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Thinking about Strategic Culture

Why have nuclear weapons not been used since Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945? Nina Tannenwald disputes the conventional answer of 'deterrence' in favour of what she calls a nuclear taboo - a widespread inhibition on using nuclear weapons - which has arisen in global politics. Drawing on newly released archival sources, Tannenwald traces the rise of the nuclear taboo, the forces that produced it, and its influence, particularly on US leaders. She analyzes four critical instances where US leaders considered using nuclear weapons (Japan 1945, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Gulf War 1991) and examines how the nuclear taboo has repeatedly dissuaded US and other world leaders from resorting to these 'ultimate weapons'. Through a systematic analysis, Tannenwald challenges conventional conceptions of deterrence and offers a compelling argument on the moral bases of nuclear restraint as well as an important insight into how nuclear war can be avoided in the future.

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The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945

The character of Reagan's rhetoric and the response to it can be explained by its narrative form. The dominance of narrative in Reagan's discourse and the nature of the narrative form combine to differentiate the perspective of Reagan's supporters and his opponents. Three characteristics of narrative form—a story‐based truth, an emphasis on morality, and a grounding in common sense—explain the way in which narrative affects political judgment. The analysis reveals the power of narrative form and, in contrast to the assertions of some narrative theorists, its fragility and moral limitations.

Telling America's story: Narrative form and the Reagan presidency

In the last five to ten years, Chinese military strategists have developed a concept of limited deterrence that is now used to describe what China`s nuclear forces ought to be able to do. Limited deterrence rests on a limited war-fighting capability aimed at communicating China`s ability to inflict costly damage on the adversary at every rung on the escalation ladder and thus denying the adversary victory in a nuclear war. It is this capability, Chinese strategists argue, that will deter such a war in the first place. Limited deterrence therefore requires the development of a greater number of tactical, theater, and strategic nuclear weapons that are accurate enough to hit counterforce targets, are mobile, can be used in the earliest stages of a nuclear crisis, and in a world of THAAD are capable of penetrating ballistic missile defense systems. These forces would thus require effective space-based early warning, and some configuration of BMD capabilities. Given that China does not now have such capabilities, the straight-line prediction would be that over the next decade or so, we should expect to see a discernible effort to shift the forces away from a minimum strike-back assured destruction posture, which China now has, towardmore » limited war-fighting. This may or may not entail a dramatic short-run increase in the absolute numbers of warheads and delivery systems: the pace will depend in part on whether the United States proceeds with TMD deployment. The speed of change in China`s nuclear capabilities will also depend in part on whether the implementation of START II leads to a steep relative increase in the size of the Chinese arsenal and reduces the relative number of counterforce targets. The primary constraints on any such efforts are exogenous, namely, budgetary and arms control constraints. It is an open question whether endogenous constraints-a shift in doctrine toward minimum deterrence-might be encouraged. 120 refs.« less

China's New "Old Thinking": The Concept of Limited Deterrence

This article uses the recent nuclear freeze movement as a vehicle for analyzing the ways in which United States political institutions cope with dissident movements. Building on the literature on political opportunity structure, I argue that United States political institutions reflect James Madison's strategy for coping with dissent by fragmenting political power. The Madisonian structure of United States government, by providing relatively easy institutional access to some challengers and numerous venues for often ritualized participation, serves to fragment, coopt, and dissipate dissident movements. I identify three complementary components of the process of fragmentation and dissipation: marginalization, depoliticization, and institutionalization. I then examine the political implications of institutionalization in the case of the nuclear freeze movement with a discussion of the movement's influence on policy. I conclude with a call for more comparative research on the process and political impact of institutionalizing social protest movements.

Nina Byers

Papers

With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush, and Nuclear War