Publisher Summary
This chapter outlines the two basic routes to persuasion. One route is based on the thoughtful consideration of arguments central to the issue, whereas the other is based on the affective associations or simple inferences tied to peripheral cues in the persuasion context. This chapter discusses a wide variety of variables that proved instrumental in affecting the elaboration likelihood, and thus the route to persuasion. One of the basic postulates of the Elaboration Likelihood Model—that variables may affect persuasion by increasing or decreasing scrutiny of message arguments—has been highly useful in accounting for the effects of a seemingly diverse list of variables. The reviewers of the attitude change literature have been disappointed with the many conflicting effects observed, even for ostensibly simple variables. The Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) attempts to place these many conflicting results and theories under one conceptual umbrella by specifying the major processes underlying persuasion and indicating the way many of the traditionally studied variables and theories relate to these basic processes. The ELM may prove useful in providing a guiding set of postulates from which to interpret previous work and in suggesting new hypotheses to be explored in future research.

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The elaboration likelihood model of persuasion

In 1974 an article appeared in Science magazine with the dry-sounding title “Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases” by a pair of psychologists who were not well known outside their discipline of decision theory. In it Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman introduced the world to Prospect Theory, which mapped out how humans actually behave when faced with decisions about gains and losses, in contrast to how economists assumed that people behave. Prospect Theory turned Economics on its head by demonstrating through a series of ingenious experiments that people are much more concerned with losses than they are with gains, and that framing a choice from one perspective or the other will result in decisions that are exactly the opposite of each other, even if the outcomes are monetarily the same. Prospect Theory led cognitive psychology in a new direction that began to uncover other human biases in thinking that are probably not learned but are part of our brain’s wiring.

Thinking fast and slow.

A review is presented of the book “Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment,” edited by Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman.

Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment

Since the subject of traffic dynamics has captured the interest of physicists, many surprising effects have been revealed and explained. Some of the questions now understood are the following: Why are vehicles sometimes stopped by ``phantom traffic jams'' even though drivers all like to drive fast? What are the mechanisms behind stop-and-go traffic? Why are there several different kinds of congestion, and how are they related? Why do most traffic jams occur considerably before the road capacity is reached? Can a temporary reduction in the volume of traffic cause a lasting traffic jam? Under which conditions can speed limits speed up traffic? Why do pedestrians moving in opposite directions normally organize into lanes, while similar systems ``freeze by heating''? All of these questions have been answered by applying and extending methods from statistical physics and nonlinear dynamics to self-driven many-particle systems. This article considers the empirical data and then reviews the main approaches to modeling pedestrian and vehicle traffic. These include microscopic (particle-based), mesoscopic (gas-kinetic), and macroscopic (fluid-dynamic) models. Attention is also paid to the formulation of a micro-macro link, to aspects of universality, and to other unifying concepts, such as a general modeling framework for self-driven many-particle systems, including spin systems. While the primary focus is upon vehicle and pedestrian traffic, applications to biological or socio-economic systems such as bacterial colonies, flocks of birds, panics, and stock market dynamics are touched upon as well.

Traffic and related self-driven many-particle systems

Much research in the last two decades has demon- strated that human responses deviate from the performance deemed normative according to various models of decision mak- ing and rational judgment (e.g., the basic axioms of utility theory). This gap between the normative and the descriptive can be inter- preted as indicating systematic irrationalities in human cognition. However, four alternative interpretations preserve the assumption that human behavior and cognition is largely rational. These posit that the gap is due to (1) performance errors, (2) computational limitations, (3) the wrong norm being applied by the experi- menter, and (4) a different construal of the task by the subject. In the debates about the viability of these alternative explanations, attention has been focused too narrowly on the modal response. In a series of experiments involving most of the classic tasks in the heuristics and biases literature, we have examined the implica- tions of individual differences in performance for each of the four explanations of the normative/descriptive gap. Performance er- rors are a minor factor in the gap; computational limitations un- derlie non-normative responding on several tasks, particularly those that involve some type of cognitive decontextualization. Un- expected patterns of covariance can suggest when the wrong norm is being applied to a task or when an alternative construal of the task should be considered appropriate.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0140525X00003435

Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate?

