse). Furthermore, we propose using high-confidence adversarial examples in a simple transferability test we show can also be used to break defensive distillation. We hope our attacks will be used as a benchmark in future defense attempts to create neural networks that resist adversarial examples.

/pdf/towards-evaluating-the-robustness-of-neural-networks-40dfcinzm4.pdf

Towards Evaluating the Robustness of Neural Networks

Recent work has demonstrated that deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples---inputs that are almost indistinguishable from natural data and yet classified incorrectly by the network. In fact, some of the latest findings suggest that the existence of adversarial attacks may be an inherent weakness of deep learning models. To address this problem, we study the adversarial robustness of neural networks through the lens of robust optimization. This approach provides us with a broad and unifying view on much of the prior work on this topic. Its principled nature also enables us to identify methods for both training and attacking neural networks that are reliable and, in a certain sense, universal. In particular, they specify a concrete security guarantee that would protect against any adversary. These methods let us train networks with significantly improved resistance to a wide range of adversarial attacks. They also suggest the notion of security against a first-order adversary as a natural and broad security guarantee. We believe that robustness against such well-defined classes of adversaries is an important stepping stone towards fully resistant deep learning models. Code and pre-trained models are available at this https URL and this https URL.

Towards Deep Learning Models Resistant to Adversarial Attacks

“Unpaired Image-to-Image Translation using Cycle-Consistent Adversarial Networks”の学習報告

Most existing machine learning classifiers are highly vulnerable to adversarial examples. An adversarial example is a sample of input data which has been modified very slightly in a way that is intended to cause a machine learning classifier to misclassify it. In many cases, these modifications can be so subtle that a human observer does not even notice the modification at all, yet the classifier still makes a mistake. Adversarial examples pose security concerns because they could be used to perform an attack on machine learning systems, even if the adversary has no access to the underlying model. Up to now, all previous work have assumed a threat model in which the adversary can feed data directly into the machine learning classifier. This is not always the case for systems operating in the physical world, for example those which are using signals from cameras and other sensors as an input. This paper shows that even in such physical world scenarios, machine learning systems are vulnerable to adversarial examples. We demonstrate this by feeding adversarial images obtained from cell-phone camera to an ImageNet Inception classifier and measuring the classification accuracy of the system. We find that a large fraction of adversarial examples are classified incorrectly even when perceived through the camera.

Adversarial examples in the physical world

We improve the recently-proposed "MixMatch" semi-supervised learning algorithm by introducing two new techniques: distribution alignment and augmentation anchoring. Distribution alignment encourages the marginal distribution of predictions on unlabeled data to be close to the marginal distribution of ground-truth labels. Augmentation anchoring feeds multiple strongly augmented versions of an input into the model and encourages each output to be close to the prediction for a weakly-augmented version of the same input. To produce strong augmentations, we propose a variant of AutoAugment which learns the augmentation policy while the model is being trained. Our new algorithm, dubbed ReMixMatch, is significantly more data-efficient than prior work, requiring between $5\times$ and $16\times$ less data to reach the same accuracy. For example, on CIFAR-10 with 250 labeled examples we reach $93.73\%$ accuracy (compared to MixMatch's accuracy of $93.58\%$ with $4{,}000$ examples) and a median accuracy of $84.92\%$ with just four labels per class. We make our code and data open-source at this https URL.

ReMixMatch: Semi-Supervised Learning with Distribution Alignment and Augmentation Anchoring

We improve the recently-proposed ``MixMatch semi-supervised learning algorithm by introducing two new techniques: distribution alignment and augmentation anchoring. - Distribution alignment encourages the marginal distribution of predictions on unlabeled data to be close to the marginal distribution of ground-truth labels. - Augmentation anchoring} feeds multiple strongly augmented versions of an input into the model and encourages each output to be close to the prediction for a weakly-augmented version of the same input. To produce strong augmentations, we propose a variant of AutoAugment which learns the augmentation policy while the model is being trained. Our new algorithm, dubbed ReMixMatch, is significantly more data-efficient than prior work, requiring between 5 times and 16 times less data to reach the same accuracy. For example, on CIFAR-10 with 250 labeled examples we reach 93.73% accuracy (compared to MixMatch's accuracy of 93.58% with 4000 examples) and a median accuracy of 84.92% with just four labels per class.

/pdf/remixmatch-semi-supervised-learning-with-distribution-3m4jhw4qma.pdf

ReMixMatch: Semi-Supervised Learning with Distribution Matching and Augmentation Anchoring

Return Oriented Programming (ROP) has become the exploitation technique of choice for modern memory-safety vulnerability attacks. Recently, there have been multiple attempts at defenses to prevent ROP attacks. In this paper, we introduce three new attack methods that break many existing ROP defenses. Then we show how to break kBouncer and ROPecker, two recent low-overhead defenses that can be applied to legacy software on existing hardware. We examine several recent ROP attacks seen in the wild and demonstrate that our techniques successfully cloak them so they are not detected by these defenses. Our attacks apply to many CFI-based defenses which we argue are weaker than previously thought. Future defenses will need to take our attacks into account.

/pdf/rop-is-still-dangerous-breaking-modern-defenses-c8k0sga1tf.pdf

ROP is still dangerous: breaking modern defenses

We show that defensive distillation is not secure: it is no more resistant to targeted misclassification attacks than unprotected neural networks.

Defensive Distillation is Not Robust to Adversarial Examples

Ongoing research has proposed several methods to defend neural networks against adversarial examples, many of which researchers have shown to be ineffective. We ask whether a strong defense can be created by combining multiple (possibly weak) defenses. To answer this question, we study three defenses that follow this approach. Two of these are recently proposed defenses that intentionally combine components designed to work well together. A third defense combines three independent defenses. For all the components of these defenses and the combined defenses themselves, we show that an adaptive adversary can create adversarial examples successfully with low distortion. Thus, our work implies that ensemble of weak defenses is not sufficient to provide strong defense against adversarial examples.

Nicholas Carlini

Papers

ReMixMatch: Semi-Supervised Learning with Distribution Alignment and Augmentation Anchoring

ReMixMatch: Semi-Supervised Learning with Distribution Matching and Augmentation Anchoring

ROP is still dangerous: breaking modern defenses

Defensive Distillation is Not Robust to Adversarial Examples

Adversarial Example Defenses: Ensembles of Weak Defenses are not Strong