Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

Boolean satisfiability is probably the most studied of the combinatorial optimization/search problems. Significant effort has been devoted to trying to provide practical solutions to this problem for problem instances encountered in a range of applications in electronic design automation (EDA), as well as in artificial intelligence (AI). This study has culminated in the development of several SAT packages, both proprietary and in the public domain (e.g. GRASP, SATO) which find significant use in both research and industry. Most existing complete solvers are variants of the Davis-Putnam (DP) search algorithm. In this paper we describe the development of a new complete solver, Chaff which achieves significant performance gains through careful engineering of all aspects of the search-especially a particularly efficient implementation of Boolean constraint propagation (BCP) and a novel low overhead decision strategy. Chaff has been able to obtain one to two orders of magnitude performance improvement on difficult SAT benchmarks in comparison with other solvers (DP or otherwise), including GRASP and SATO.

/pdf/chaff-engineering-an-efficient-sat-solver-2ima1ekzuu.pdf

Chaff: engineering an efficient SAT solver

We explore the effect of dimensionality on the nearest neighbor problem. We show that under a broad set of conditions (much broader than independent and identically distributed dimensions), as dimensionality increases, the distance to the nearest data point approaches the distance to the farthest data point. To provide a practical perspective, we present empirical results on both real and synthetic data sets that demonstrate that this effect can occur for as few as 10-15 dimensions. These results should not be interpreted to mean that high-dimensional indexing is never meaningful; we illustrate this point by identifying some high-dimensional workloads for which this effect does not occur. However, our results do emphasize that the methodology used almost universally in the database literature to evaluate high-dimensional indexing techniques is flawed, and should be modified. In particular, most such techniques proposed in the literature are not evaluated versus simple linear scan, and are evaluated over workloads for which nearest neighbor is not meaningful. Often, even the reported experiments, when analyzed carefully, show that linear scan would outperform the techniques being proposed on the workloads studied in high (10-15) dimensionality!.

When is nearest neighbor meaningful

* Starting from Need* Evolution of the Toyota Production System* Further Development* Genealogy of the Toyota Production System* The True Intention of the Ford System* Surviving the Low-Growth Period

Toyota production system : beyond large-scale production

Generalized Linear Models (2nd ed.)

An important class of machine scheduling problems is characterized by a no-wait or blocking production environment, where there is no intermediate buffer between machines. In a no-wait environment, a job must be processed from start to completion, without any interruption either on or between machines. Blocking occurs when a job, having completed processing on a machine, remains on the machine until a downstream machine becomes available for processing. A no-wait or blocking production environment typically arises from characteristics of the processing technology itself, or from the absence of storage capacity between operations of a job. In this review paper, we describe several well-documented applications of no-wait and blocking scheduling models and illustrate some ways in which the increasing use of modern manufacturing methods gives rise to other applications. We review the computational complexity of a wide variety of no-wait and blocking scheduling problems and describe several problems which remain open as to complexity. We study several deterministic flowshop, jobshop, and openshop problems and describe efficient and enumerative algorithms, as well as heuristics and results about their performance. The literature on stochastic no-wait and blocking scheduling problems is also reviewed. Finally, we provide some suggestions for future research directions.

A Survey of Machine Scheduling Problems with Blocking and No-Wait in Process

Although the supply chain management literature is extensive, the benefits and challenges of coordinated decision making within supply chainscheduling models have not been studied. We consider a variety of scheduling, batching, and delivery problems that arise in an arborescent supply chain where a supplier makes deliveries to several manufacturers, who also make deliveries to customers. The objective is to minimize the overall scheduling and delivery cost, using several classical scheduling objectives. This is achieved by scheduling the jobs and forming them into batches, each of which is delivered to the next downstream stage as a single shipment. For each problem, we either derive an efficient dynamic programming algorithm that minimizes the total cost of the supplier or that of the manufacturer, or we demonstrate that this problem is intractable. The total system cost minimization problem of a supplier and manufacturer who make cooperative decisions is also considered. We demonstrate that cooperation between a supplier and a manufacturer may reduce the total system cost by at least 20%, or 25%, or by up to 100%, depending upon the scheduling objective. Finally, we identify incentives and mechanisms for this cooperation, thereby demonstrating that our work has practical implications for improving the efficiency of supply chains.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/4132420.pdf

Supply chain scheduling: Batching and delivery

This paper and its companion Part II concern the scheduling of jobs with cost penalties for both early and late completion. In Part I, we consider the problem of minimizing the weighted sum of earliness and tardiness of jobs scheduled on a single processor around a common due date, d. We assume that d is not early enough to constrain the scheduling decision. The weight of a job does not depend on whether the job is early or late, but weights may vary between jobs. We prove that the recognition version of this problem is NP-complete in the ordinary sense. We describe optimality conditions, and present a computationally efficient dynamic programming algorithm. When the weights are bounded by a polynomial function of the number of jobs, a fully polynomial approximation scheme is given. We also describe four special cases for which the problem is polynomially solvable. Part II provides similar results for the unweighted version of this problem, where d is arbitrary.

Earliness-Tardiness Scheduling Problems, I: Weighted Deviation of Completion Times About a Common Due Date

Zest is a positive trait reflecting a person's approach to life with anticipation, energy, and excitement. In the present study, 9803 currently employed adult respondents to an Internet site completed measures of dispositional zest, orientation to work as a calling, and satisfaction with work and life in general. Across all occupations, zest predicted the stance that work was a calling (r = .39), as well as work satisfaction (r = .46) and general life satisfaction (r = .53). Zest deserves further attention from organizational scholars, especially how it can be encouraged in the workplace. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Zest and work

A companion paper Part I considers the problem of minimizing the weighted earliness and tardiness of jobs scheduled on a single machine around a common due date, d, which is unrestrictively late. This paper Part II considers the problem of minimizing the unweighted earliness and tardiness of jobs, allowing the possibility that d is early enough to constrain the scheduling decision. We describe several optimality conditions. The recognition version of the problem is shown to be NP-complete in the ordinary sense, confirming a well known conjecture. Moreover, this complexity definition is precise, since we describe a dynamic programming algorithm which runs in pseudopolynomial time. This algorithm is also extremely efficient computationally, providing an improvement over earlier procedures, of almost two orders of magnitude in the size of instance that can be solved. Finally, we describe a special case of the problem which is polynomially solvable.

Nicholas G. Hall

Papers

A Survey of Machine Scheduling Problems with Blocking and No-Wait in Process

Supply chain scheduling: Batching and delivery

Earliness-Tardiness Scheduling Problems, I: Weighted Deviation of Completion Times About a Common Due Date

Zest and work

Earliness-tardiness scheduling problems: II. Derivation of completion times about a restrictive common due date