Theory and research on small group performance and decision making is reviewed. Recent trends in group performance research have found that process gains as well as losses are possible, and both are frequently explained by situational and procedural contexts that differentially affect motivation and resource coordination. Research has continued on classic topics (e.g., brainstorming, group goal setting, stress, and group performance) and relatively new areas (e.g., collective induction). Group decision making research has focused on preference combination for continuous response distributions and group information processing. New approaches (e.g., group-level signal detection) and traditional topics (e.g., groupthink) are discussed. New directions, such as nonlinear dynamic systems, evolutionary adaptation, and technological advances, should keep small group research vigorous well into the future.

Group performance and decision making.

This article considers a practice in scientific communication termed HARKing (Hypothesizing After the Results are Known). HARKing is defined as presenting a post hoc hypothesis (i.e., one based on or informed by one's results) in one's research report as i f it were, in fact, an a priori hypotheses. Several forms of HARKing are identified and survey data are presented that suggests that at least some forms of HARKing are widely practiced and widely seen as inappropriate. I identify several reasons why scientists might HARK. Then I discuss several reasons why scientists ought not to HARK. It is conceded that the question of whether HARKing ' s costs exceed its benefits is a complex one that ought to be addressed through research, open discussion, and debate. To help stimulate such discussion (and for those such as myself who suspect that HARKing's costs do exceed its benefits), I conclude the article with some suggestions for deterring HARKing.

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HARKing: Hypothesizing After the Results are Known:

Three experiments tested the hypothesis that group members exert less effort as the perceived dispensability of their efforts for group success increases. The resultant motivation losses were termed "free-rider effects." In Exp I, 189 undergraduates of high or low ability performed in 2-, 4-, or 8-person groups at tasks with additive, conjunctive, or disjunctive demands. As predicted, member ability had opposite effects on effort under disjunctive and conjunctive task demands. The failure to obtain a relationship between group size and member effort in Exp I was attributed to a procedural artifact eliminated in Exp II (73 Ss). As predicted, as groups performing conjunctive and disjunctive tasks increased in size, member motivation declined. This was not a social loafing effect; group members were fully identifiable at every group size. Exp III (108 Ss) explored the role that performance feedback plays in informing group members of the dispensability of their efforts and encouraging free riding. Results are generally consistent with those of Exps I and II.

Dispensability of member effort and group motivation losses: Free-rider effects

Theory developed to account for behavior in social dilemmas—situations in which -
the rational pursuit of self-interest can lead to collective disaster—was applied to
the analysis of group motivation losses. Two group motivation loss effects demonstrated
in previous research, the social-loafing effect and the free-rider effect,
were shown to follow from social dilemma theories. An experiment was performed
to empirically demonstrate a third motivation loss effect, termed the sucker effect.
It was hypothesized that group members would reduce their efforts if they had a
capable partner.who free rode on their efforts, that is, who was capable of contributing
to the group but would not. This prediction was confirmed. The effect was particularly
strong in males. Potential remedies for such motivation losses were discussed.

Motivation losses in small groups: a social dilemma analysis

Foreword Part I. Introduction and Theory: 1. Interpersonal situations: the context of social behavior 2. Outcome interdependence 3. Interaction conditions and person factors 4. Exploring the geography of the outcome patterns Part II The Situations: Preface to the Entries for the Situations Single Component Patterns: 1. Independence: we go our separate ways 2. Mutual partner control: I scratch your back, you scratch mine 3. Corresponding mutual joint control: getting in sync 4. Conflicting mutual joint control: match or mismatch Two- and three-component patterns: 5. The prisoner's dilemma: me versus we 6. Threat: trading loyalty for justice 7. Chicken: death before dishonor 8. Hero: let's do it your way 9. Conjunctive problems: together we can do it 10. Disjunctive problems: either of us can do it 11. Asymmetric dependence: you're the boss Time-extended patterns: 12. Iterated prisoner's dilemma: united we stand, divided we fall 13. Investment: building for the future 14. Delay of gratification: resisting temptation Incomplete information situations 15. Negotiation: can we agree on a deal? 16. Encounters with strangers: lack of information about a partner 17. Joint decisions under uncertainty: bird in the hand 18. Twists of fate: coping with an uncertain future N-person Situations 19. Third parties: effects of an outsider 20. N-person prisoner's dilemma: tragedy of the commons Movement from one situation to another 21. Movement among situations: where do we go from here? Part III. Epilogue.

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Norbert L. Kerr

Papers

Group performance and decision making.

HARKing: Hypothesizing After the Results are Known:

Dispensability of member effort and group motivation losses: Free-rider effects

Motivation losses in small groups: a social dilemma analysis

An Atlas of Interpersonal Situations